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The reintegration of ex-combatants has become a major focus of cease-fire 
agreements in the past 20 years (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007).  However, the 
success of these programs remains elusive.  In this study, I interview members of 
Nuevo Horizonte, an intentional cooperative comprised of Guatemalan ex-guerrillas 
who fought during the 36 year civil war that ended in 1996.  These men and women 
reflect on two questions:  What was the process of reintegration like? and What 
advice do you have for others who are going through the process?  Using grounded 
theory, I develop a set of themes or strategies that these ex-combatants utilized 
during this transformative process to achieve a degree of successful reintegration:  
being united, being autonomous, being connected, being visionary, and being role 
models.  The collective voice of these ex-combatants calls into question conventional 
reintegration programs in two major ways.  Firstly, it challenges the premise that 
demobilization is necessary to maintain stability and peace in a post-conflict society 
by showcasing how their unity was integral to their reintegration experience.  
Secondly, it challenges the Development Model (where ex-combatants are viewed 
through a deficit lens and where outside experts deliver solutions) by highlighting 
how reliance on their own capacity engendered a sense of empowerment and 
resulted in their successful reintegration.  These ex-combatants believe their 
experience can be used to assist other ex-combatants who are reintegrating into 





Definitions and Key Words 
Ex-combatant refers to a former member of an armed group who took up arms to 
further a political or social cause.  Following a negotiated peace agreement, these 
men and women are usually collectively referred to by the term ex-combatant, not 
only by external agencies which have brokered peace deals, but also by the civilian 
population and by the ex-combatants themselves. Former rebels, guerrillas, and 
insurgents are labels that are often used to describe the ex-combatants.  Typically 
the term ex-combatant refers to insurgents or rebels, not to members of state armed 
forces.  
Post-conflict Society refers to a society (such as a nation state) that has recently 
ended a civil war.   A post-conflict society has achieved an end to direct violence, 
but is still struggling with indirect violence (such as injustice, fear) the members are 
collectively dealing with restitution, reconciliation and social justice.   
Reintegration refers to the process of ex-combatants making the transition back 
into a civilian life.  Typically this is part of a formal program of demobilization, 
disarmament and reintegration.  Reintegration for ex-combatants typically has 
political, economic, social and psychological aspects.   
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) is an official component 
of the peacekeeping process occurring in post-conflict situations around the globe.  
Through disarming and disbanding former rebel groups and assisting them to re-
join the larger society, the transition to lasting peace is thought to be measurably 
improved.      
Nuevo Horizonte is an intentional cooperative comprised of approximately 400 
Guatemalan ex-combatants and their families.  This community, located in the rural 
remote tropics of northern Guatemala, was formed after the signing of the 
Guatemalan Peace Accords, and represents the collective intentions of its members 
to re-integrate into Guatemalan civilian life. 
URNG, or National Revolutionary Union of Guatemala, was the umbrella organization 
of insurgent rebels who fought against the Guatemalan forces from 1960-1996. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
An Invitation to the Reader 
     I begin this paper on a personal note by sharing with the reader not only how and 
why this dissertation came to be written, but more importantly, why I believe it is 
relevant. Firstly, this paper is a life-long culmination of my personal interest in the 
ideas, theories and hopes about peace, which in my younger years was manifested 
in activism, volunteer work and self-learning, but has since transformed into a formal 
academic pursuit into the growing but still young discipline of Peace Studies.  In the 
Fall of 2007, I returned to university to take my doctoral course work in Peace 
Studies.  As part of my foray into studying Peace Studies, I, along with my wife and 
two sons, had the privilege of living in Guatemala for a year–a country where 14 
years ago we volunteered as international human rights observers to accompany 
thousands of Guatemalan refugees who were returning from southern Mexico 
following their exodus during the genocidal violence of the civil war.   
     When we returned in 2007, the community where we lived was called Nuevo 
Horizonte, which means New Horizon–an intentional cooperative in rural Guatemala 
comprised of former combatants from the Guatemalan civil war. The members of this 
community had taken up arms and joined the National Revolutionary Union of 
Guatemala (known by its Spanish acronym URNG) to fight against the Guatemalan 
army in the bloodiest and most violent civil war in the history of the western 
Hemisphere.  The signing of the Peace Accords in 1996 transformed their lives and 
initiated their engagement in the challenging process of reconstructing and re-
integrating into a new post-conflict Guatemalan society.  These men and women 
made the intentional decision to reintegrate into Guatemalan society collectively, 
rather than individually, and 14 years later, their successes and their challenges are 
readily seen in the community they have created out of the sparsely populated 
northern Guatemalan jungle.  My lived experience with these former guerrillas and 
their families generated a desire to better understand how soldiers and combatants 
make the transition from war to peace.  In this inquiry, I do not focus on their 
experience as guerrillas or insurgents, and do not offer an analysis of their decision 
to take up arms, or their underlying political and social struggle.  Rather, this paper 
is about their post-conflict story–their reintegration back into a civilian society.  This 
paper is about their story, but it is for all Guatemalans, and I believe, relevant to us 
all.  Therefore, I hope the reader will gain deep understanding and appreciation for 
the transition people make, collectively and individually, from war to peace, and at 
the same time understand why I, as a Canadian-born male whose mother tongue is 




     Secondly, my hope is that the reader gains a clear understanding of why the 
discipline of Peace Studies offers an important academic and practical perspective 
to our world.  Peace studies is multi-disciplinary by nature, and inherently normative 
in perspective–that is, Peace Studies is more than merely the pursuit of 
understanding war and human conflict.  Peace Studies is about learning how to 
promote peace and prevent war.  Peace Studies scholars assert that while human 
conflict is inevitable, a systematic inquiry into the nature of conflict will guide us to a 
better understanding of how to solve conflict without resorting to violence.  Although 
this dissertation explores only a small issue in the grand scheme of peace (the 
reintegration experience of ex-combatants following civil war) I believe these 
personal stories have the real potential to enlighten us all. 
     Thirdly, this inquiry into the reintegration experience of ex-combatants will offer 
the reader an example of research from a social constructionist perspective.  
Traditionally, the study of macro human conflict has taken a realist or liberalist 
approach (Nye, 2007, p. 7), focussing on the struggle (implicitly violent) over scarce 
resources or power (Avruch, 1998, p. 24). However, more recent constructionist 
approaches have challenged these traditional perspectives for failing to consider 
how identity, culture and meaning are inextricably linked to constructing conflict, 
and explicitly involved in the resolution or transformation as well.  Moreover, 
international conflict analysis over the past 20 years has embraced the importance of 
peace building following the termination of violent conflicts (Wallensteen, 2007), 
which naturally lends itself to a constructionist perspective of building 
understanding and dialogue.  Conflict is the construction of a special type of reality.  
Most of the time we assume and take for granted that we share a single reality with 
others, but we do not (Augsberger, 1992, p. 17).  Therefore, my hope is two-fold:  to 
build on the constructionist literature within the discipline of Peace Studies, and to 
offer social constructionist researchers an example of how grounded theory can be 
applied in the context of peace research.  
     In keeping with the commitment to situate this research project in the socio-
political and historical context in which the ex-combatants of Nuevo Horizonte came 
to be, I will briefly discuss my lived experience in the cooperative of Nuevo 
Horizonte, the historical background of the Guatemalan Civil War, the Peace 
Process, and the transition experience of the Guatemalan ex-combatants to present 
day, providing the reader with a deeper understanding of the macro forces 
undergirding the Guatemalan ex-combatant experience, and prepare the reader to 
consider the next three sections of this introduction:  Definition of the Issue, Purpose 




My Lived Experience in Nuevo Horizonte 
     From September to December 2007, I lived in the community of Nuevo Horizonte 
along with my wife and two sons, aged 10 and 12.  My wife, Mary Ann Morris, had 
previously established a relationship with this community, as a nursing instructor 
who had accompanied senior undergraduate nursing students to Guatemala to learn 
about the social and economic determinants of health in an international context.  
Nuevo Horizonte had established relationships with a number of North American 
post-secondary institutions and routinely hosted students who came to learn about 
Guatemala in general, and about their post-conflict journey specifically.   
     After having made annual visits for several years, Mary Ann formally asked the 
community if she and her family could live in their community for one year, as an 
opportunity to learn more about their history.  I was excited to engage in this 
experience as an opportunity to combine a lived experience with former combatants 
while studying theory about peace and conflict.  The community executive (Junta 
Directiva) agreed to our request.  They provided us with a rent-free house in 
exchange for our helping out in the community in mutually agreed-upon ways. 
     Our rent-free house was an adventure in itself.   All the houses in the community 
were virtually identical, as they had been built collectively and at the same time 10 
years earlier.   Although many now had small additions or other modifications, they 
all consisted of partial concrete block walls (with large open spaces to the outside) 
concrete and dirt floors, wooden shutters or clear plastic coverings for windows, and 
one outside tap.  Our house had been abandoned for a period of time and needed 
some repairs when we arrived, which we completed with the help of community 
members in about 3 weeks. 
     Our two sons attended the locally run school while continuing with their English 
curriculum from home.  Mary Ann spent her time helping out with some local 
projects while I engaged in my full-time course work in Peace Studies, which I 
completed through a distance program from the United States.  Internet access was 
unreliable in Nuevo Horizonte, so I normally commuted daily by bus to the nearest 
city, about 45 minutes away. 
     The community of Nuevo Horizonte is situated on the major highway that connects 
the northern Guatemala to the capital city.  The bus ride from Guatemala City takes 8 
to 10 hours.  The road is modern and in good repair, but often congested with 




green pastures, scrub and forests.  Much of the original tropical forests have been 
replaced by large scale ranching. 
     Nuevo Horizonte is unique as a Guatemalan village.  Its streets have been 
arranged in an orderly fashion and comprise about four city blocks by four city 
blocks, which are lined with identical looking houses, giving the village a unified 
and organized ambience.  The village is surrounded by 900 hectares of common 
land, which host fields for cattle, private garden patches, a cultivated pine forest (to 
be harvested in a generation) and a natural tropical forest that is home to two kinds 
of monkeys and the occasional jaguar and tiger (caught on film by night cameras), 
deer, armadillos, and a host of birds, insects and flora. A 45-minute walk from the 
village (but within the 900 hectares) brings one to a lagoon, which hosts a tilapia fish 
farm project and, according to all the locals, alligators that only come out at night.  
     Nuevo Horizonte has two community stores–one of which is run by the women’s 
collective.  In addition there are probably half a dozen smaller shops that operate 
privately out of people’s houses.  All the other businesses (a hostel, a restaurant, a 
wood shop) are community owned and operated. 
     In spite of being situated in a rural and sparsely populated area, I recall Nuevo 
Horizonte being very noisy at night.  I usually fell asleep to the grunting and 
growling of the howler monkeys, whose calls, it seemed, echoed for miles. In 
addition, every household had at least several roosters who insisted in alerting us all 
to any night time activity.  By 6 am, the entire community was awakened by the 
sunrise and by the loud grinding of the two gas-powered corn mills, which ground 
families’ corn for their day’s tortillas. 
     Unfortunately, our stay in Nuevo Horizonte was cut short due to my failing health.  
The harsh conditions (humidity, heat, insects, and dietary changes) exacerbated a 
pre-existing chronic health condition.  Our anticipated one-year stay ended after 
only 4 months when we relocated to an urban setting in the temperate highlands 
about 8 hours away.  Our relationship with Nuevo Horizonte continued from a 
distance as we occasionally returned to visit and hosted members in our home who 
were travelling to the city.   
     Through my 4-month experience, I learned a great deal about the community of 
Nuevo Horizonte.  I came to know the men, women and children of this community as 
individuals and as friends.  I also came to know some men and women on a personal 




     I came to understand not only their idealized and heroic visions and aspirations, 
but also their realities–shortcomings and challenges that face all communities and 
societies throughout the world.  As we lived together, the people of Nuevo Horizonte 
became more real to me than could have ever happened only through the typical 
interactions of formal research, such as interviews and short visits.                  
Background Information 
     Guatemala is a nation of contrasts.  Its natural beauty and wealth, which includes 
rich agricultural land and natural mineral resources, are immediately visible.  
However, Guatemala’s riches are contrasted with its poverty rates that are among 
the highest in the western hemisphere.  Guatemala’s poor, which includes a 
disproportionate number of the country’s majority indigenous population, is further 
juxtaposed against a minority wealthy class that has remained essentially intact and 
entrenched throughout Guatemala’s past 5 centuries of post-colonial history.  In fact, 
disparity in wealth between Guatemala’s rich and poor remains one of the highest in 
the world (Jonas, 2000).   
     As Guatemala’s agricultural industry continued to prosper and grow in the last 
century, its political and economic power became consolidated in the hands of a 
minority wealthy elite (Jonas, 2000).  The large plantations of export crops, such as 
sugar and coffee, were worked and harvested in near slave-like conditions, mostly 
by the indigenous subsistence farmers, whose own meagre plots of land were not 
sustainable in providing enough of a livelihood to support their families.  Attempts at 
agrarian reform were violently repressed with the assistance of the United States, 
who had major economic interests in Guatemala’s export agriculture industry (Jonas, 
2000, p. 19).   
     However, conditions changed dramatically in the 1940s, with Guatemala’s first 
freely elected president, Juan Arevalo, who along with his democratically elected 
successor, Jacobo Arbenz, ushered in a period of land reform and peasant rights.  
This “Guatemalan Spring” was short-lived.  In 1954, a CIA-backed coup toppled the 
government of President Jacobo Arbenz, and marked the beginning of over 3 
decades of right-wing military rule.  Democracy returned in the 1980s in a nominal 
sense, with the advent of elections that met minimal international democratic 
election standards, but were distinguished by the dominance of ultra-conservative 
parties, repression and intimidation, and very poor voter turnout (Jonas, 2000).   
     In common with other recent civil wars in Central America, the Guatemalan 




States and the Soviet Union (Mamdani, 2005, p. 11).  The rebels were labelled as 
Marxist, and American support, couched in moral and religious terminology 
(Mamdani, 2005, p. 111) was delivered under the rubric of saving its southern 
neighbours and allies from the evils of communism.  The United States’ major 
economic interests in Guatemala, which dated back to the 19th century, were 
seriously threatened by any hint of political and economic reform.       
     It was during this epoch of repressive military domination that in 1960, an 
insurgent movement began through the efforts of disgruntled members of the 
military, urban intellectuals and students (Jonas, 2000).  The Cuban revolution had 
just occurred, and members of this newly formed movement looked upon Cuba as a 
model for bringing land reform, political, social and economic rights to all the 
citizens of Guatemala.   
     The armed insurgence was not the only response to the worsening social and 
economic conditions in Guatemala.  During the 70s and 80s, the Catholic Church in 
Guatemala, largely in response to Vatican II and a renewed orientation to 
preferential treatment for the poor, reoriented its mandate and pastoral work to 
focus on the people of the poverty-stricken western highlands, the majority of whom 
were indigenous (Falla, 1992).  The Church began to purchase land and organize 
agricultural cooperatives, which provided many communities with the ability to 
become self-sufficient for the first time since the Spanish conquest 500 years 
previous.  This, however, had the effect of drying up the cheap labour force for the 
country’s large estates that produced cash crops for export.  In light of the Cold War 
rhetoric of this time, these cooperatives, and the Catholic leaders who organized 
them, were labelled subversive and communist by the Guatemalan military and 
economic elite.  The results were tragic.  In the name of fighting communism, the 
Guatemalan Army responded with untold brutality.  At the height of the military 
repression in the early 1980s, more than 600 massacres were carried out (many of 
which consisted of destroying entire villages including torturing and killing all the 
men, women and children) in the military’s official “Scorched Earth” policy (Falla, 
1992, p. vii).    
     Two national leaders stand out in the history of Guatemala’s repression:  General 
Fernando Lucas Garcia and General Efrain Rios Montt.  Both came to power as 
military rulers and their legacy, considered the most brutal in Guatemala’s history, 
lasted from 1978 to 1983.  Lucas Garcia has since died while living in exile in 
Venezuela, while Rios Montt is alive and well, and was recently re-elected in the fall 




     As a result of the extreme and violent repression of the early 80s, tens of 
thousands of rural indigenous subsistence farmers (campesinos) fled their villages to 
Mexico to seek refuge.  Hundreds of thousands more became internally displaced 
within Guatemala.  Most of these people had experienced untold trauma losing 
family members to torture, disappearance and death, losing their land, animals and 
crops.  It is out of this population that the Guatemalan insurgence, now called the 
URNG, received a new wave of support.  Some of these campesinos, who had lost 
their families and livelihood and who had witnessed the systematic repression of 
non-violent organizations such as the Catholic Church, the Mutual Support Group 
(known by its Spanish acronym of GAM for Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo), Union of 
Campesinos (known by its Spanish acronym of CUC for El Comite de Unidad 
Campesina) among many others, determined that armed struggle was their only 
alternative.  This is the story of the members of Nuevo Horizonte–subsistence 
farmers, many of whom had gained more than a decade of experience in the 
cooperative movement of the 70s, now reluctantly taking up a violent struggle 
against a brutal military regime. 
     It must be noted, however, that throughout the history of the URNG, the numbers 
and actual military prowess were fairly insignificant; at the signing of the Peace 
Accords in 1996, there were only approximately 3600 combatants (Hauge & 
Thoresen, 2007).  According  to the United Nations-sponsored Truth Commission 
(known by its Spanish Acronym of CEH for Comisión para el Esclarecimiento 
Histórico) which was published in 1999, the Guatemalan military and its allied forces 
were deemed responsible for 93% of the war crimes and human rights abuses, while 
the insurgent forces of the URNG were held accountable for only 3%.  This wide 
disparity in responsibility is a testament to the excessive use of force by the 
Guatemalan army (supported militarily at various points by the United States and 
Israel) to counter an insurgency that was never very powerful.  The blame for the 
massacres, officially labelled as genocide by the United Nations report, rested 
almost entirely at the feet of the government forces and its allies.  
     By the early 90s, however, global forces, such as the end of the Cold War and a 
widening global search for additional stable economic markets, brought external 
pressure to end the Civil War.  Negotiations culminated on December 28, 1996, 
when the Guatemalan government and the URNG signed the final of 12 Peace 
Accords, which ushered in a much-anticipated official cease-fire.  The Guatemalan 
Peace Accords were a testament to the tireless efforts of the representatives of both 
sides of the struggle, plus the negotiating and mediating skills of third parties, 
including representatives from Norway, Mexico, the United States, Venezuela, 




Perhaps the success in sustaining the cease-fire was the agreement, or at least the 
promise, of the Guatemalan government to address a number of key issues that 
spoke to the very core of the causes underpinning the Civil War.  These issues 
included recognition of the human rights of the Indigenous Peoples, agrarian and 
socio-economic development, the creation of a civil society built on the foundations 
of a culture of peace, and the establishment of a truth commission (Secretaria de la 
Paz, 2008). In other words, far beyond the agreement of a cease-fire (negative 
peace) the accords prescribed the steps agreed upon that would foster Guatemala’s 
transition to a country of “positive peace,” a nation built on the principles of social 
justice.  The specifics of the documents were impressive and included the 
operationalization, complete with timelines, of the dissolution of the Military Police, 
the reduction of the size of the Guatemalan Army by 33%, the reorganization of 
military training from offensive counterinsurgency to peace keeping, and processes 
for the inclusion of poorly represented groups, such as women and the Indigenous 
majority, in decision-making (Secretaria de la Paz, 2008).   The Guatemalan Peace 
Accords constituted a truly negotiated settlement (Jonas, 2000, p. 33), rather than a 
victor’s imposition of terms upon the defeated, and included major concessions from 
both sides.  However, upon reflection, it is unfortunately obvious that the reforms 
promised remain overwhelmingly unfulfilled (Crandall, 2004). 
     The Peace Accords also set the terms for the disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration of the ex-combatants, commonly referred to as DDR, increasingly a 
crucial element in the drafting of peace accords throughout the globe. The URNG, 
the former rebel organization, was given legal status as a political party according to 
Accord Number Ten, further attesting to the commitment of the accords to open the 
way for the journey from military to civil society (Secretaria de la Paz, 2008). 
     The process of their disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 
received a great deal of assistance from outside agencies such as the United States, 
the European Union and the United Nations (Hauge & Thoresen, 2007, p. 23) and 
included, among other things, training in a trade such as agriculture, construction or 
small business.  The URNG members were divided into two groups: those who had 
families, land or some form of livelihood to which to return and those who had 
neither family nor assets within civilian society.  The latter group amounted to a 
significant minority and represented people whose family members had been 
massacred and in many cases, whose entire villages had been completely 
destroyed.  Of these, a large majority wished to re-integrate into Guatemalan society 
collectively.  Borrowing from their experience of forming Catholic-based 
cooperatives in rural Guatemala in the 1970s and 1980s, they envisioned and 




purchase of collectively-held land and the establishment of legally recognized 
cooperatives where they would have the opportunity to create a social, political and 
economic model of life based on the principles of equality.  This dream was realized 
by many when three separate collectives were established throughout the country.  
However, due to many factors, two have disbanded and only one remains (T. 
Figueroa, personal communication, December 12, 2007).  The remaining 
cooperative of Nuevo Horizonte (New Horizon) has approximately 400 residents and 
although it is struggling under the burden of a nearly $1,000,000 mortgage (no funds 
were made available to the ex-combatants to purchase their land), they continue to 
steadfastly journey to enact their vision of social, political and economic equality set 
within Guatemalan civilian society, 14 years after putting down their weapons.   
     The cooperative began as an abandoned estate of 900 hectares with no 
permanent housing or infrastructure.  According to founding members, the first few 
years were extremely difficult, as people had no money or other resources to 
transform the tropical pastureland and forest into a viable agricultural operation.  
Long days of hard labour produced very little in terms of short term rewards and 
promises of government support went largely unfulfilled.  However, 14 years later, 
the results of their-long term vision and hard labour, coupled with financial backing 
from international governmental and non-governmental organizations, are readily 
visible.  I witnessed the results personally when I lived in Nuevo Horizonte.  Just a 
few examples of the cooperative’s successes include the following:  local potable 
water system, an eco-tourism project that attracts international visitors, a restaurant 
and hostel, a fish farm, livestock, fruit and vegetable production, a chicken and egg 
project, a reforestation project, a community health centre, library, woodworking 
shop, daycare and their own independent high school.  While individual wealth, in 
the form of personal material possessions, is not readily visible, their collective 
wealth is.  The people of Nuevo Horizonte are very proud of their collective 
accomplishments. 
     Nuevo Horizonte, however, is a paradoxical microcosm of the current larger 
Guatemalan society.  In spite of its social and economic progress, the same cannot 
be said so readily for the country as a whole.  The social, political and economic 
disparity, which formed the basis for the Civil War in the first place, seems to have 
only been consolidated in the post-conflict period (Paris, 2004). 
     Within the context of Guatemala, the cultural gap or relational distance that exists 
between the indigenous and non-indigenous or “Ladino” subcultures is significant.  
The underlying variable, to which all discussions of power and poverty in Guatemala 




Guatemala’s ruling elite that is undergirded by racism (Arzu, 1992, p. 14). It is 
widely contended that the country is ruled and controlled by an elite consisting of 
approximately 150 families (Briscoe, 2007).  Although the Civil War has ended, this 
oligarchy continues unabated, so firmly entrenched that democratic initiatives to 
date have not altered it (Arzu, 1992, p. 14).  Although the Civil War adversely 
impacted the nation’s poor, indigenous, and in some cases, even members of the 
middle class through counterinsurgent state terror, the ruling class remained 
essentially untouched.  Therefore, while the peace accords have brought some relief 
from human rights violations and minimally improved social conditions related to 
poverty and discrimination to the majority, it did not do so at the expense of the 
ruling minority. 
     The following table provides an overview of historical events in Guatemala 
leading up to the creation of the cooperative Nuevo Horizonte (information for this 
table was gathered from community presentations and participant interviews, as 





Table 1.1:  A Brief Outline of Guatemala’s History, as it Relates to Nuevo 
Horizonte 
1954 CIA-backed coup occurs in Guatemala, ending a 10-year 
period of democracy and land reform, and ushering in a 
40-year period of political repression characterized by 
military rule. 
1960 Civil war begins.  Insurgent forces largely comprised of 
disgruntled military, urban intelligentsia. 
1960s and 1970s Cooperative movement starts in the Guatemalan 
highlands bringing self-sufficiency to many of the 
subsistence farmers of the western highlands. 
1980s Height of military repression.  Over 600 massacres, 
primarily concentrated in the western highlands, occur.  
Tens of thousands flee to Mexico as refugees.  
Cooperatives are particularly targeted, as are local 
Catholic priests and lay leaders.  Insurgent forces 
(URNG) are now joined by many indigenous farmers 
from the western highlands whose families were either 
killed or who fled, and whose farms and cooperatives 
were destroyed. 
1985-1996 The URNG and government forces engage in the Peace 
Process, producing 12 separate accords, culminating in 
the cease-fire (Final Accord), on December 29, 1996, 
which ended the Civil War. 
January 1997 to February  
1998 
United Nations Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) carries 
out formal disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration process for Guatemalan insurgent forces 
members.  
February 1998 Nuevo Horizonte Cooperative is established in the 
northern province of El Peten, consisting of 400 ex-
combatants, including their children (130 families).  The 
land is purchased collectively, and consists of an 
abandoned estate of 900 hectares. The members of this 
cooperative crossed ethnic divisions and includes 
people of Mam, Quiche, Kek’che and Ladino (mixed 
indigenous and European) ancestry. 
1998-2010 Nuevo Horizonte is transformed from an abandoned 




includes day care, primary and high schools, eco-
tourism projects, restaurant, hostel, poultry and egg 
production, fish farm, tree farm, cattle ranching and 
intensive market garden vegetable farming. 
Sources:  Gurriaran, 2010; United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala, 2004; 
Figueroa-Acetuna, 2009, and participant interviews. 
Definition of the Issue 
     In the previous section, I provided a general overview of the history of the 
Guatemalan Civil War, its antecedent factors, and the subsequent peace process.  
From this broad picture, I then focussed on the specific legacy of the insurgent ex-
combatants who collectively re-integrated into Guatemalan civilian life through the 
cooperative of Nuevo Horizonte.  This background story brings us to the main issue 
of this study:  How do ex-combatants make the transition from being a 
soldier/guerrilla to a civilian?  
     There is little in the literature that comes directly from the lived experiences of 
ex-combatants, particularly in their voice as they define successes and challenges.  
My review of the literature has led me to the conclusion that almost all of the 
literature is written from the perspective of First World experts (for example, see 
Boas & Hatloy, 2008; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007; Metsola, 2006).  We know that 
the challenges are many, but we know little about how ex-combatants face those 
challenges, and what they do to address or overcome them.  As there is growing 
attention from international and non-governmental peace building organizations on 
ex-combatant reintegration, it is necessary to build the research literature on this 
important topic.  In addition, considering that Guatemala represents only one of 
many nations that is struggling to achieve positive peace following a violent conflict, 
lessons to be learned from the Guatemalan experience have global implications. 
     While an analysis of a post-conflict society such as Guatemala could be 
undertaken from a number of different perspectives, I am particularly interested in 
an inquiry into the challenges of the journey of Guatemala’s people to re-build their 
nation, through the lens of the ex-combatants.  I posit that their worldviews, shaped 
by their unique role in Guatemala’s history, have not been adequately understood, 
and that a scholarly inquiry into their narrative may offer a potentially important 
perspective to the current literature on post-conflict societies and the reintegration 




     Recent history gives many examples of post-conflict societies addressing the 
question of ex-combatants following civil war.  Demobilization, Disarmament and 
Reintegration (referred to as DDR) of ex-combatants following armed civil conflict 
has become an increasingly common strategy, and in recent years, the United 
Nations has adopted official guidelines for the implementation of DDR (United 
Nations, 2000).  While the mechanisms for Demobilization and Disarmament of 
troops are fairly finite and straightforward, the reintegration of ex-combatants is 
much more difficult (Hamber, 2007).  The research literature on this topic is growing, 
and attests to the many challenges and failures that ex-combatants and those 
facilitating their reintegration have experienced in various countries which have 
recently ended civil conflict.  In light of a fairly extensive body of negative literature 
regarding the process and enactment of DDR, the positive reintegration of the ex-
combatants of Guatemala’s insurgent forces (the URNG) in the cooperative of Nuevo 
Horizonte is unique and has been deemed a success by many in the international 
community, and by the ex-combatants themselves (United Nations Verification 
Mission in Guatemala, 2004).  It is my hope that lessons can be learned from their 
story and from their journey. 
Purpose of the Study 
     The purpose of this study is to elicit thoughts and ideas from the ex-combatants 
who are living in Nuevo Horizonte, Guatemala, about how they as ex-combatants 
have made the transition back into civil society.  My hope is that by using a 
grounded theory approach, a mid-range theory can be generated that may offer 
greater understanding about the core phenomenon (the ex-combatants’ 
reintegration), causal factors, strategies and consequences.  Though generalizability 
of the results to other post-conflict contexts is not directly possible, nonetheless, my 
hope is that the methodology used and the understanding gained will be 
transferrable and useful with other similar groups of people.  
Research Question  
     My research inquiry is broken down into the following two questions: 
1. How did you make the transition back into civilian life?   
2. What advice do you want to give to other ex-combatants in other countries 




     My goal is to elicit rich, substantial and relevant information by asking these two 
basic questions to a selected group of Guatemalan ex-combatants who live in the 
Nuevo Horizonte Cooperative. 
Summary 
     In this introductory chapter, I have explained my own interest and connection to 
the ex-combatants of Nuevo Horizonte, Guatemala, and subsequently briefly 
described the historical context in which these guerrillas engaged in an armed 
struggle and subsequently agreed to a cease-fire.  Following this, I explained the 
purpose of this inquiry, its significance, and finally, put forward two interrelated 





Chapter 2:  Review of the Literature 
Introduction 
     I begin the literature review with a description of the context in which it was 
written.  Prior to beginning my formal literature search, I drew my understanding 
about the reintegration of ex-combatants from the following:  having lived in Nuevo 
Horizonte for 4 months with a group of Guatemalan ex-combatants, and having 
familiarity with the literature on the reintegration of ex-combatants in Guatemala.  
Although incomplete, it provided the impetus to learn more.  However, I was faced 
with a disconnect between seemingly opposing thoughts on the nature and the 
success of the reintegration of the ex-combatants who now live in Nuevo Horizonte.  
While some researchers referred to Guatemala as a success story of reintegration 
(United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala, 2004) others emphasized the 
challenges and failures (Hauge & Thoresen, 2007).       
     I believe it is important to address the question of whose standards are utilized for 
measuring the success or failure of a reintegration program.  Economic standards 
(often used as a marker for success) vary greatly throughout the world and 
perspectives between local ex-combatants and foreign researchers may be 
divergent.  For example, from a foreigner’s perspective, the community of Nuevo 
Horizonte appears to be, by northern standards, poor.  Housing is crowded, 
vulnerable to insects, rain and flooding, cold and heat.  Although most houses have 
electricity, many families struggle to pay the bill.  Floors are often dirt, and running 
water is available for only 6 hours per day, via one outdoor tap per household.  This 
raises two issues:  perhaps the story of Nuevo Horizonte is somehow different from 
other stories of ex-combatants around the world, and perhaps evaluations of 
reintegration programs and strategies are not measuring success with precise tools.  
My hope is that this review of the literature will address these preliminary questions, 
as well as provide a knowledge foundation for the methodology and analysis used in 
this study.  
     My purpose in this chapter is to review the relevant literature in order to gain a 
better understanding of reintegration strategies and outcomes from around the 
world.  By critically examining what knowledge and ideas have already been 
established in the field of reintegration of ex-combatants, I hope to direct this study 
in a way to address any gaps and inconsistencies in this knowledge.  I hope to 
synthesize various theoretical concepts, identify possible gaps, and determine how 




limitation to the current understanding, and therefore it is necessary to pursue this 
research topic. 
     Although some grounded theorists advocate delaying a review of the research 
literature until data collection and analysis are completed (in order to not be driven 
by existing ideas and constructs) (Charmaz, 2006, p. 6), others acknowledge the 
value in calling attention to gaps or bias in existing knowledge and thus providing a 
rationale for the study purpose (May, 1986, p. 149).  I have decided to conduct a 
thorough review of the literature prior to my data collection, in order to direct this 
current study in a manner that will render it as relevant as possible.  As Gergen 
(2009) states, learning about existing knowledge can potentially open new and 
exciting vistas of possibility, rather than limit us to the constraints of the existing 
scientific “cultural constructs” (p. 58).   
     I begin this chapter with a discussion of the discipline of Peace Studies and how 
this study fits into this broader academic discipline.  Considering the axiological 
assumptions of this inquiry, a discussion on how this topic relates to Peace Studies 
will help to contextualize the purpose as well as the discussion and conclusion.  
Following this, I divide the review of the literature into five sections.  In the first 
section, Peace Building and Reintegration of Former Combatants: The Current 
Global Context, I examine the literature on recent and current global trends, 
including the changing nature of war and peace building (along with an analysis of 
current discourse on various models of justice), and the theoretical challenges which 
post-conflict societies (and therefore ex-combatants) face during the post-conflict 
phase.  In the second section entitled: What Does Successful Reintegration Look 
Like, I review how DDR research and evaluation describe success.  This section 
exposes the difficulties in measuring a concept (such as reintegration) that may 
initially appear straightforward.  In the third section, Reintegration and Rational 
Reconciliation (a title based on categories developed by Stovel, 2008), I examine the 
reintegration process from a quantitative, or a rational or materialist paradigm.  
Under this heading, I examine the literature that focuses on measurable indicators, 
such as reintegration in terms of economic performance and the re-occurrence of 
civil war.  In the fourth section, entitled Reintegration and Sentient Reconciliation 
(from Stovel, 2008), I discuss the concepts of reintegration that move beyond the 
material perspective of reintegration and examine theoretical issues such as social 
psychological reintegration, identity formation and transformation (both from the 
perspective of the ex-combatant and from external perspectives), and the processes 
of forgiveness and reconciliation.  And in the final section, I summarize the major 




and conclude by offering a justification for the current content and process of this 
study.   
Peace Studies:  A Foundation for Studying Reintegration of Ex-Combatants 
     Peace Studies is a relatively new discipline, normative and trans-disciplinary in 
nature, integrating broad perspectives ranging from psychology and sociology to 
political science and religious studies.  Our understanding of war and peace has 
shifted over the past 50 years.  We now view peace as something more than the 
mere absence of military combat (negative peace); we include the concept of 
positive peace; that is, eradicating structural violence (attaining social justice for all)  
as articulated by Galtung (1969).  Thus, peace research has also evolved from a 
study on the prevention of war and arms control to include a study on how to 
transform oppressive systems which cause widespread poverty and suffering 
(Jeong, 2000, p. 42).  Thus, the goal of peace research is much broader than merely 
trying to prevent or stop military conflicts.  Understanding the reintegration process 
of former combatants is part of the new interpretive analysis, which is predicated 
upon consideration of the context of wider social and cultural structures, relations 
and processes (Jeong, 2000, p. 45).    
     Understanding the complex nature of interpersonal conflict is essential to working 
towards peace and justice.  A materialist approach emphasises conflict as a matter of 
competition over scarce resources (Avruch, 1998).  Coupled with the realist 
paradigm that dominated international conflict analysis during the Cold War, 
theorists essentially ignored cultural and social-psychological underpinnings of 
conflict.  Avruch, however, posits that conflict, even at the international level, has 
social and cognitive components that require what he refers to as a cultural 
approach.  Lederach (1995) adds to this by saying:  “The psychological and even 
cultural features often drive and sustain the conflict more than the substantive 
issues” (p. 13).  Understanding the connection between conflict and culture is not 
merely a question of sensitivity or of awareness, but a far more profound adventure 
of discovery of the accumulated shared knowledge that is common to a group of 
people (Lederach, p. 10).   Lederach’s discussion leads us to a social constructionist 
paradigm, which explains how shared culture and meaning play a pivotal role in 
constructing conflict.  Accordingly, construction of social meaning lies at the heart of 
how human conflict is created.    
A constructionist view suggests that people act on the basis of the meaning 
things have for them.  Meaning is created through shared and accumulated 




of creating and expressing as well as interpreting and handling conflict.  
Understanding conflict and developing appropriate models of handling it will 
necessarily be rooted in, and must respect and draw from, the cultural 
knowledge of a people. (Lederach, p. 10)   
     By emphasizing social constructionism as a foundational assumption of this 
inquiry, I justify why an understanding of the ex-combatants’ reintegration process 
necessitates hearing their perspective.   
     Peace Studies is a normative discipline, that is, one that moves beyond describing 
how things are to suggesting how things should be.  However, articulating and 
theorizing how things should be is in itself a socially constructed enterprise.  Who 
decides what the ideal is?  Since Peace Studies began as a formal discipline in a 
Western, European model of social sciences (Jeong, 2000), it is subject to criticism of 
being Eurocentric (Berkowitz, 2002).  Gergen (2009) acknowledges that scientific 
theory does not spring solely from observation, but from the scientist’s social group 
(p. 23), and that scientific thought and research therefore is constructed in a manner 
in which the proponents benefit (p. 14).  Peace Studies literature in general and 
research on DDR specifically, needs to be scrutinized in terms of who is determining 
the research agendas and in particular, who is establishing the goals and objectives 
of DDR programming.  It is therefore necessary to note that none of the literature 
from which this review is drawn, was written by an individual or group of ex-
combatants.  On the contrary, the literature is dominated by scholars and 
professionals from so-called advanced Western nations.    
Peace Building and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: The Current Global 
Context 
     The reintegration of the ex-combatants of Nuevo Horizonte, and indeed all ex-
combatants, operates on both the individual and group level.  Hence, the factors that 
influence this transition range from the intrapersonal to the group and beyond.  
Because the reintegration of ex-combatants in general is managed by foreign and 
international organizations, global and international forces and trends potentially 
have a significant impact on the way in which reintegration programs are 
operationalized.  Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998) ask the important question:  how 
do macro level events affect the individual?  The following section reviews the 
literature on recent trends in large scale conflict (and particularly the post-conflict 




     Although popular perception may suggest otherwise, the last few decades of 
human history have seen a dramatic decline in almost all forms of armed conflict, 
including civil war (Human Security Report, 2005, p. 146; Wallensteen, 2007).  The 
reasons for this decline have been attributed to the end of the Cold War and post-
colonial independence struggles (Nye, 2007), decreased ethnic discrimination, 
more democracy, and less poverty (Human Security Report, 2005, p. 146).  In 
addition, armed conflicts currently have far fewer deaths than those in previous 
decades, although it is important to stress that casualties have largely shifted from 
those of combatant deaths to civilian deaths (Human Security Report, p. 2).   
     Perhaps a much more significant trend, however, is the way in which our global 
collective attitude and understanding of armed conflict has changed.  It is 
noteworthy that intergroup conflicts today are rarely resolved through achieving 
victory via the unconditional surrender by one side in the conflict (Maoz & Eidelson, 
2007, p. 1476).  With the development of international organizations such as the 
United Nations, there has been a much greater emphasis on diplomacy and 
prevention (Evans, 2009; Human Security Report, 2005; Wallensteen, 2007).  
Furthermore, the role of United Nations and other bodies has transitioned from one 
initially concerned with monitoring and maintaining cease-fires to one concerned 
with reconstruction and even reconciliation (Evans, 2009, p. 191), and focusing more 
practically on the causes of armed conflict, such as poverty (Evans, 2009, p. 199). 
Reintegration of ex-combatants has grown out of this shift in orientation.  Kofi Annan, 
a former United Nations Secretary General, stated that the aim of peace building is to 
create the conditions necessary for a sustainable peace in war-torn societies (United 
Nations, 2000) so that a peace would endure long after the departure of the peace 
builders themselves, and contended that peace is more complex than the absence of 
armed conflict. 
     The demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of the former members 
of the URNG have been a critical component of the peace accords and follow 
international peacebuilding efforts over the last 20 years.  Formal DDR operations of 
the United Nations began in 1989, and have since figured prominently in post-
conflict rebuilding in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Balkans (Humphreys & 
Weinstein, 2007, p. 532).  While the United Nations proclaim that DDR programs 
have had remarkable success, as measured by the associated political stability, 
prevention of a recurrence of armed conflict (United Nations, 2000, p. 1) and 
improved economic outcomes (Pugel, 2007), others challenge these assertions by 
arguing that there is little empirical evidence to support the premise that 
internationally funded programs facilitate reintegration (Humphries & Weinstein, 




programs, they have grown in both popularity and magnitude.  By 2005, over 
1,000,000 former combatants had participated in DDR programs in approximately 20 
countries worldwide (Theidon, 2009).  A testimony perhaps to the recent global shift 
in commitment to lasting peace and a more comprehensive rebuilding of post-
conflict societies has been our current collective willingness to pay for such 
programs for the financial cost has been significant.  For example, costs to enrol an 
ex-combatant in a DDR program are 4.7 times the average income of his/her 
respective country.  This sobering figure may also attest to the level of stark poverty 
found in the majority of countries where DDR programs have been offered to date 
(Theidon, 2009, p. 2).     
     In the next section I present a detailed analysis of the benefits and challenges of 
DDR programs; however, it is necessary to first review the larger context in which 
DDR programs are implemented.  As stated already, a growing global culture of 
collaboration and conflict prevention has formed the foundation for DDR programs.  
This, no doubt, is a positive trend for reasons already discussed.  However, some 
researchers query the underlying political ideology behind DDR programs and 
question how these fit into larger geo-political and economic forces.  To begin with, 
some scholars assert that DDR programs are part of overall strategies to improve 
democratic processes in post-conflict societies.   Paris (2004) challenges this 
assertion and suggests that the peacebuilding activities of the United Nations and the 
development wings of wealthy Western nations ultimately serve to foster conditions 
amenable to the goals of neo-liberalism and related economic and political 
aspirations, thus ultimately supporting the vested interests of these same donor 
nations.   
     Paris labels this new peacemaking formula the Liberal Peace Thesis.  The premise 
of the Liberal Peace Thesis is that liberal democracies tend to be more peaceful, 
both domestically and internationally.  Stated more simply, liberal democracies do 
not go to war with one another.  This assertion has been corroborated by others 
(Rosato, 2003) and perhaps satirically illustrated by Klein (2007), who contends that 
no two countries with McDonalds franchises have ever engaged in armed conflict 
with each other.  According to the thesis, transformation of post-conflict societies 
into liberal democracies leads to the creation of new market economies, that 
subsequently ensure  lasting peace, the commonly sought goal of all parties 
following a civil war.  Democracy therefore goes hand-in-hand with market 
liberalization by reducing trade barriers, downsizing government intrusion into the 




     Paris discounts this particular orientation to peacemaking by examining the 
progression of 14 recent post-conflict societies from around the world (including 
Guatemala), where he concludes that there is very little evidence to support the 
Liberal Peace Thesis.  Reasons are complex, but include some fundamental issues, 
such as the fact that liberalization increases competition in societies which can be 
ultimately conflict inducing in post-war states dealing with longstanding erosion of 
infrastructure, laws, and civil institutions (p. 45).  A quick shift from autocracy to 
democracy is often accompanied by increased, not decreased, civil violence 
(Fearon & Laitin, 2003), and an attendant exacerbation of the disparity between rich 
and poor.  Paris (2004) notes that peacebuilding efforts in Guatemala have helped 
only a very small portion of the population (p. 113) and furthermore, have  
reproduced the very conditions that led to the conflict in the first place, namely  
social and economic disparity (p. 114).  Jonas (2000) concurs with this position by 
concluding that post-conflict economic trends in Guatemala have actually 
undermined democracy rather than supported it (p. 219).  Garibay (2006) 
convincingly confirms these concerns in his analysis of post-conflict El Salvador, 
where neo-liberal economic policies (reduction of government intervention, 
decreasing trade barriers and increasing natural competition) have led to a 
deepening of disparity (p. 478).   
     One is left with the question of how the Liberal Peace Thesis, of which neo-
liberalism is the cornerstone, has impacted the development and implementation of 
DDR programs throughout the world.  The literature does not address this question 
directly.  However, there is ample evidence that the peacemaking programs 
promulgated by the United Nations and Western nations have directed the 
international post-conflict rebuilding efforts for the past 20 years (Paris, 2004) and 
that DDR programs have become an integral component of this work.  The concerns 
are as follows:  the inherent challenges of DDR programs may be related to the 
underlying and overarching ideology upon which they are based, and the 
challenges of reintegration for ex-combatants may be exacerbated by limited 
choice regarding participation in programs whose ideology they do not share.     
     In the discussion thus far, I have argued that the context in which DDR programs 
are conducted is greatly influenced by global economic and political forces, and 
significantly shaped by the Liberal Peace Doctrine.  In addition to these influences 
are a variety of issues that specifically challenge the post-conflict society’s journey 
from violence to sustainable peace.  Brewer (2003) has determined a number of 
these challenges, such as the tension between seeking peace and seeking justice, as 
well as the tension between seeking truth and seeking reconciliation.  An additional 




brutality of the armed conflict and subsequently manifests in different forms in the 
post-conflict phase that include criminal violence (Goldstein, 2007; Morales-
Alvarado, 2008) and domestic violence (Alston, 2007; Briscoe, 2007; Rehn & Sirleaf, 
2002, p. 11)    
     The transition from a conflict to post-conflict period is fluid and permeable.  
Although direct combat may have ceased, there is a period of time in which the 
language of the people remains determined by the conflict (Bucaille, 2006) and a 
collective memory of the events of the conflict dominate.  It has proven to be a major 
challenge to eradicate violence despite a resolution of the outstanding conflict, for 
ample evidence suggests that post-conflict societies are often burdened with simply 
a new form of violence.  For example, 12 years after the end of the Civil War, 
violence within Guatemala shifted substantially.  In some ways the nation has 
changed dramatically, and in other ways, it is disturbingly similar.  Today there is no 
longer an armed conflict being waged by the guerrillas, army, paramilitary forces or 
government dictated civil defence patrols.  However, in its place there is rampant 
fear of random criminal violence.  Guatemala’s chief Human Rights Officer 
summarizes Guatemala’s current reality by saying that although the civil war is over, 
the country now faces a more difficult, undeclared war (Morales-Alvarado, 2008).  
Political violence has been replaced by criminal violence, whereby Guatemala 
currently has the third highest murder rate in the western hemisphere (Cereser 
2007), unprecedented violence of all forms against women (Frenkiel, 2006), gang 
violence and rising drug related violence.  One might conclude that the source of 
fear has simply been replaced from fear of the army and/or guerrillas to fear of 
criminals.  Goldstein (2007) chronicles a common shift in focus from “communists to 
criminals” throughout Latin America since the end of the Cold War.  A recent human 
rights opinion poll determined that almost two thirds of Guatemalans listed security 
related to crime as the nation’s number one priority while less than 1% listed 
political human rights (Masilla-Wever, Office of the Procurador of Human Rights, 
Guatemala City, personal communication, May 12, 2008).  The shift from political 
human rights to security can be seen in the sometimes violent reactions of ordinary 
citizens to criminals, in response to the perceived inaction of the state to protect 
them.  Horrific acts of violence, including lynchings, burning persons alive and other 
forms of gross violations of human rights are brought upon petty criminals in 
Guatemala as vigilante justice.  Even Guatemala’s network of human rights offices, 
located in each of the 22 departments, is receiving more complaints related to gangs 
and delinquency than to the political human rights abuses that were rampant just 




     Some suggest that this anomalous upsurge in violence is directly related to the 
failed reintegration of ex-combatants (Bougarel, 2006, p. 486).  This may be linked to 
learned patterns of aggression that are being imported into domestic relationships 
(Bougarel, 2006, p. 486) and the lack of economic opportunities for ex-combatants, 
which in turns leads them to resort to violent criminal activity for their livelihood 
(Knight & Ozerdem, 2004, p. 502).   This sobering perspective was echoed by a 
former member of the Guatemalan army when he poignantly stated that peace will 
not be achieved until all those who participated in the atrocities have died (L. 
Contreras, personal communication, January 15, 2008). 
     However, Garibay (2006) disputes this notion when asserting that most of the 
criminal activity in El Salvador is carried out by a generation that was too young to 
have participated in the armed conflict in that country.   Along with Theidon (2009), 
he posits that today’s social violence and civilian breakdown  (p. 17) stems from 
globalization and the dominant neo-liberal economic order, which has led to the 
migration of millions of young people north in search of work.  According to 
Garibay, illegal status, overwhelming numbers, lack of employment and English 
language fluency or lack of work skills leads to involvement with criminal gangs in 
poor neighbourhoods of North American cities (p. 478) and subsequent seeding of 
gangs and related illegal activities and violence throughout Central America and 
Colombia when they are deported.     
     Jeong (2000) notes that many would argue that the global dominance of neo-
liberal capitalism has shifted real power from nation state to multinational 
corporations.  The result is that even well-intentioned democratically elected 
governments in Guatemala will struggle (p. 91), perhaps with increasing futility, to 
carry out their mandates of gender equity, education and health reform, and 
economic development.   
     The concept of peace is closely related to justice and equality (Galtung, 1969; 
Jeong, 2000, p. 29).  The term justice has many nuances, especially in the context of 
building peace in the post-conflict society.  As described previously, the out-dated 
notion of victor and loser was born out of a retributive justice ideology, one in which 
defeating the enemy was the surest way to justice.  Retributive justice is built upon 
constructing the other as adversary, and is synonymous with revenge (Lambourne, 
2001, p. 313).  Retribution as a form of justice inevitably focuses only on one’s own 
grievance, and necessitates a solid defeat of the enemy in order to prevent further 
retaliation and retribution.  The limitations of this paradigm are readily apparent 




     Restorative justice, on the other hand, refers to a much more holistic approach, 
where the emphasis is placed on restoring relationships and addressing the 
underlying injustices which led to the original conflict (Lambourne, 2001, p. 313).  
Restorative justice is based on the belief in the innate humanity in both the victim 
and the perpetrator (Clark, 2009).  Social and economic justice are often described 
as separate forms of justice, but ultimately, both the social and economic 
underpinnings of any conflict need to be considered when working from the 
perspective of restorative justice.     
     Reconciliation is another concept closely related to justice, restorative justice in 
particular.  In reconciliation there is an emphasis on promoting healing broken 
relationships (Larson, 2009, p. 54) and it is a process that engages victim, offender 
and community in dialogue.  Lambourne (2004) acknowledges that the relationship 
between two conflict groups, especially after traumatic events such as genocide, can 
never return to the past and that injustices may never be forgotten.  However, 
reconciliation can allow a relationship to be transformed in a profound process of 
psychological and spiritual healing.  Stovel (2008) considers DDR programs to be a 
form of reconciliation.  However, she criticizes conventional DDR programs as only 
addressing what she labels rational reconciliation, those measurable impacts such as 
signing peace agreements, and demobilizing ex-combatants back into their 
communities of origin.  The second form, called sentient reconciliation (Stovel, 2008), 
though much more difficult to measure, fosters greater transformation as it 
encompasses issues of trust, feelings, emotions and healing.  
     Kriesberg (2007) has identified several basic dimensions of reconciliation, such as 
apology, forgiveness and acknowledgement, but concludes that many post-conflict 
societies engage in only a small realm of reconciliation.  In Guatemala for example, 
both the URNG and the Guatemalan Army officially apologized for their crimes 
against the civilian population (Jonas, 2000), and a Truth Commission was conducted 
(Comision Esclaramiento Historico, 1999).  However, the country has fared poorly in 
some of the other dimensions of reconciliation put forward by Kriesberg including 
reduction of inequities and development of cross-cutting ties among culturally and 
economically diverse sectors.  Viewed from this angle of inquiry, Guatemala ranks 
last or near last on reconciliation indicators such as income disparity, life 
expectancy, infant mortality, literacy and poverty (Government of United States, 
2008), when compared with its Central American neighbours.   
     In summary, this section outlined the greater context in which ex-combatants must 
engage in the reintegration process.  From global socio-political and economic 




that there is a myriad of contextual factors that undergird the reintegration process 
and profoundly impact its outcome.  
What Does Successful Reintegration Look Like? 
     In this next section, I review the literature to determine a comprehensive 
definition of successful reintegration.  What does successful reintegration look like?  
It is not an easy question to answer, let alone draw generalizations, as all conflicts 
are unique (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007).  
     Although the DDR process has been studied in academic circles (Doyle & 
Sambanis, 2000) and scrutinized by evaluations (Theidon, 2009, p. 3), Humphreys 
and Weinstein (2007) contend that there still is little information on the factors that 
explain which individuals reintegrate successfully (p. 562).  The DDR literature 
instead focuses on details of program design and implementation, with information 
that has tended to be technocratic and simply quantifying the number of participants 
and number of weapons collected (Theidon, 2009, p. 3).  Part of this lack of 
understanding can be attributed to the difficulty in evaluating such programs, as 
they do not take place in isolation, but rather are usually complemented by an array 
of social and economic interventions.  Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) conclude 
that far from being able to determine that DDR programs are successful, there are 
too few cases and far too many confounding variables to identify what contribution 
DDR programs have made to the reintegration of ex-combatants (p. 533).   
     In spite of the complexities in measuring the success of DDR programs, one factor 
that was widely acknowledged was the ability for ex-combatants to find employment 
following program participation (Garibay, 2006, p. 467; Humphries & Weinstein, 
2007, p. 549).  In addition to finding employment, Humphries and Weinstein (2007) 
constructed three other criteria in their study of reintegration of ex-combatants in 
Sierra Leone: acceptance by family and community, improved confidence in the 
state’s ability to operate (from the ex-combatant’s perspective), and disintegration 
of the ties among the ex-combatants.  This last criterion is worth noting, considering 
the ex-combatants of Nuevo Horizonte explicitly requested to re-integrate 
collectively, ostensibly bringing into question the validity of this fourth criterion.  
Ozerdem (2002) suggests an additional criterion to measure successful 
reintegration:  the sustainability of the negotiated peace processes (p. 91).  
Considering that peace requires breaking the command and control structures 
operating over rebel fighters (Spear, 2002, p. 141) in order to prevent them to return 
to organized rebellion, it seems the ex-combatants of Nuevo Horizonte have fallen 




     It is worth noting that criteria for successful reintegration were universally set out 
or defined by external bodies (such as researchers or program evaluators).  There is 
little information provided in the literature to determine how much input the ex-
combatants had in drafting these criteria.  Rather, ex-combatant input tended to 
focus on how well these programs (designed by others) fared (Humphreys & 
Weinstein, 2007; Stovel, 2008).  Intuitively, it seems obvious that economic 
reintegration or employment would be considered legitimate by any ex-combatant.  
However, considering that the ex-combatants of Nuevo Horizonte measured the 
success of their reintegration by remaining in close connection with their combatant 
colleagues (in contrast to the fourth criterion discussed by Humphreys and 
Weinstein, 2007) raises the question of how the criteria in general were established.       
     Humphreys and Weinstein found that one dimension of success (i.e., 
employment) was not a good predictor of another dimension (e.g., acceptance by 
their community).  They conclude that although it would provide simple and clear 
information for policy and analysis, it is not possible to generate a single measure of 
reintegration success.  “Distinct processes may underlie each of these measures of 
reintegration success” (p. 543).  Therefore, an identified gap is to determine what 
these processes are. 
     A growing body of DDR literature has focused on the unique reintegration needs 
of female ex-combatants (Bouta, 2005; Edloe, 2007).  Special challenges for women 
included addressing their reintegration into a broader society that often devalued 
the role of women (Stovel, 2008, p. 317).  Many female ex-combatants reported that 
their time in combat was characterized by equality and unprecedented respect by 
their male colleagues (Hauge & Thoresen, 2007; Theidon, 2009), but upon return, the 
larger cultural values seemed to honour only the male ex-combatants, while treating 
the females as “dirty” (Hauge & Thoresen, 2007; Theidon, 2009).  However, Theidon 
challenges the preoccupation with traditional gender discourse in evaluating DDR 
programs.  She argues that in order to evaluate DDR programs, our concept of 
masculinity itself needs to be deconstructed in order to separate male identity from 
violence militarism and armed combat (Theidon, 2009). 
     Methodological approaches to studying conflict can be differentiated into two 
different strategies.  One strategy is based on an analyst-centred, objective 
viewpoint, which Avruch (1998) refers to as an etic approach.  The hallmark of the 
etic approach, according to Avruch, is the identification of categories or discrete 
variables that are amenable to statistical manipulations, and are able to reduce 
tremendous diverse information into a few manageable dimensions (p. 68).  A 




description” (p. 68) and brings with it all the benefits of ethnography, including 
attention to context and detail and closer attention to the lived experience of those 
being studied.   
     What follows next is a more detailed analysis of the literature on the outcomes of 
reintegration programs from around the world.  In this first section, I review the 
literature in which an etic or objective perspective has been provided.  
Reintegration and Rational Reconciliation 
     Humphreys and Weinstein’s (2007) research on the reintegration of ex-
combatants in Sierra Leone has questioned the efficacy of DDR programs, 
contending that little is known about the factors that account for successful 
reintegration at the micro level (p. 531).  In response to this identified gap, 
Humphreys and Weinstein undertook a quantitative analysis of surveys conducted 
with over 1000 ex-combatants.  The authors constructed four variables, based on the 
accumulated research and evaluation of DDR programming, to measure successful 
reintegration:  dissolving the ex-combatant networks, improved income earning 
opportunities, increased confidence in democratic process and reconciliation with 
family and community.  The authors assert that their study does not demonstrate that 
the DDR process in Sierra Leone assisted the process of reintegration, even after 
controlling for factors such as spill over (positive benefits from concurrent peace 
building programs in the country), and selection biases or sampling issues. 
     Economic reintegration was the most prominent component of reintegration 
programs for ex-combatants, as evidenced by the literature.  The primary challenge, 
however, is not difficult to anticipate, considering that most reintegration programs 
have occurred in countries where poverty is a major issue.  Often, it is poverty that 
has led to the civil war in the first place, as is the case for Guatemala, and often it is 
poverty that draws young disenfranchised men into the combatant role (Jonas, 2000).  
Therefore, to implement programs to economically re-integrate ex-combatants into 
a society mired by poverty and a lack of economic opportunities seems to be a 
difficult, if not futile task, as evidenced by Garibay’s (2006) research in El Salvador, 
Paris’ (2004) analysis of post-conflict Nicaragua, and Hamber’s (2007) research in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone.  Hamber adds that in Northern Ireland, which unlike the 
previous examples, boasts a highly developed economy, unemployment among ex-
combatants after DDR was still six times higher than the national average (2007, p. 
5).  Metsola (2006) explains that in Namibia, greater success was achieved with 
economic integration through a unique program where ex-combatants were given 




measurably improving the former rebels’ loyalty and confidence in the state (p. 
1126).  Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) acknowledge the inherent challenges in 
economically rehabilitating ex-combatants, but assert that in relative terms, 
participation in a DDR program offered ex-combatants more economic opportunities 
than those who did not (p. 549).   Understanding the variables that improved the 
individual’s success remained inconclusive, however, as age and gender were not 
consistent predictors of their four variables of reintegration (p. 546).  Interestingly, 
socio-economic status and education were associated with worse success at 
reintegrating (p. 546), as measured by finding employment. 
     Acceptance of ex-combatants by their former communities was also an important 
factor in evaluations of reintegration programs.  Although more difficult to measure, 
the degree of acceptance of former combatants following their demobilization has 
been studied by Humphreys and Weinstein (2007).  Understandably, individuals 
who did not participate in war crimes found acceptance easier in Sierra Leone.  This 
may have been the result of the psychosocial impact of the conflict or may have 
reflected the unwillingness of host community members to accept the ex-combatants 
who may have committed violent abuses against them or their families (p. 548). 
     Weapons for Cash programs, designed to both disarm ex-combatants and offer 
direct economic opportunity, were initially an important part of DDR programs, but 
have since been determined to have negligible effect and often have had the 
unintended consequence of creating illegal arms markets, and creating an influx of 
weapons into fragile nations (Berdal, 1996, p. 34). 
     This review on the materialist, or objective and measurable outcomes of DDR 
programs has focused primarily on the economic opportunities on which they 
ostensibly have provided.  While there is some evidence that economic 
opportunities do improve after participation, the literature is mixed, and 
acknowledges the complicating large-scale influences, such as societal poverty.  
Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) propose further quantitative randomized research 
be designed to further understand the real measurable benefits of DDR programs (p. 
561).  
Reintegration and Sentient Reconciliation 
     The rational construction of DDR focuses on outcomes as defined by outsiders, 
such as economic opportunity, and unbroken peace accords.  Knight and Ozerdem 
(2004, p. 502) summarize these etic understandings with the macro-insecurity 




combatant, but on a societal level, also prevent former combatants from either re-
engaging in combat, or engaging in criminal activity.  However, intrinsic to this 
outsider perspective has come a certain distrust or labelling, resulting in the 
construction of negative labels for ex-combatants, such as “spoilers” (Stedman, 
1997), “belligerents” (Krampe, 2009), and “obstacles” (Hauge & Thoresen, 2007). In 
Liberia, ex-combatants were generally viewed as “uprooted urban youth with a 
history of unemployment, underemployment, and idleness (Boas & Hatloy, 2008, p. 
33), prone to criminal behaviour (Abdullah, 1998) in spite of contrary evidence 
gathered from the ex-combatants themselves (Boas & Hatloy, 2008, p. 33).  Stovel 
(2008), too, expresses concern that rebel groups are portrayed as terrorists (p. 310). 
Metsola (2006) suggests the reasons why ex-combatants are viewed with a great 
deal of suspicion rather than with potential is that of fear that their organizational 
capacity, strategic knowledge and military skills might be used against the ruling 
class, and extends to the international community and donor countries. Collier’s 
(2007) appraisal of the moral character of insurgents is particularly negative, and he 
contends that these groups comprise a major stumbling block to economic 
development in the world’s poorest countries. He paints insurgents with broad 
strokes, insisting that their motives are dubious and their tactics are anything but 
noble, and uses examples from Sierra Leone (rebels were recruited from “teenage 
drug addicts, easily controlled and not excessively inhibited by moral scruples” [p. 
25]), and their supposed demands for social justice are quickly appeased with 
simplistic materialistic achievements such as expensive wristwatches (p. 20), thus 
placing them on a moral level of a petty street gang.  While these situations do exist, 
they do not represent the entire range of ex-combatants.  Collier (2007) draws upon 
the work of Oyefusi, whose research focuses on the decision-making processes of 
Nigerian youth who joined rebel organizations.  Oyefusi determined that perceived 
grievance was not a predictor of participation.  Rather, being young, uneducated 
and without dependents were more accurate predictors for joining rebel 
organizations.  Collier infers that “it is difficult to reconcile these characteristics of 
recruitment with an image of a vanguard of fighters for social justice” (2007, p. 31).  
However, this argument neglects the evidence that social movements of the last 
century, ranging from women’s rights to gay rights to anti-war movements, tended 
to attract young and unattached activists.  What is concerning about Collier’s 
analysis is that he (as a former executive with the World Bank and best-selling 
author) maintains powerful influence with global policy-makers involved in post-
conflict rebuilding.  I believe that ex-combatants, due to these pervasive negative 
images, may potentially, as Gergen (2009) states, become “morally condemned by 




     The image of the morally corrupt and violent and dangerous rebel fits in with our 
global dominant culture construct that terror and violence comes to our world 
primarily at the hands of rebels, guerrillas and insurgents (Sluka, 2000).  The 
statistics firmly contradict this widely held belief; the majority of terrorist acts 
(defined as direct or indirect violence aimed at a civilian population for a political 
cause, with the purpose of instilling fear and terror into a society) are carried out not 
by rebel groups, but by so-called legitimate state governments (some of them 
liberal democracies) and their actors–armies, secret police and paramilitary forces 
(Sluka, 2000, p. 2).   
     My own experience living with the ex-combatants in Nuevo Horizonte has given 
me a contradictory understanding of this constructed identity of ex-combatants.  As 
Avruch (1998) states, immersing oneself in the lives and stories of a group of people 
inevitably leads to a deep or emic level of understanding.  Outsider observers, in 
their guise of objectivity, appear to have depicted the ex-combatant as a potential 
threat to their nation’s future security and peace.  This may not be totally unfounded; 
however, my experience suggests to me that this perspective is quite different from 
the way in which ex-combatants view themselves.  Stovel (2008), for example, 
exposes how the international peace brokers touted the reconciliation process in 
Sierra Leone as successful, while her in-depth interviews with the ex-combatants 
themselves revealed a contradictory view (p. 307).  I explore this apparent disparity 
in constructed identity further in this next section with a review of the literature 
which focuses on the psychosocial aspects of reintegration, moving beyond the 
quantifiable and material dimensions of DDR programs.     
     The initial transformation from civilian to combatant is a profound process, one in 
which one’s identity is significantly affected.  This newly formed identity is 
manifested both individually and collectively, and may internally embody the heroic 
images of the warrior fighting for a just cause, while externally embodying a 
threatening and fearful image (Stovel, 2008).  This identity formation is sometimes a 
simple process, such as the case of men and women who take up arms for a cause 
which they strongly believe to be just (Bougarel, 2006; Garibay, 2006).  However, in 
the case of abducted child soldiers in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the participation in 
extreme forms of abuse and violence has led to identity confusion and breakdown.  
For example, the children who were forced to commit acts of violence against their 
own villages and families, not only faced rejection during DDR, but were also forced 
to confront their own contradictory identities (child, son, daughter and murderer) 
that were constructed during their combat time (Veale & Stavrou, 2007).  Regardless, 
Kelman (2007) argues that identity is a basic human need and is strongly tied to our 




overlooked in conventional DDR programs (Stovel, 2008; Theidon, 2009).  The larger 
society may think it is essential to keep such a group under control due to their 
potentially destabilization abilities (Bucaille, 2006, p. 426).  These deeply 
entrenched, yet opposing internal and external identities are resistant to change 
(Bar-Tal, 2007).  Bar-Tal asserts that constructing the identity of the ex-combatant 
fulfills fundamental social psychological needs for both the combatant and those in 
the larger society.  The collective identity is maintained and strengthened in 
protracted conflicts, but ultimately must be deconstructed and reconciled in order 
for reintegration to be successful (Fisher, 2001, p. 25).  Levy (1992) suggests this 
process is further challenged by the Observation of Prospect Theorists, who 
hypothesize ex-combatants would tend to be risk-acceptant to avoid losses (that is, 
clinging to entrenched conflict-based identities) and risk-averse to achieve gain 
(that is, rejecting new civilian identities, in spite of potential rewards). 
     Interviews of ex-combatants in El Salvador exemplify the fundamental need of 
belonging:  “I knew that my life was about to change, as if all of a sudden I was to 
become an orphan:  the army had been my father and the Acahuapa battalion my 
mother.  I couldn’t imagine being turned into a jobless civilian overnight” 
(Castellanos-Moya, 2001, p. 12). Theidon (2009) goes further in exploring how the 
identity of the ex-combatant is tied to cultural norms of masculinity.  One ex-
combatant from Colombia expresses his identity crisis after the disarmament 
process by describing himself as “one more unemployed, unskilled young man” (p. 
16), because conventional symbols of masculinity (such as income, education, 
decent housing and car) were now inaccessible.  The only symbol of masculinity that 
was accessible to the ex-combatants was in organized crime and gang activity, 
where prowess with a weapon and combat experience was recognized (Theidon, p. 
18). 
      As mentioned previously, the reintegration experience of female ex-combatants 
has become a particular area of focus in the literature, which according to Theidon, 
has been restricted by traditional iterations of sensitivity, which simply call for 
adding a gender dimension to evaluation frameworks.  This dimension is important, 
as the unique challenges that women face during reintegration have been largely 
ignored.  However, Theidon (2009) argues that this sidesteps a more important issue 
of male identity, masculinity and the military (p. 4).  She examines the question of 
how violent forms of masculinity are “forged and sustained” (p. 5) and how DDR 
programs might effectively “disarm masculinity” or re-shape it in the reintegration 
phase.  Theidon questions whether DDR should deconstruct and then reconstruct 
what it means to be a man in a post-conflict society, because DDR may be seen as a 




that sense of status may be stripped during reintegration (p. 23).  Since peace 
building programs have not significantly addressed the pervasive post-conflict 
challenge of subsequent domestic violence, Theidon strongly suggests that DDR 
programs need to incorporate strategies to assist former male combatants in how to 
forge a “new masculinity”  (p. 29) that incorporates and honours the role and 
identity of a loving, nurturing husband and father in a new civil society. 
     The ex-combatants who live in Nuevo Horizonte all constructed new identities 
upon entering the armed conflict, evidenced in the very concrete act of adopting 
new first and last names.  The rationale for adopting pseudonyms was to protect their 
close relatives from violent reprisals if they were ever captured and interrogated by 
the Guatemalan armed forces.  It is interesting to note that the ex-combatants 
retained these pseudonyms during and after the reintegration programs, and 
maintain their “rebel” names even today, ostensibly long after the threat of capture 
and reprisal is gone.  This is perhaps a small yet significant example of how one’s 
individual identity is maintained long after DDR programs have been completed.  
Although DDR programs appear to be oriented to the ex-combatant who is identified 
as a potential threat, based on traditional military and security objectives (Theidon, 
2009), my review of the literature did not provide any examples of ex-combatants 
who identified themselves in this manner, attesting to a potentially significant 
discrepancy in identity construction between the ex-combatants and those who 
manage their reintegration.     
     While much of the literature has been devoted to exploring the ex-combatant’s 
identity as perpetrator, little has focussed on the identity as victim.  Perhaps the only 
time ex-combatants’ victimization has been explored is in the context of the child-
soldier, but even in this context, child ex-combatants are labelled as both victims 
and perpetrators.  In spite of the fact that the literature is focused on issues such as 
loss of identity and lack of economic opportunity, the use of a language of 
victimhood is absent.  It would therefore be interesting to see whether ex-
combatants view themselves as victims.   
     Reintegration, therefore, is a much larger transition and cannot be captured 
solely by quantifiable variables such as gainful employment or whether or not 
combatants re-engage in violent warfare.  In fact, the demobilization phase of DDR 
explicitly attempts to break down the connections and allegiances that were forged 
during combat.  The goal is to deconstruct them so that the reintegration process is 
done individually.  In a sense, this breaks up their collective identity as combatants, 
but the literature does not provide any backing that this collective identity is a 




literature was found which suggested that this collective identity could actually assist 
in the reintegration process.  This question is important for this study, considering 
the ex-combatants of Nuevo Horizonte explicitly chose to reintegrate collectively 
(negotiating as a unified body that is based on their guerrilla past), explicitly 
countering the objectives of the DDR process in Guatemala.   
     I have reviewed the literature on how identity is considered a component in the 
psychosocial reintegration of ex-combatants.  In discussing how the identity of 
combatants is constructed (often as perpetrator and in generally negative terms) 
and how the identity is transformed, I believe that the literature is limited in that the 
perspective of the ex-combatant is under-represented.  Our Western paradigm of 
cultural sensitivity is nonetheless limited in research by the power relationships (in 
which the researcher is the expert), and our own cultural biases (in which Western 
ways of knowing are considered superior) (Potts & Brown, 2005).  As DDR processes 
are usually implemented and controlled by outsiders, there is the potential for lack 
of sensitivity for cultural nuances, power imbalances and other biases.  Sometimes, 
in the effort to embrace cultural sensitivity, foreigners mistakenly concentrate on 
traditional and perhaps romantic notions of reconciliation, which, in reality, may 
mask underlying problems.  Stovel (2008) states that in the case of Sierra Leone, 
Western DDR leaders embraced the notion of a traditional slogan:  There’s no bad 
bush to throw away a bad child (referring to the inherent reconciliatory nature of 
African culture).  Her qualitative interviews with ex-combatants however, often 
contradicted this romantic ideal, and instead raised significant concerns about their 
concerns about justice and equality.  She argues that DDR processes controlled by 
cultural outsiders may actually reinforce the very tensions and power structures that 
contributed to the war in the first place (p. 306).   
     A final concept in the social/psychological aspects of reintegration is forgiveness.  
If reintegration can be construed as a form of reconciliation, or restorative justice, 
then the concept of forgiveness is important to investigate.  The paradox of 
forgiveness is that, according to Tavuchus (1991) “an apology, no matter how 
sincere or effective, does not and cannot undo what has been done.  And yet, in a 
mysterious way and according to its own logic, this is precisely what it manages to 
do” (p. 5).    
     Forgiveness is a component of Stovel’s sentient reconciliation (discussed earlier), 
and as such, has often eluded conventional DDR programs.  Forgiveness in the 
context of ex-combatants also requires a revisiting of the discussion of whether ex-
combatants identify themselves as victims (thereby needing to accept calls for 




(thereby needing to offer forgiveness to the victims of their violence).  However, the 
literature specific to DDR addresses only the latter, while avoiding the perspective 
of how ex-combatants may see themselves as victims.  In her analysis of post-conflict 
reconciliation in Sierra Leone, Stovel (2008) examines how forgiveness transpires 
between the former rebels and the communities that were victimized by their violent 
insurgence.  Stovel criticizes the process, asserting that communities were 
pressured into forgiving the former rebels in order to expedite reconciliation.  
“Many statements of forgiveness, then reflect no real forgiveness but rather 
helplessness” (p. 314).   
     In Guatemala, for example, The URNG (of which the ex-combatants of Nuevo 
Horizonte were members) were determined to be responsible for 3% of the human 
rights abuses during the civil war (CEH, 1999) while the government forces were 
responsible for 93% (CEH, 1999).   This overwhelming imbalance implies that the 
ex-combatants could be identified as victims.  They may further view themselves as 
victims by focussing on their economic and political reasons for becoming 
guerrillas.  Although both sides asked for forgiveness in the years immediately 
following the Peace Accords (Jonas, 2000, p. 157), it is questionable whether 
apologies without addressing the inherent long-standing power imbalances can lead 
to true reconciliation.  According to Corntassel and Holder (2008), official states’ 
apologies can go only so far so as not to disrupt political and legal stability, and 
implicitly, economic status quo.  The victims of state abuses (in Guatemala’s case, 
the victims of the longstanding economic and political hegemony) are being asked 
to become reconciled with loss (p. 467).  Stovel (2008) warns, however, that social 
conformity does not equal equality and justice (p. 318).  Taiaiake’s (2005) 
condemnation of state apologies (without a restitution component) are strong:  “The 
logic of reconciliation as justice is clear:  without massive restitution, including land, 
financial transfers and other forms of assistance to compensate for past harms and 
continuing injustices committed against our peoples, reconciliation would 
permanently enshrine colonial injustices and is itself a further injustice” (p. 152). 
     In an analysis of the shooting of five Amish schoolgirls in 2006 in Pennsylvania, 
Kraybill, Nolt and Weaver-Zercher (2007) conclude that the community was able to 
offer complete forgiveness to the perpetrator due to their Christian faith, their 
history of martyrdom and communal culture built upon non-violence.  Their strong 
Christian faith freed them to leave questions of life and death in God’s hands 
(Kraybill et al., 2007).  However, unlike Rwandan survivors of genocide, one could 
argue that the Amish had access to a formal justice system that was ready and willing 
to offer them retributive justice (i.e., punishment for the perpetrator), so their 




forgiveness is to be a component of DDR programs, it must also be offered and 
requested freely, as part of a reconciliation program that includes restitution for all 
those who have been harmed.   
Summary 
     From a social constructionist perspective, a review of the current literature is 
necessary to understand the forces that shape dominant thought and research 
priorities.  This exploration is not the ending, but rather a beginning.  That is, this 
exploration invites us to ask: How did we come to hold these views? Why do they 
seem so very obvious? What are the reasons to explore alternatives? (Gergen, 2009, 
p. 32). 
     The reintegration of ex-combatants has become an integral component of post-
conflict peacekeeping programs throughout the world in the past 20 years.  This 
process, however, has proven to be challenging to implement and difficult to 
evaluate.  Through an examination of the literature, I have argued that influential 
global trends such as neo-liberal political and economic policies have predisposed 
the outcomes of DDR programs as well as the way in which we have evaluated their 
successes and challenges.  The research has been varied, as has been the contexts 
in which DDR programs have been implemented.  Reviews from Latin America have 
tended to construct ex-combatants as ideological fighters for social justice, while 
reviews from Africa have tended to view ex-combatants more as political or 
economic opportunists.  In almost all reviews, however, the ex-combatant is viewed 
with some suspicion by the greater society, by those in charge of DDR programs, 
and even by the researchers and evaluators.  The methods used to measure the 
success (or lack thereof) of DDR programs have ranged from the quantifiable, 
objective approaches to ethnographic inquiries seeking understanding into identity 
transformation and the complex process of reconciliation.  In all cases, however, the 
researchers and authors were not ex-combatants, and in most cases did not reside in 
the country in which the conflict had taken place.  This is indicative, perhaps, of our 
current geopolitical context, where most civil wars are taking place in countries 
ravaged by long-standing poverty, lack of education and an absence of the first-
person voice in the dominant literature.  This Eurocentric perspective has been 
clearly documented in the larger context of Peace Studies literature. 
     In the definitive pursuit of seeking understanding of the reintegration process of 
the Guatemalan ex-combatants of Nuevo Horizonte, this review of the literature, in 
my opinion, has left some important issues unaddressed.  The ex-combatants from 




politically and economically revolutionize their communities and their country.  
While the Peace Accords offered them an end to the fear of being killed, they 
offered only minimal economic security.  What the Peace Accords have failed to 
offer to them, or to the majority of the people of Guatemala, was political and 
economic social justice, the vision for which they took up a violent struggle in the 
first place.  They have essentially been requested to re-integrate into the status quo.  
While the Guatemalan experience in not very unique in this perspective, the 
literature did not provide sufficient insight into how ex-combatants dealt with this 
lack of change in a process that is deemed to be transformative.  Stated more 
plainly, the ex-combatants were expected to transform, while the larger society was 
allowed to remain unchanged. 
     Furthermore, the literature is scant on the potential benefits of re-integrating in a 
collective manner, attesting to the dominant perspective that splitting up insurgent 
groups is best for the overall security of the society.  Additionally, this review has 
left us with insufficient insight into the conditions which foster positive reintegration 
on the individual or community level.  
     My hope, therefore, is to seek greater understanding and clarity on how the ex-
combatants in Nuevo Horizonte were able to reintegrate so successfully.  Perhaps 
their story will stand apart from the existing literature, because they have viewed 
their journey as a positive one.  We may be able to learn valuable lessons from their 




Chapter 3:  Methodology 
Introduction 
           To introduce the methodology section, I would like to reiterate the goal of this 
study, the purpose and the significance.  The goal of this study is to elicit thoughts 
and ideas from the ex-combatants who are living in Nuevo Horizonte, Guatemala, on 
how ex-combatants make the transition back into civilian life after an armed conflict.  
This study is important because the understanding it may generate corresponds with 
our transforming global priorities of rebuilding, reconstruction and reconciliation.  
This study is relevant because DDR programs are now present throughout the world, 
and current research and evaluation strategies have focused upon outcomes and 
criteria defined primarily by non-combatants, and we have not completely 
understood when or if this process is successful.   
     In this section, I outline the methods I used to seek understanding and answers to 
the research questions, as articulated in the introduction, and repeated here: 
1. How did you make the transition back into civilian life?   
2. What advice do you want to give to other ex-combatants in other countries 
who are in the process of reintegration?     
     The process of defining the research question is directly connected to defining 
the core phenomenon.  The core phenomenon is the primary process or action 
which I seek to understand, and is based on the research question.  The core 
phenomenon in this study is the reintegration of ex-combatants.   
     The methodology chapter is divided into six sections.  In the first section, 
Philosophical Foundations of Methodology, I discuss the ontological, 
epistemological and axiological assumptions of this inquiry as well as ethical 
considerations in conducting the research.  In the second section, Establishing 
Trustworthiness and Authenticity, I describe how the methodology meets qualitative 
research methodological rigour.  In the third section, I discuss the anticipated ethical 
issues.  In the fourth section, Description of Methodology, I justify why I have chosen 
grounded theory as a methodological approach, describe my role as researcher, 
and describe the sources of data.  In the fifth section, Data Collection Procedures, I 
detail how I selected participants and how I conducted the interviews.  In the sixth 
section, Data Analysis Procedures, I describe the process of transcribing, coding, 




     Figure 3.1, on the following page, displays the methodology process in graphic 
form, and outlines the process in terms of planning, data collection and data 
analysis.  This figure offers a clear visual representation of the methodological 
processes.  However, its linear presentation is limited in conveying the dynamic 
process of overlapping the collection and analysis of the data, which characterizes 
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Philosophical Foundations of Methodology 
Ontological Assumptions   
     Ontological assumptions refer to the foundational suppositions one makes about 
the nature of reality.  Creswell (2007) asserts that in an ontological inquiry, the 
researcher asks the question of when something is considered real (p. 248).  Strega 
(2005) adds that ontology is a theory about what the world is like, or more simply, 
ontology is a worldview (p. 201).  The history of Western inquiry has been 
dominated by a realist or modernist ontology, whose supporters assume that reality 
is separate and distinct from humans (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 176).  Realist 
researchers, therefore, aim at discovering the truth, using rigorous scientific 
methodology.   
      My inquiry, however, is grounded in social constructionism, and as such is based 
on the ontological assumption that reality is socially constructed, and therefore 
cannot be viewed as independent from those who have constructed it (Creswell, 
2007, p. 248).  Charmaz (2006) asserts that a social constructionist approach 
explicitly assumes that any conclusions or theoretical development offers an 
interpretation of the studied world, not an exact picture of it (p. 10).  The goal, 
therefore, of this project is to gain understanding, rather than discovering the 
positivistic conceptualization of “truth.”  Charmaz (2006) adds that “neither data nor 
theories are discovered.  Rather, we are part of the world we study and the data we 
collect” (p. 10). 
     Social constructionists acknowledge that the research process emerges from 
interaction (Charmaz, 2008, p. 402); in this case, the interaction between the 
members of the Nuevo Horizonte cooperative and myself.  In other words, the 
researcher and participants co-construct the data–the data are not the observed 
objects.  From this, Gergen (2009) posits that scientific knowledge, therefore, is a 
by-product of a social process.  The process by which a scientific inquiry is chosen, 
is carried out and is ultimately disseminated is highly influenced by social 
interactions that often create the belief that scientific discourse is in essence a 
“natural, taken-for-granted reality” (p. 23).  New paradigms or worldviews 
occasionally challenge collectively held and firmly entrenched beliefs.  However, 
these shifts do not necessarily bring us closer to a reality that is fixed and 
unchanging.  Instead scientific revolution shifts horizontally, not progressively, as 





      An epistemological assumption addresses the question of what counts as 
knowledge (Strega, 2005, p. 201).  How one views the world is influenced by what 
knowledge one possesses, and what knowledge one is capable of possessing is 
influenced deeply by one’s worldview (or ontology).  Schwandt (2000) suggests that 
researchers do not find or discover knowledge so much as they interpret and 
construct it, through models, frameworks and schemes (p. 197).  Denzin and Lincoln 
(2000) concur, by stating that research findings are created, not discovered (p. 168).  
Our knowledge, therefore, offers a means of explaining our world, thus influencing 
our world view (ontology).  Concurrently, our world view directs the knowledge we 
seek.  Ontology and epistemology are therefore inextricably interconnected 
according to the social constructionist paradigm.   
     I can claim with certainty that, as someone who has been educated within the 
dominant culture of North America, I have become accustomed to an educational 
system dominated by a Eurocentric epistemology or “way of knowing.”  Modernism 
sprang out of the European Enlightenment view of reality, and is characterized by 
the idea that reality can be understood and discovered through a rational, objective, 
scientific method, which is neutral and value-free.  Those who operate from this view 
hold that knowledge is impartial and neutrally discovered.  Implicit in this 
understanding is that non-traditional methods of inquiry are inferior.  “Information 
gathered by other methods and by researchers who socially and politically locate 
themselves fails to attain the status accorded to knowledge” (Strega, 2005, p. 204).  
The enlightenment also led to a type of knowledge colonization, in which Western 
thought was argued to be at the top of the epistemological hierarchy.   
     It is difficult, and perhaps unwise, for me to attempt to evaluate the 
epistemological assumptions of the ex-combatants in Nuevo Horizonte. Considering 
our differences in education, language and culture, it is prudent to assume that their 
assumptions may be disparate from my own.  However, after having lived in 
Guatemala and in their community, I would like to offer the following observations.  
Based on my children’s experience of participating in the Guatemalan school system 
(including a time in the community of Nuevo Horizonte), I believe that in general, the 
dominant Guatemalan society has embraced the modernist, Western epistemology 
in much the same way as our dominant North American culture has.  This belief is 
further backed by encouragement of the community members, individually and 
formally (as a cooperative), of their children to pursue formal education in the 
modern and conventional paths (i.e., high school and university).  However, I 
occasionally witnessed examples in which this Western modernist epistemology was 
challenged by other ways of knowing.  One example occurred when Jose, an ex-




required a palm-thatched roof to cover a portion of our living space that did not have 
a roof.  When we were about to set off into the forest to harvest palm leaves at a time 
that had been negotiated the day before, Jose cautioned me that maybe this was not 
the best time to build this roof.  His rationale was that, according to the elders, it 
would be necessary to wait until after the full moon to harvest palm branches.  
Breaching this requirement would probably lead to a leaky roof in the future.  Jose 
seemed not entirely convinced about this elder advice, and asked me what my 
opinion was.  I replied that I would respect whatever he believed, but that in all 
honesty, I did not believe that the full moon had any bearing on the future 
permeability of our roof.  His face lit up and he quickly responded that he did not 
believe it either, and that we should be on our way with our day’s work.  It is 
interesting to note that a few months after the roof was complete, it did end up 
leaking. Explanations offered by visiting community members ranged from poor 
workmanship (a modernist paradigm) to not adhering to lunar cycles (a traditional 
paradigm).     
     What counts as legitimate knowledge is an important question to ask in preparing 
for a research inquiry.  Potter (1996) considers how a certain way of knowing is 
socially made to appear stable, factual, neutral and independent of the speaker, 
often at the expense of an alternative perspective.  “Like money on the international 
markets, truth can be treated as a commodity which is worked up, can fluctuate, and 
can be strengthened or weakened by various procedures of representation” (p. 5). 
     Ladson-Billings (2000) argues that one’s worldview can potentially be both 
liberating and hegemonic.  Nonetheless, it is necessary to acknowledge that my own 
way of knowing may differ in many ways from the participants, who represent a 
separate ethnic, cultural and linguistic group that is underrepresented in the 
research literature of the dominant culture.  The challenge faced by many minority 
writers, is whether to find legitimacy within the dominant paradigm, or whether to 
seek alternative epistemologies to describe their experiences (Ladson-Billings, p. 
260).  My challenge in writing this dissertation, therefore, is to continually question 
my own “way of knowing” and to seek alternative and/or complementary 
worldviews regarding the reintegration of ex-combatants. 
     According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000), epistemology, ontology and 
methodology are all interconnected.  The researcher approaches the world based 
on his or her situatedness (e.g., nationality, culture, education), which formulates a 
set of ideas or a world view (ontology), that specifies a set of questions 
(epistemology) that is then examined is a specific manner (methodology).  The net 




is social constructionism.   In addition, the research is guided by the values and 
ethics (or axiological assumptions) of one’s distinct interpretive community, which in 
this paper, is the discipline of Peace Studies.  In the next section, I further explore 
my axiological assumptions and how they are connected with the social 
constructionist paradigm.   
Axiological Assumptions 
     Axiology refers to methodological assumptions based on our ethics and values.  
Lincoln and Guba (2000) assert that one’s axiological assumptions, namely one’s 
values and ethics, influence the research process in fundamental ways.  Values and 
ethics influence the choice and focus of one’s research, the framing of the research 
question and the selection of a theoretical framework and methodology (p. 169).  I 
acknowledge that all research is value laden, and therefore it is necessary to 
explicate what values I will bring to my research design, implementation and 
analysis. 
     As a researcher in the discipline of Peace Studies, I believe that an inquiry such as 
this one needs to be placed in a framework of how can we further our understanding 
of working through conflict without resorting to violence, or as Jeong (2000) states, 
motivations behind theoretical analysis must be associated with a commitment to 
change (p. 46).  As such, I view this inquiry as fitting into this characteristic of peace 
research in which I seek understanding of the reintegration of ex-combatants with 
this understanding forming the potential catalyst for positive change.  As Charmaz 
(2006) states:  “Grounded theorists’ background assumptions and disciplinary 
perspectives alert them to look for certain possibilities and process in their data” (p. 
16).  I believe, as an individual, that I can still enact the results of this inquiry as a 
form of activism.   
     In the meantime, that is, before I am able to disseminate an understanding of the 
reintegration of these Guatemalan ex-combatants, I can demonstrate my 
commitment to activism in other ways.  Concurrent to the researching and writing of 
this paper, I am working with the people of Nuevo Horizonte by supporting a 
community based library project.  In conjunction with several other activist partners, 
we have collaboratively sponsored an education scholarship (a monthly stipend for 
a young person attending university to coordinate the community library) for Nuevo 
Horizonte.     
     Peace studies, as a normative discipline, explicitly calls for research and inquiry 




fairness, equality and hierarchy.  As Charmaz (2005) states, “it signifies thinking 
about being human and about creating good societies and a better world. . .it means 
exploring tensions between complicity and consciousness, choice and constraint, 
indifference and compassion, inclusion and exclusion, poverty and privilege, and 
barriers and opportunities (p. 510).  In specific terms, what does this mean for the 
people of Nuevo Horizonte?  When formally approached about seeking permission 
to conduct this study, the president of the cooperative agreed to the community’s 
participation, but requested that this study be actively shared in order to raise the 
profile of the cooperative, and share their story with others.  In addition to the 
conventional ways in which dissertations are shared (i.e., academic journals and 
conferences), I hope to produce a summary article in Spanish, so that the members 
of the cooperative can promote the findings among themselves and within the own 
networks.    
     Considering that I am a male of European descent, living in a globally dominant 
society (Canada), it is necessary to consider how this impacts my relationship with 
the men and women who will be participating.  Adherents to an anti-oppressive 
perspective (Potts & Brown, 2005) acknowledge the unbalanced nature between 
researcher and participants in all situations, and stress how this relationship is 
further skewed by differing socio-economic and cultural backgrounds (Potts & 
Brown, 2005).  Anti-oppressive researchers also acknowledge the tendency to 
objectify participants, such as defining them by their poverty, or by labels such as 
ex-combatants, which, as evidenced by the review of the literature, comes with 
potential negative connotations.  Adherents to an anti-oppressive perspective 
acknowledge that the research participants are first and foremost human beings with 
a multitude of identities and strengths. 
     Along with the relationship between researcher and participants, the ethical issue 
of lending one’s voice to others must also be considered.  Hertz (as cited in Gergen 
& Gergen, 2000, p. 1027) emphasizes that a researcher brings his or her own history 
and perspective, but one’s primary obligation is to tell the stories of the people one 
is studying (p. 1027). Lincoln and Guba (2000) suggest that a social constructionist 
paradigm lends itself to the researcher assuming a role of “passionate participant” 
(p. 166) with the aim of seeking understanding.  However, Lincoln and Guba do not 
go so far as to suggest that social constructionism lends itself to advocacy and 
activism.  Instead, they place these aims under a different paradigm, that of critical 
theory.  Perhaps the embedded relativism in the social construction paradigm 
paralyzes the researcher into inaction.  If we lack any criteria for deciding what 
knowledge or what voice is better (Schwandt, 2000, p. 200), how do we advocate or 




qualitative research in the pursuit of human rights, social justice, and the need to 
redress past injustices (p. 12).  I personally believe that seeking understanding in 
itself is an authentic form of advocacy, and ties into Potts and Brown’s (2005) anti-
oppressive orientation to research.  In the same way, giving voice to those who are 
underrepresented in mainstream discourse is an important example of advocacy.  In 
close relation with the discipline of Peace Studies, anti-oppressive research is 
inherently linked to activism; the researcher is continuously aware of how this 
activism is consciously influenced by his/her values (Charmaz, 2006, p. 15).  
Establishing Trustworthiness and Authenticity 
     In constructionist inquiry, the traditional positivist criteria of internal and external 
validity are replaced by what Lincoln and Guba (2000, p. 180) refer to as 
trustworthiness and authenticity.  Trustworthiness is a process to assure the 
credibility of the rigor of the methodology process (Rodwell, 1998, p. 96).  To ensure 
trustworthiness of the data and the process, I kept a journal during the research 
process.  The purpose of this journal was to record all data collection events and 
their context.  This helped to verify the chronology, accuracy and interpretation of 
the process.  I ensured confirmability by video recording all of the interviews, so 
that a verbatim copy of the data was readily available for reference.  I addressed 
dependability by working closely with a dissertation committee–specifically Dr. 
Sally St. George, who is the dissertation supervisor.  Credibility was addressed by 
asking participants to review the video recordings and the interview transcripts to 
confirm that their thoughts were validly reflected.     
     To further address authenticity, I presented a two-page written summary (See 
Appendix D:  Summary for Member Checking) of the theoretical framework to each 
of the participants for their feedback.  Their endorsement of this summary ensured 
me that I utilized the grounded theory process to arrive at a mutually shared 
understanding.  Additionally, excerpts of my primary coding were reviewed by an 
independent expert (a Guatemalan human rights activist) to ensure that my codes 
accurately reflected the participants’ words, and did not miss any important themes.  
Finally, at the end of the process, I conducted a final review of the codes and memos 
to ensure that no major themes had been missed.  
     Authenticity has five dimensions (Lincoln & Guba, 2000).  I addressed the first 
dimension, fairness, by working closely with the cooperative’s leadership to ensure 
that those participants who were chosen reflected the overall voice of the 
community.  The nature of the interviews ensured a safe and fair space so that honest 




ontological authenticity, by ensuring that the participants understood how their 
answers fit into the larger context of knowledge of the reintegration of ex-
combatants.  The third dimension, catalytic authenticity, refers to creating a 
foundation for potential for change.  I believe this was (and will be) addressed by 
improving participant awareness of the global importance of understanding the DDR 
process; the participants will become stakeholders in sharing knowledge and 
wisdom.  The participants will have the opportunity to tell their story to a wider 
audience.  Through this process I will also address the fourth dimension, tactical 
authenticity, which refers to empowerment.  The fifth dimension, educative 
authenticity, I believe will be evident in the final outcome of this study.  As a 
beginning researcher, collaborating with the ex-combatants to elicit their stories will 
facilitate my understanding of the study question from multiple perspectives.   
      I would also like to add that I believe my authenticity and trustworthiness as a 
researcher in a cross-cultural setting has been enhanced by my taking up residence 
in the cooperative for 4 months in 2007.  Establishing rapport with the participants 
(Charmaz, 2006, p. 19) allowed me as the primary researcher to enter into the 
participants’ world and to gain richer understanding.  Learning about their views, 
their lives and their perspectives allowed me to reflect on “what our research 
participants take for granted or do not state as well as what they say and do” (p. 19).  
After having lived in the community for 4 months, and after having heard educational 
presentations, watched community plays produced by the youth and read historical 
material, it was evident to me that there was a strong collective understanding and 
memory regarding the community’s recent history. 
Anticipated Ethical Issues 
      Prior to engaging in the interview process, I discussed the ethical issues of this 
study with both the community representatives and with the participants themselves.  
In addition to the priority goal of eliciting input, the purpose of these meetings was 
to facilitate a sense of community involvement and to ensure that this research 
project was as collaborative as possible.  Colonizing discourse (Fine, Weis, Weseen, 
& Wong, 2000, p. 108) is the historical tendency to separate out the researcher from 
the subject.  Bringing in the community leaders to address ethical issues may have 
assisted to break down that separation.   
     Firstly, I met with the community’s Junta Directiva (community council made up of 
a president, vice president and several other elected officials).  Upon reviewing the 
study, the Junta Directiva recommended that the following issues be addressed:  




approached to participate, but that youth within the community should not be 
recruited.  Secondly, they requested that the community receive a written summary 
of this dissertation (in Spanish) so that the knowledge and understanding gained 
could not only be shared with the community, but also remain as co-property of the 
community.  Thirdly, they acknowledged the importance of some form of community 
compensation, in return for the appropriation of the community’s time and 
knowledge.  To this end, a library project had already been proposed and initiated 
at this point by myself and activist colleagues, with the purpose of hiring young 
people who were attending either high school or university.  The wages were to be a 
source of well-needed income to support secondary and post-secondary education 
which often was cost-prohibitive in the community.   
     Next, I approached all potential participants with a written consent form (see 
Appendix A) which listed the potential ethical issues (e.g., a community member 
read the consent form to one participant who could not read).  Among other issues, 
the participants and I discussed the potential harm of participation, the absence of 
any personal compensation, and confidentiality.  Upon completion of these 
individual discussions, all potential participants understood how the material was 
going to be used.  Participants were given the choice of having their names attached 
to the study.  In addition, participants were given the choice to have a DVD copy of 
their interview placed in the new community library as an archive of their 
experience of reintegration.  Also, each participant was given a DVD copy of his/her 
interview for his/her personal use. 
          In light of the power imbalance between myself (a foreign researcher) and 
members of the community, I acknowledge that there is the potential imbalance, as 
well in the benefits, of the research process.  Although not articulated in these terms, 
the Junta Directiva aptly addressed this issue through their requests to ensure that 
the community had something to gain from the process.  As an additional response 
to this issue, I have collaborated with the community (along with other Canadian 
activists) to establish a fund to be used by community and youth to access secondary 
and post-secondary education opportunities.  This was established before the study 
had begun, and the first recipient was able to come to Canada to study English at a 
post-secondary institution.  This endeavour was considered a priority for the 
community’s effort to expand their eco- and solidarity tourism projects, as no 
members of the cooperative had previously been able to speak English.    
     In lieu of an Institutional Review Board, my dissertation supervisor acted as an 
ethics monitor throughout the research process.  Although this process was more 




had more intimate knowledge of the context of the research than an institutional 
review board, and our relationship lasted for the entire length of the research 
process. 
 Description of Methodology 
     The purpose of this study is to gain a deep understanding of the reintegration 
experience of a group of ex-combatants.  An inquiry such as this lends itself to in-
depth interviews, due to the personal and experiential nature of the subject.  
Although information from interviews can be analyzed both quantitatively and 
qualitatively (Patton, 2002), a qualitative inquiry facilitated the understanding of an 
inherently personal transition from combatant to member of civil society.  
Grounded Theory      
      I have utilized grounded theory as my methodology.  Grounded theory is a set of 
“systematic yet flexible guidelines for collecting and analyzing qualitative data to 
construct theories ‘grounded’ in the data themselves” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 2).  
Grounded theory has appealed to many qualitative researchers because it allows 
the inquiry to move beyond description to generate a theory (Creswell, 2007).  It 
consists of developing increasingly abstract ideas about the meaning of the 
participants’ reflections and ideas and finding data to refine emerging conceptual 
frameworks (Charmaz, 2005, p. 508). 
     There are a number of iterations of grounded theory.  However, I have adhered 
most closely to that of Charmaz (2006), because her social constructionist 
perspective fits with the epistemological assumptions of this inquiry.  
     I believe grounded theory is best suited for this study for several reasons.  Firstly, 
as stated above, grounded theory provides a process to move the inquiry beyond 
description to potentially offer a theoretical framework.  In this instance, grounded 
theory has provided a better understanding of the core phenomenon of 
reintegration, by understanding at a conceptual level what conditions, processes 
and forces influenced successful reintegration of the ex-combatants, and what 
conditions may have challenged reintegration.  The process of coding has provided 
a coherent and dynamic process through which the data could be analyzed to move 
from simple definitions and categories, to a complex framework.  The coding 
process has helped me as the researcher to remain attuned to the participants’ views 
of their realities (Charmaz, 2000, p. 515).  Ultimately, I believe this process has 




     Secondly, grounded theory has provided a process in which the voices and views 
of the ex-combatants are given validity and legitimacy.  The steps and procedures of 
this methodology that I used helped me prevent any pre-existing or extraneous 
concept (or voice) from creeping into the analysis (Glaser as cited in Charmaz, 2000, 
p. 511).  Thirdly, grounded theory, as a qualitative methodology, calls for the 
simultaneous involvement in data collection and analysis (Charmaz, 2006, p. 5), and 
therefore is sufficiently flexible to allow the researcher to use the data to influence 
and reshape the collection process, yet rigid enough to prevent process derailment.  
“The rigor of grounded theory approaches offers qualitative researchers a set of 
clear guidelines from which to build explanatory frameworks that specify 
relationships among concepts”  (Charmaz, 2000, p. 510).  This flexible process 
allowed for more input from the ex-combatant participants.  For example, 
participants provided feedback on preliminary analyses.  Grounded theory has 
allowed for changes and revisions in the methodology (such as asking additional 
questions or expanding the number of participants) based on the input of the 
participants.  
     Fourthly, because this is an inductive form of inquiry, the grounded theorist does 
not start from a place of logically deduced pre-conceived hypotheses (Charmaz, 
2006, p. 5), but rather is open to an authentic unfolding of understanding.  Charmaz 
(2000) explains that grounded theory helps researchers to gain authentic 
understanding by utilizing strategies that are neither rigid nor prescriptive, by 
focusing on meaning to further (rather than limit) interpretive understanding, and by 
embracing the relativistic paradigm of social constructionism (p. 510).  In addition, 
the inductive nature of grounded theory allows the researcher to remain open:  
“Unlike quantitative research that requires data to fit into preconceived standardized 
codes, the researcher’s interpretations of data shape his or her emergent codes in 
grounded theory” (2000, p. 515).  Put more simply, my pre-conceived 
understandings of the participants’ reintegration experience were not centralized in 
the data collection or analysis. 
Role of Researcher 
     According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000, p. 19), the role of the researcher is to 
record one’s own observation while also uncovering the meaning or voice of the 
participants he or she is studying.  This speaks to the idea that the researcher is an 
instrument or tool to disseminate someone else’s message.  The role of the 
researcher, therefore, is shrouded with responsibility. It is necessary to share 
control to the point of allowing participants’ voices to dominate (Lincoln & Guba, 




researcher, have determined the salient questions, how data would be collected, 
and how it would be disseminated.   Considering the declared ontological, 
epistemological and axiological assumptions of this inquiry, it was necessary for me 
to engage in the process of reflexivity, which necessitated the acknowledgement of 
how my role and myself have influenced the voices of those I have attempted to 
represent (p. 183).  
I, as principal researcher, personally conducted the interviews.  I was also 
responsible for negotiating permission from the community to conduct the research, 
and to disseminate any relevant findings from the study.  I guided my role of 
researcher according to the grounded theory researcher characteristics which 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) articulate:  the ability to step back and critically analyze 
situations, the ability to recognize the tendency towards bias, and sensitivity to the 
words and actions of participants (p. 7).  
Sources of Data 
     The primary source of data was the videotaped interviews of members of the 
Nuevo Horizonte Cooperative.  The interviews were a particularly well-suited form 
of data collection to study people’s understandings, and to document their personal 
experiences and perspectives (Kvale, 1996, p. 105).  Interviews were video 
recorded in order to provide additional contextual information (such as facial 
expression, body language and other nonverbal cues) that audio recording alone 
could not provide (Kvale, 1996, p. 161).  
     In analyzing the data, I referred to two informal conversations that took place in 
the Fall of 2007, when I lived in the community.  I took notes during these 
conversations and kept them among my preliminary notes and was able to refer 
back to them during my analysis of the interviews.  These two conversations were 
with community members who agreed to be participants in this study.   
     While I lived in Nuevo Horizonte, from September to December 2007, I read some 
community documents, attended community presentations and watched a play 
performed by the local youth group on the history of their community.  While I do 
not refer directly to these data sources, they indirectly acted upon this inquiry as 
influencing my lived experience in the community of Nuevo Horizonte.  In addition 
to the two conversations to which I refer in the above paragraph, there were 
countless conversations over coffee and during mealtimes with community 
members.  I do not refer to any of these directly, but nonetheless, they formed a 




influenced my perspectives on how and why I chose to pursue this study, and 
therefore, need to be acknowledged.    
Data Collection Procedures 
     The formal data collection process took place over a period of several weeks, 
from December 13 to December 30, 2009.  During this time, I traveled to Nuevo 
Horizonte from Canada and resided in the community for most of this period.  Prior 
to arriving in Guatemala, I had received approval in principle to conduct the 
interviews from the Junta Directiva.  Upon arrival in Nuevo Horizonte, I met with the 
Junta Directiva in person and received their formal approval after agreeing to 
several conditions (discussed in Ethical Issues section).   
      Prior to the formal data collection, I conducted some informal preliminary 
interviews in the Fall of 2007 when I lived in Nuevo Horizonte.  This exercise allowed 
me to evaluate issues such as trust, community interest in the topic, willingness of 
people to participate, appropriateness of interview format and style (including 
nature of questions), and my ability to conduct this process in Spanish.  On all 
accounts, I felt sufficiently satisfied that this project had community endorsement, 
and that there was the potential to collaborate successfully. 
     In keeping with grounded theory process, I was open during the data collection 
process to questions that arose during the research that allowed for the construction 
of new data gathering methods and for the revision of earlier ones (Charmaz, 2006, 
p. 15).  During the analysis, however, I was satisfied that the data collection 
procedures that I utilized were sufficient. 
Selection of Participants    
     The process for selecting participants began before I travelled to Nuevo 
Horizonte.  I established a relationship with a university student from Nuevo 
Horizonte, Arnulfo, (the son of two ex-combatants) to assist in this process.  It was 
necessary for me to coordinate this process with a local contact, due to my 
geographic distance from the community, and due to the short period of time that I 
was able to be in Nuevo Horizonte.  I selected Arnulfo to help me because I knew 
him well, because of his interest in the topic, and because of his young age, he was 
excluded from being chosen as a participant.  Prior to my arrival, Arnulfo began 
formulating a list of potential participants, based on the agreed-upon criteria 
(discussed below).  Upon my arrival, I met with Arnulfo, who had agreed to help me 




We then began the process of visiting potential participants by going to their homes, 
presenting them with the consent form (which explained the nature of the study in 
detail) and answering any questions.  The consent form was left with the person and 
a mutually convenient time was arranged for the interview.   
     This process was flexible.  Of the preliminary list of 10 participants, we were 
unable to contact three people, due to their schedules or absences.  There was one 
other person we were able to contact, and although she wanted to participate, she 
was unable to due to her work schedule and holiday plans.  Arnulfo and I added new 
names.  This process of finding available participants lasted for most of my time in 
the community.  In the end, 10 community members agreed to be interviewed and 
agreed to a time to be interviewed.  Ultimately, two of these people did not 
participate.  A family issue came up for one person, and she was unable to make the 
interview time.  Because this interview was set up for the last day of my time in the 
community, it was not possible to reschedule.  The second person had agreed to the 
interview upon our first encounter.  However, when I returned to conduct the 
interview he had changed his mind.  He stated that after having read the consent 
form, he felt needed more time to think about the issues and did not feel prepared.  
He told me that if I were to return at a later date (as his interview was also on the last 
day of my stay) he would be willing to be interviewed then.   
     Selection criteria for including participants included:  a) current members of 
Nuevo Horizonte cooperative and b) participated as combatants in the guerrilla 
forces (URNG) during the Guatemalan Civil War.  A cross-section of men and women 
was sought, as was a representation of various ages.   In the end, five were men and 
three were women.  The ages ranged from the 40s to the 70s.     
     I planned for a sample size of 8-10 participants.  I justify this number for two 
reasons:  firstly, using a grounded theory qualitative approach, I was not seeking 
generalizability from the interviews (Kvale, 1996) and secondly, I acknowledge that 
the nature of grounded theory methodology is dynamic, and therefore, I had a 
contingency plan to expand the number of interviews, if saturation of information 
was not initially attained.  As Kvale states:  “The interviews bring forth new and 
unexpected aspects” (p. 102); therefore, this number was a starting point, and 
theoretical sampling would have been employed (described later) if required.  
Sampling was conducted to the point of saturation, that is, when no new information 
was elicited (Kvale, 1996, p. 102).   
     In evaluating whether quality or sufficiency of data has been attained from the 




 Have I collected enough background data about persons, processes 
and settings to have ready recall and to understand the context of a 
participant’s story? 
 Have I gained descriptions from a range of participants’ views? 
 Does the data move beyond the superficial? 
 Have I gathered data to develop analytic categories? 
 What kinds of comparisons can I make with the data?  How do these 
comparisons generate and inform ideas? 
Pre-Interview Preparation 
     I anticipated initiating the interview process with an orientation meeting for all 
participants, for the purposes of (a) creating an opportunity to seek mutual 
clarification of the goals of the study, (b) presenting them with the global scope of 
reintegration of ex-combatants, and (c) eliciting from them ideas on what successful 
reintegration looks like.  However, this orientation session did not occur.  This was 
mainly due to the fact that my contact, Arnulfo, did not think it was necessary and 
that attendance would probably have been poor.  However, I believe these three 
goals were accomplished by raising them individually with each participant at the 
beginning of each interview. 
Description of the Interviews 
     According to Loflund and Loflund (1995), an interview provides an avenue for in-
depth exploration of a particular experience, and was therefore appropriate to elicit 
information regarding a journey of reintegration for ex-combatants.  The 
researcher’s questions allow the participants to reflect upon experiences in ways 
that seldom occur in everyday life, and rarely present an opportunity through 
normal informal conversation (Charmaz, 2006, p. 25).  The two specific research 
questions were broad, open-ended questions, and were intended to focus the 
interview while inviting detailed discussions on the topic (Charmaz, p. 26). 
     From a social constructionist perspective, I acknowledge that the interview 
participants were actively constructing knowledge around questions and responses 
(Holstein & Gubrium, 1995).  The actual interviews were a combination of structured 
and unstructured formats.  The structured nature was based on the fact that each 
participant was asked two specific questions, as outlined in the introduction of this 
chapter.  These questions were given to each participant prior to the interview.  The 
rationale for this was to elicit thoughtful, rational responses to the research questions 




may facilitate comparisons.  In addition, the interview also had unstructured 
characteristics, as evidenced by their allotted length (up to one hour to allow time 
for participants to own the direction of conversation).  The purpose of this was to 
allow and encourage the emotional dimension of the participants’ responses 
(Fontana & Frey, 2000, p. 650). 
     The actual interviews were structured as follows (Kvale, 1996): 
a) Pre-interview:   
I conducted an equipment check for audio and video function.  I also secured 
the selected interview location for appropriateness with regards to privacy, 
sound and comfort.  The interview locations varied as they were chosen by 
the participants themselves based on what was convenient.  They ranged from 
people’s living rooms to porches, to offices and work sites.   
b) Introduction:   
The participant and I reviewed the purpose of study and the purpose of the 
interview.  This was accomplished primarily by reviewing the written consent 
form.  Because the consent form was given to the participants prior to the 
interview, they had the opportunity to formulate any questions or comments.  
After this discussion, I obtained written informed consent from each 
participant.   
c) Body of Interview: 
The interviews were semi-structured, but consistently began with the primary 
research question:  What was your experience of reintegration like?  Towards 
the end of the interview, I asked each participant the same question:  What 
advice do you have for other ex-combatants who are re-integrating back into 
society?  Throughout the interviews, I utilized a variety of open ended-
questions and a range of appropriate listening responses (Adler, Rosenfeld, 
Proctor & Winder, 2009), from silent listening (to facilitate the voice of 
participant and leave him/her in control), questioning (to elicit clarification, 
keep on topic, ask for further information), paraphrasing (to affirm my interest 
in the participant’s message, and to clarify my understanding of what was 
said) and supporting (to offer solidarity with the participant). 




At the end of each interview, I allowed one more opportunity to raise any 
issue, thought or opinion that had not yet been covered.  I also thanked each 
participant prior to ending the taping.   
Data Analysis Procedures 
     The following data analysis procedures are based on a grounded theory 
approach, which, according to Charmaz (2006), relies entirely on interpretation of 
the data, and not from preconceived logically deduced hypotheses (p. 5).  Because 
the grounded theory process does not set rigid boundaries between methodology 
and analysis, I provide only a brief description here of how data analysis unfolded.  I 
describe this process more fully in the following chapter. 
Part 1:  Transcribing Conversation from Video Discs    
     A transcriptionist who is fluent in both Spanish and English transcribed all the 
dialogue from the interviews in their entirety.  The videotaped conversations were 
therefore transformed into an electronic written format from which I conducted the 
analysis.  The interviews were not translated during this process, but remained 
entirely in Spanish.  Several of the recorded interviews contained small sections 
(typically less than a sentence in length) which the transcriptionist could not 
understand.  The transcriptionist has noted all these sections. 
     Once the discs were transcribed, I utilized the paper copies of the interviews 
during the methodology and analysis processes.  Prior to the transcription, however, 
I watched all of the videos and made approximately 30 pages of rough notes in my 
memo binder.  These notes included summaries, thoughts and questions.  I reviewed 
these notes and memos and made a secondary set of notes that made preliminary 
linkages among the thoughts and ideas of the participants and my preliminary 
analyses.  I completed this process while still in Guatemala.     
Part 2:  Primary Coding 
          Coding is a grounded theory process in which one defines what is happening 
in the data and in which one begins to grapple with what it means (Charmaz, 2006, p. 
46).  Coding also identifies gaps in the data (p. 48) and coding is done in 
progressive stages.  The beginning coding has been referred to as initial coding 
(Charmaz, 2006) or open coding (Creswell, 2007).  For the purposes of this study, I 
refer to the initial stage of coding as primary coding, and the second stage as 
secondary coding, to avoid the confusion of the various names, and to describe 




     I began primary coding with a detailed analysis of the data, in this case interview 
transcripts, and broke the data into small discrete chunks of information.  For the 
purposes of this study, I employed thought-by-thought coding, which works well 
with issues and with information collected from interviews and gives the reader a 
clear picture of the ideas (assumptions, meanings, significance of what was said).  It 
also offers a sufficiently detailed approach to safeguard against the superimposition 
of preconceived notions (Charmaz, 2006). Thought-by-thought primary coding 
identifies categories and processes in a way to allow comparison of the data among 
the various interviews.  Charmaz exemplifies this flexibility by asserting that if a 
category or process is identified in a later interview, the researcher can then go 
back to previous interviews to see if that category or process can be used to explain 
those as well (p. 53). 
     Charmaz offers advice to the researcher regarding the challenge of forcing the 
coding into pre-conceived codes and categories.  In following her advice, I have 
achieved intimate familiarity with the phenomenon, I have defined what is 
happening in the data first (that is, keeping an open mind during the initial coding 
phase) and during the primary coding phase, and I reflected on the following: 
 How does my coding reflect the incident or described experience? 
 Do my analytic constructions begin from this point? 
 Have I created clear, evident connections between the data and my 
codes?  
 Have I guarded against re-writing and therefore recasting the studied 
experience into a lifeless language that better fits our academic and 
bureaucratic worlds than those or our participants? (2006, p. 69). 
     The ultimate result of the primary coding was the preliminary analysis of the core 
phenomenon, which in this study was Reintegration.  
Part 3:  Secondary Coding: Creating Categories Around Core Phenomenon   
     In order to begin the process of conceptualizing categories, I coded information 
based on the following categories (as they relate to the core phenomenon of 
reintegration), based on Strauss and Corbin (1998):  
 Conditions (what factors preceded reintegration?) 
 Strategies (what actions were taken in response to reintegration?) 




 Lessons Learned (what advice can we discern from the experience of 
reintegration?) 
     I utilized these categories for my initial analysis for the following reasons:  firstly, 
reintegration is a dynamic process, with a specific beginning and an endpoint.  My 
preliminary notes and memos supported the idea that the participants reflected on 
their experience in the same way–as a dynamic and chronological process.  
Secondly, these categories were sufficiently broad and general to capture the 
concrete stories and occurrences from the interviews, as well as the conceptual 
reflections and analyses.   
     Secondary coding takes the analysis of the data to a higher level.  According to 
Strauss and Corbin (1998), primary coding breaks apart data and secondary coding 
is a strategy to bring the data back together to form a coherent message, and can be 
organized to address the above questions.  Secondary coding brings the thought-by-
thought coding together into broader concepts.   
     During the process of coding, Charmaz (2006) contends that memo writing assists 
in the analysis of the material and supports its trustworthiness (p. 72).  These memos 
act as the mode for making comparisons among all the data.  I adhered to these 
guidelines in writing memos:  each memo had a specific title according to its 
analytical properties, memos were structured to chart observed and predicted 
relationships among the data and to identify gaps in the analyses (Charmaz, pp. 80-
82).  Memos were also questions aimed at framing further inquiries or summaries 
when the same theme was found in more than one interview.   
     When I travelled to Nuevo Horizonte to conduct the interviews, I wrote memos in 
a notebook.  I tended to write memos at certain times:  immediately after each 
interview, in the evening upon reflecting on the day’s events, and also whenever a 
certain thought came to mind.  The memos written after the interviews tended to be 
summarizing in nature, describing how the process unfolded and what my 
immediate thoughts were about the content of the interview.  As the number of 
completed interviews grew, I wrote additional memos that highlighted emerging 
themes, similarities or contradictions among the interview.  Many memos were 
written in point form and were the basis for discussion items in Chapter 5 of this 
paper.   




 Initial thoughts–concentrated a lot on the conflict, had a macro analysis, not 
micro (December 17, 2009 
 I was struck on my way back to my room, as I passed little children playing in 
the playground–their complete sense of peace and freedom (December 18, 
2009). 
      Examples of memos written during coding are provided here: 
 Talks about label of communists and how the labeling is used against them 
(January 29, 2010). 
 Identity–they did not actually change their identity, they had a strong positive 
collective identity that did not change with reintegration–the people around 
them needed to change, and they did (February 4, 2010). 
     These four memos offer examples of memos written as personal reflections, as 
interpretations of how I perceived the interviews, and as analysis of interview 
content. 
     I continued to write memos during the analysis phase, after the interviews had 
been transcribed.   My memos became the method for me to continue to make 
linkages between interview commonalities, and linkages between related topics.  
Memos allowed me to elicit questions from a certain interview, which would send me 
back to a different interview for comparison.  I used memos to reflect on the 
authenticity of my interpretations.    
     After the secondary coding, I further framed the codes using two different 
dimensions or two layers.  The decision to perform this was based on my analysis of 
the primary codes.  More specifically, the process of primary coding revealed more 
information regarding the participants’ thoughts on strategies used during 
reintegration, and their ideas on how they thought reintegration was successful (or 
not).   
     The two dimensions refer to the process of taking the codes and framing them in 
two separate ways.  In the first dimension I analyzed the codes by developing a set 
of themes that lent an understanding to the strategies used during reintegration.  In 
the second dimension I analyzed the codes by addressing the question of whether 
reintegration (the core phenomenon) was deemed to be successful or not.   




     Prior to conducting the interviews, I identified some criteria that I would use to 
determine whether I would need to arrange for additional interviews.  If elaboration 
or refinement were necessary in order for the information to be more robust, I would 
have performed what Charmaz (2006) calls “theoretical sampling.”  How this would 
actually be accomplished would have depended on what data categories and 
themes may have emerged.  For example, if there was a theme based on the issue of 
gender, I would have worked with the community to select members from the 
cooperative who may have had important contributions to make.  Because the pool 
of potential participants was limited, and because all participants were well known 
to each other, this process may have been conducted quite informally. 
     After the data analysis was completed, I decided that further interviewing was not 
necessary.  I provide a more detailed rationale for this decision in the next chapter.  
Part 5:  Developing a Theoretical Model 
     The final step of data analysis is to move the data reporting beyond mere 
description to the development of a theoretical model.  In keeping with the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions of this inquiry, theory will emphasize 
understanding of the phenomenon, rather than the more positivist aims of 
explanation and prediction (Charmaz, 2006, p. 126).  In order to conceptualize the 
phenomenon in abstract terms: 
 Coding the data provides the opportunity to establish connections 
between the core phenomenon and causal conditions, strategies, 
intervening conditions and consequences. 
 By this stage, core phenomenon will be identified. 
 Data will be saturated, as verified through further interviews 
determined by theoretical sampling. 
Other categories and concepts were identified, and relationships among the 
concepts were documented and explored based on memo writing.   
     Strauss and Corbin (1990) identify several criteria to assist in generating a 
grounded theory: 
 Are concepts systematically related? 
 Are there many conceptual linkages, and are the categories well 
developed? 




    In order to make the analytical transition from secondary coding to the 
development of a theoretical framework, an additional level of coding can be 
utilized.  Charmaz (2006) refers to this process as theoretical coding, a sophisticated 
analysis that conceptualizes how the codes may relate to each other as propositions 
or hypotheses to be integrated into a theory (p. 63).  “In short, theoretical codes 
specify possible relationships between categories you have developed in your 
focused coding” (p. 63).   
     In the next chapter, I demonstrate how I re-analyzed the secondary codes to form 
relationships that moved the analysis beyond the descriptive to a coherent 
conceptualization of the process of reintegration.  From a thorough analysis during 
primary and secondary coding I created themes and connections that moved 
beyond the linear framework (conditions, strategies, consequences and lessons 
learned) that I had developed before the analysis began.  As new information was 
incorporated, this preliminary framework of categories seemed insufficient to 
incorporate all relevant connections.  Although I did not anticipate incorporating this 
third stage of coding during my initial methodology outline, the need to more fully 
develop categories arose during the analysis phase of the research process.  I 
provide a more detailed discussion on the reasons for this additional level of coding, 
and for developing a framework that moved beyond the categories I had originally 
thought would be encompassing enough in the next chapter (found in Part 5:  
Developing a Theoretical Model, A) Developing Themes, p. 127).    
Summary 
     In this chapter, I have provided a detailed description of the process of inquiry 
that I used to investigate how Guatemalan ex-combatants have made the transition 
into civilian life.  I have described the stages that I utilized from the starting point of 
articulating one’s philosophical foundations to collecting and progressively 
analysing data to arrive at a theoretical framework to understand the process of 
reintegration.  In this chapter, I have justified the utilization of the various techniques 
and methodologies by referring to established grounded theory practitioners and 
authors, particularly Charmaz (2006).  In the next chapter, I provide a more detailed 




Chapter 4:  Analysis and Findings 
Introduction 
     In this chapter, I describe the stages of data exploration and analysis, beginning 
from note taking and memo writing to constructing a conceptual framework, and 
finally, to developing a theoretical framework.  Before initiating the description of 
the initial coding phase, I believe it is necessary to define a few of the terms used in 
this chapter.   
     The term, core phenomenon, refers to the main or foundational issue on which this 
analysis is based.  As such, the core phenomenon (the process of reintegration) was 
established or defined in the preliminary phase of developing the research 
question.  The core phenomenon in this study is the reintegration of ex-combatants.   
     The term, code, refers to the short summaries of the thoughts and reflections of 
the participant interviews.  Coding is the process by which I summarized and 
interpreted the interview transcripts.  During the analysis, I initially employed two 
stages of coding, which I refer to as primary and secondary coding.  I describe these 
processes in greater detail in subsequent sections of this chapter.    
     The term, category, is used to define how the codes have been organized, based 
on the core phenomenon, reintegration.  During the secondary coding phase, the 
following four categories were used to flesh out the core phenomenon of 
reintegration:  conditions, strategies, consequences and lessons learned.   These 
categories provide a preliminary organizational framework, somewhat linear and 
concrete, from which I then derive a more conceptual or theoretical framework.   
     The term, two-dimensional framework, describes the next stage of analysis:  After 
the secondary coding, I further framed the codes using two different dimensions or 
two layers.  The two dimensions refer to the process of taking the codes and framing 
them in two separate ways.  In the first dimension I analyze the codes by developing 
a set of themes that lend an understanding to the strategies used during 
reintegration.  In the second dimension I analyze the codes by addressing the 
question of whether reintegration (the core phenomenon) was deemed to be 
successful or not.   
     The term, theory, is used in the context of grounded theory, as articulated by 
Charmaz (2006).  At the end of this chapter, I arrive at a theory, that is, a 
conceptualization of the phenomenon of reintegration, and how I have understood 




     I have used the terms themes and strategies, though distinct in many contexts, 
interchangeably in this chapter.  In describing the five emerging themes, I also call 
them strategies.  In my understanding both terms are correct, as the five of them 
(e.g., being united) are a collection of recurring ideas and patterns (themes) and at 
the same time represent coherent actions (strategies) that were utilized in order to 
achieve an articulated goal (successful reintegration).  Therefore, both these terms 
seem appropriate and interrelated.    
Analysis 
Part 1:  Informal Review of Videos Prior to Transcription 
     As Charmaz (2006) contends, data collection and analysis occur simultaneously 
and influence each other.  After the eight interviews were conducted and recorded, I 
left the community of Nuevo Horizonte to reflect on the process to that point.  I had 
planned on conducting two more interviews after this break, but as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, these two follow-up interviews did not occur. 
     During this break, I reviewed all of the video recordings and made notes.  These 
notes represented my thoughts, interpretations and understandings of the 
participants’ responses.  Many notes took the forms of questions:  How did one 
particular reflection relate to another?  How did one opinion relate to my pre-
conceived notions, or to theory, or to my review of the literature?  Many of these 
preliminary notes represented the memo writing process as described by Charmaz 
(2006, p. 72), as they prompted many connections between various expressed views 
and thoughts and conceptual framing.  In summary, these notes and memos 
highlighted the participants’ sense that being united was a major factor in their 
process of reintegration.     
     I continued memo writing throughout the analysis process.  I kept these 
handwritten memos and notes in a notebook, and this documentation served as an 
ongoing diary to which I was able to refer throughout the analysis.   
     After having completed the coding and the development of the theoretical 
framework, I once again reviewed the notes and memos to ascertain whether there 
was a consistency between the two.  I concluded after my review that the theoretical 
framework authentically represented my preliminary notes and memos.  I 
concluded that there were no important themes or issues that were omitted or 




framework.  After this initial review, the interviews were transcribed.   I conducted 
the subsequent analysis from the written transcriptions. 
Part 2:  Primary Coding 
     After the taped interviews were transcribed, I reviewed each interview 
thoroughly, in its written form, and wrote codes in a margin on the left hand side of 
the page.  I completed this process twice.  During the first phase, most of my codes 
were descriptive summaries; however, some codes moved beyond mere 
description to interpretation.  This process lasted several months; I completed the 
coding of each transcribed interview once I received it from the transcriptionist.  
They came to me usually one per week.   
    After having written primary codes for all of the interviews, I reviewed the coding 
process thus far with my dissertation supervisor.  Upon her advice, I approached 
them for a second time, attempting to develop codes that were more strictly 
descriptive and less interpretive, in order to remain as authentic to the participants’ 
voices as possible.  This second phase of primary coding took less than a week, and 
occurred approximately after a 6-week interlude after the first session was 
completed.  I believe this break in between repeating the coding process allowed 
for a fresh and clear second approach, and at the same time, allowed a chance to 
review the process when I had much more comfort and familiarity with the data.  
After these two thorough reviews, I believed I had a good grasp of the content, to the 
point where I could recognize the authorship of many quotes that I had previously 
pulled out from the interviews.    
     During this second phase of primary coding, I developed a total of 438 codes from 
the interviews (see Appendix B).  The structure of the codes was fairly loose; some 
codes were only several words while some codes were complete sentences.     
Part 3:  Secondary Coding: Creating Categories Around a Core Phenomenon 
     The 438 primary codes were printed on coloured paper (a different color for each 
interview to keep track from which participant each code came) and cut up into 
pieces of paper and arranged according to themes. I undertook this step in order to 
track the distribution of various themes among the interviewees once the codes 
were consolidated into broader categories.  Appendix B demonstrates this 
distribution of codes according to interview.   
     I organized the primary codes using the headings (categories) of conditions, 




Strauss and Corbin (1998).  These categories were based on the core phenomenon: 
reintegration.  I utilized these categories for my initial analysis for the following 
reasons:  firstly, reintegration is a dynamic process, with a specific beginning and an 
endpoint.  My preliminary notes and memos supported the idea that the participants 
reflected on their experience in the same way–as a dynamic and chronological 
process.  Secondly, these categories were sufficiently broad and general to capture 
the concrete stories and occurrences from the interviews, as well as the conceptual 
reflections and analyses.  To align a code under one of the four categories, I asked 
the following questions during sorting:             
 What were the conditions that influenced reintegration? 
 What were the strategies used to reintegrate? 
 What were the consequences of reintegration? 
 What were the lessons learned? 
     The table below displays how I sorted the 438 primary codes according to the 
four categories and their corresponding question listed above.  Of the 438 codes, 63 
did not neatly fall into the four categories and were therefore categorized as 
miscellaneous.  The reason these codes did not fit was mainly because they were 
from conversation about events that did not relate to reintegration.  Most commonly, 
these codes represented summaries of conversations about the Civil War, were 
about the current political situation, or were in other ways unrelated to the study 
topic.  These 63 codes were eliminated from the subsequent analysis. 
     The table below also lists the 50 secondary codes, and displays how many 
primary codes were collapsed into each secondary code.  For example, under the 
category of Conditions, the 76 primary codes were analyzed during the secondary 
coding phase, and grouped and collapsed into 12 codes.   Appendix B breaks down 





Table 4.1:  Secondary Codes 







Conditions 76 12 Hope (2)  
We were organized (1)  
No skills for civil life (16)   
Fear/uncertainty/mistrust (13)  
Had nothing (10)  
Inadequate formal process (10)  
Poor leadership/representation (9)  
Feeling vulnerable (6)  
Feeling forgotten/abandoned (2)  
Feeling judged (2)  
Difficult conditions (4)  
In touch with our history (1)  
Strategies 70 11 Working with people from other 
countries (5)  
Being organized/working together 
(16)  
Building community infrastructure (5)  
Positive attitude (1) 
Took charge (3)  




Non-violence (2)  
Learning a skill (3)  
Reached out to neighbours (16)  
Used our knowledge from the war (1)  
Ideological framework (9)  
Consequences 153 16 Life is good (7)  
Received a lot of outside help and 
recognition (2)  
Re-integrated with our neighbours (7)  
Employment still a problem (5)  
The repression has stopped (12)  
We’re in charge of our future (5)  
Still engaged in political struggle (15)  
Building community infrastructure (10)  
Feel betrayed, let down (26)  
Violence continues, just a different 
type (5)  
We remain united (18)  
Don’t rely on the state for anything 
(13)  
A cynical analysis of the world (11)  





There was some success (4)  
Debt (10)  
Lessons Learned 76 11 We didn’t negotiate well (8)  
Stay united (14)  
Need to be in charge of the process 
(9)  
Work with other ex-combatants (3)  
Need to know what you’re getting into 
(12)  
Integrate with the locals (4)  
Need strong mechanisms to 
implement peace accords (8)  
Struggle through nonviolence (6)  
Hard Work is necessary (2)  
Apathy, cynicism  (3)  
Need to have a good analysis of the 
causes of war and conflict (7)  
Miscellaneous 63   
Total  438 50  
*The number after each of the secondary codes represents the number of primary 
codes that were grouped or collapsed into the secondary code 
     In the following analysis, I demonstrate further how the codes and categories fit 
together by sharing quotes from the interviews.  I translate each quote into English 
and place them next to each other in the body of this paper.  I believe that placing 
the Spanish excerpts directly into this paper allows the participants’ voices to be 
directly visible to the reader, even if he or she is unable to read Spanish.    




     The 12 secondary codes in this category attest to the vulnerability of the ex-
combatants as they entered the reintegration process.  While the secondary codes 
represent an array of sentiments, including ideas such as hope, being organized and 
being in touch with our history, the majority attest to the difficult condition in which 
they were placed.  They had nothing, they did not have the experience to engage in 
negotiating their process, and they felt judged, forgotten and abandoned.  In 
addition, they had no jobs, financial resources or practical skills.  I believe the most 
appropriate way to summarize their conditions was to say that they were vulnerable. 
     The following comments attest to their vulnerability: 
“El salir de la selva, el dejar el equipo militar, uno siente como 
salir desnudo y sin protección.” (interview #1) 
Leaving the jungle (where we lived as combatants), leaving 
your weapons, one feels like one is coming out naked and 
without any protection. 
“Y digo que es una cuestión duda porque uno viene con ese 
miedo, con ese temor de que ¿Qué nos ira a pasar, no?” 
(interview #1) 
I say that it is a question full of doubt because one comes with 
this fear:  what is going to happen to us? 
“Bastante duro.  Bastante duro en el sentido de cuando nos 
integramos a la vida civil nuevamente era como empezar de 
Nuevo, como empezar de cero.” (interview #5) 
Really tough.  Really tough in the sense that when we 
integrated ourselves back into civilian life it was like 
beginning all over again, like beginning from zero. 
“Creíamos que iba a ser una maniobra política y que iba a ser 
una cuestión de que después nos iban a reprimir e iban a 
matarnos otra vez a nosotros.” (interview #7) 
We believed that it (the peace process) was going to be a 
political manoeuvre, and that it was going to be a question of 
afterwards they were going to repress us and were going to 




“. . . el ejercito guatemalteco ha sido el mas sanguinario de la 
historia de Latinoamérica.  Entonces, firmar la paz…crea 
cierta incertidumbre o inseguridad.  Entonces eso traducido a 
lo personal de alguna manera te deja como en una situación 
así de vulnerabilidad.” (interview #8) 
The Guatemalan army has been the most bloody army in the 
history of Latin America.  Therefore, signing the peace 
accords creates a kind of uncertainty or insecurity.  This then 
translates, at a personal level, in a way that leaves you in a 
situation of vulnerability. 
B) What Strategies Were Used to Reintegrate? 
     The 11 secondary codes in this category attested to the participants’ working 
hard, building a community, connecting with neighbours seeking relationships with 
international organizations and partners, working collectively, taking charge and 
continuing with the ideological struggle. 
     The following quotes attest to this composite of strategies: 
“Y de ahí nos trasladaron para acá donde estamos.  A seguir 
trabajando hombres y mujeres. . .la pobre gente daba lastima 
porque aquí no había ni un palo.  Todo era sabana.  Para 
poder hacer las casas y el agua en lo principal. . .haciendo 
zanjas para zanjeo del agua.” (interview # 4) 
And from there we relocated ourselves to where we are now 
(Nuevo Horizonte).  We continued working, men and 
women...the poor people–it was very hard because here there 
was nothing, not even one tree.  Everything was open 
savannah.  In order to be able to build the houses at the 
beginning. . .making ditches for drainage. 
“O sea que fue bastante difícil en ese sentido la integración 
porque todo el mundo lo miraba, todo mundo lo miraba mal. . 
.pero nos propusimos que media vez tenga uno voluntad 
puede hacer muchos cambios uno dentro de la sociedad. . 
.porque nosotros a través de nuestro comportamiento, a través 




.principalmente como a nosotros como personas.” (interview 
#5) 
Reintegration was pretty difficult because everyone looked 
upon us as bad. . .but we decided to be willing to be able to 
make many changes within our society. . .because we, through 
our exemplary behaviour, through our ability to organize 
ourselves, we were demonstrating so much to them…more 
than anything, that we were human beings. 
“El día que desmovilice, lo primero que fui…es hacer parte 
de una asamblea de desarrollo comunitario en otra 
comunidad.  Lo primero que fui. . .que me puse a participar 
con la gente.  Me ofrecí con la gente a trabajar en bien de la 
comunidad.  Y esa es una cosa importante.  No los aislamos.  
Al contrario, hay que unirte a esa comunidad.  Hay que unirte 
a la población.  No hay que alejarte”. (interview #7) 
On the first day of the demobilization, I went to take part in an 
assembly on community development in another village.  The 
first thing I did. . .I immersed myself by participating with the 
people.  I offered to work with the people of the community.  
This is a very important thing.  We cannot isolate ourselves.  
On the contrary, we need to unite with the surrounding 
community. You need to unite yourself with the people.  You 
cannot move away from them. 
     These quotes and the secondary codes which they represent, describe a sense of 
seeking control over the phenomenon of reintegration.  I will discuss this in more 
depth in the next chapter. 
       C) What Were the Consequences of Reintegration? 
     More primary codes fell under the category of Consequences than any other of the 
categories (153 of the 438).  These 153 primary codes were collapsed into 16 
secondary codes (see Table 4.1).  Through this consolidation, I was able to further 
organize and synthesize the large amounts of data into a more workable and 
coherent organization.  In simple terms, one could simply ask:  based on the 
consequences of the core phenomenon, was reintegration successful or not?  Of the 




easily categorized as negative, offering a dichotomy.  This is discussed more 
thoroughly below in the section called success. 
     The following four comments exemplify ways in which outcomes of the 
reintegration process have been regarded as successful:  rebuilding a community, 
reintegrating in society and remaining united/true to their roots: 
“Ningún desperfecto por lo menos de cosas malas. Eso es lo 
que a mí me honora. Porque se oigan hablar que aquí sólo 
malos hay. Pero por la gracia de Dios hasta el momento no ha 
habido ninguna cosa mala. . .Pero por la gracia de Dios todo 
ha ido saliendo bien.” (interview #4) 
There were no damages due to bad things.  This is what I 
appreciate, because you hear people say that there are a lot of 
bad things here.  But, thanks to God, until now, there have not 
been any bad things here. . but because of God’s grace 
everything has been working out well. 
 “Porque aquí hemos tenido logros, hemos tenido éxitos de 
poco a poco irnos superando en lo que es la vida social-
económica, aunque nos ha costado mucho. Pero sí hemos ido 
aprovechando los proyectos que hemos logrado conseguir 
para la comunidad.” (interview #6) 
 But here we have had successes, we had had victories, little by 
little we move forward, surpassing in terms of socio-economic 
life, even though it has been very difficult.  But we have been 
profiting from the community projects that we have managed 
to construct. 
 “Bueno, ahorita la situación ha cambiado. Ya después de 12 
años la situación ha cambiado y la mayor parte de la gente ya 
nos ve bien a nosotros. Todavía guardamos mucho respeto… 
la gente nos aprecia. Y es poca la gente que nos ve con mucha 
diferencia.” (interview #6) 
 Well, now the situation has changed.  After 12 years, the 
situation has changed and the majority of the people now look 
at us positively.  Now we maintain a lot of respect. . .the people 




 “Ahora otro de los beneficios sería el que quedamos aquí 
agrupados, en un grupo bastante grande, y que siempre 
hemos tratado en que tenemos errores porque somos 
humanos y cometemos errores. Hemos tratado de 
mantenernos siempre en colectivo, de resolver ciertos 
problemas de la comunidad en colectivo, y trabajamos 
individual entre mi colectivo comunal y en grupitos y el 
colectivo en general, o sea, entre formas. Y gracias a nuestro 
trabajo como lo hemos traído hasta hoy día.” (interview #1)  
 Now another one of the benefits would be that we have 
remained here together, in a substantial group, and that we 
have always worked hard, in the sense that we are still human 
beings and make mistakes.  We have tried to maintain our 
collective lifestyle, to resolve our community problems 
collectively, and we work individually but within a common 
collective and in little groups, etc.  And thankfully we have 
worked in this style up until today. 
     However, there is another side to the consequences, as exemplified in the 
following comments.  The most pervasive negative consequence is the debt on their 
land, which probably has been the largest obstacle facing the community since its 
establishment.  Also, many comments reflected the disappointment with the lack of 
change, economically and socially, within the larger Guatemalan society: 
 “Ahora nosotros los guerrilleros nos quedamos endeudados 
ahorita con 6 millones ahorita en Horizonte, aquí en Horizonte, 
para pagar la tierra. Y del día que nos desmovilizamos, el año 
1996, entramos en deuda con el Estado.” (interview #7) 
 Now, we, the guerrillas are stuck with a debt of 6,000,000 
quetzales (nearly 1,000,000 USD) now in Nuevo Horizonte, 
because of our land purchase.  The very day that we 
demobilized in 1996, we went into debt with the state. 
 “En cuanto al combate de la pobreza, otro asunto. El principal 
origen de la lucha armada fue la inequidad entre los pobres y 
los ricos en Guatemala. No había equidad. Los ricos siendo 
ricos y los pobres siendo más pobres y muriéndose de 




compromisos de invertir en los bienes públicos con el interés 
de crear oportunidades y disminuir un poco la pobreza. Por el 
contrario. Si antes había pobreza, hoy hay extrema pobreza. 
Ha incrementado el número de gente más pobre. Ha 
incrementado el número de gente que se muere de 
desnutrición crónica. Y eso es no cumplir con los acuerdos de 
paz.” (interview #8) 
 In the case of combating poverty, that’s another subject.  The 
main reason for the armed struggle in the first place was the 
inequality between the rich and the poor in Guatemala.  There 
was not equity.  The rich were rich and the poor were poor and 
dying of hunger.  The peace accords were signed–the state 
assumed commitments to invest in the public goods with the 
intent of creating opportunities and reducing poverty.  But on 
the contrary, sure there was poverty before, but now there is 
extreme poverty.  The number of people living in poverty has 
increased.  The number of people suffering from chronic 
malnutrition has increased.  This is not accomplishing what 
was set out in the peace accords. 
D) What Were the Lessons Learned? 
     Each participant was asked directly what advice they would give other ex-
combatants who were going through DDR.  Their feedback was organized under the 
category called “lessons learned.” 
     Overall, their advice offers wise reflections from people who according to one 
participant, feel, if only we knew then what we know now. 
“Aquí en la comunidad también hemos adquirido mucha 
experiencia.  Aunque en realidad pudimos haber llegado a 
este lugar en otras condiciones tal vez de una forma mas 
organizada. . .que nos ha hecho falta mucha organización.  Y 
sin embargo, con la poca experiencia que teníamos de 
reinserción a la sociedad civil, hemos logrado ir escalando 
poco a poco.” (interview #6) 
Here in the community also, we have acquired a lot of 




this place in better conditions, perhaps more organized, 
because we lacked a lot of organization.  But nonetheless, with 
the little experience we had on reintegrating into civil society, 
we have succeeded in furthering ourselves little by little. 
     Some of their analysis is not surprising and fits in with information found in other 
categories (see Appendix B), namely make relations with your neighbours, be 
organized, stay united. Their advice apparently grows out of their disappointment 
and frustration with the peace accords process.   Specifically, there was resentment 
articulated about the promises that were not delivered: 
“Pero de eso, pues, se decía que a cada excombatiente se le 
iba a dar tierra adonde trabajar, su casa digna, proyectos para 
empezar a trabajar, y de eso no dieron nada. Porque lo que 
tenemos, pues, nos ha costado y ayuda de alguna otra gente.” 
(interview #1) 
Well, we were told that each ex-combatant was going to 
receive a piece of arable land, a proper house, employment, 
and they did not give us any of this.  Because what we have, 
well, came from our own hard work, and from the help of other 
people. 
“Bueno yo no le entiendo mucho a la política. . .pero así a 
nivel político, yo creo que los gobiernos que han estado de 
turno, ninguno de ellos se ha cumplido con lo que le prometió 
al pueblo para lo de la firma de la paz. Ni al pueblo, ni a los 
excombatientes.” (interview #1) 
Well, I don’t know a lot about politics, but on a political level, I 
believe that each successive government in Guatemala, none 
of them has carried through on those things that were 
promised to the people by the signing of the peace accords.   
Neither to the people, nor to the ex-combatants. 
“Que ya estábamos a punto desmovilizando, yo cargaba mi 
seguridad. Y todo estaba muy bien. Luego, media vez 
nosotros entregamos las armas, se fueron olvidando los 




At the time that we were demobilizing, I was in charge of my 
own well-being, my own security.  And all was well.  Later, 
while we were handing in our arms, they forgot that the peace 
accords even existed.  The accords were forgotten. 
“Pero en ese momento no teníamos la experiencia. Entonces 
yo pienso que tenemos que tener mucho cuidado como 
cuando se hacen las firmas de algo. . bueno, cuando decimos 
se firmó la firma de la paz.” (interview #5) 
But at this point, we didn’t have the experience.  Therefore, I 
think that we need to have a lot of diligence when we sign 
anything, for instance, when peace accords are signed.  
“El objetivo que tenía el Estado de Guatemala e incluso las 
mismas Naciones Unidas. . .el único objetivo que tenía era 
ponerle un silencio a las armas que URNG tenía.”(interview 
#2) 
The objective of the Guatemalan government and also of the 
United Nations. . .the only objective they had was to silence 
the guns of the URNG. 
“Lo único que les interesa es el silencio de las armas y no 
importa en qué condiciones quedes. O sea no hay garantía de 
que esos acuerdos sean reales. Y la verdad es que los 
acuerdos de paz de Guatemala son letras muertas en papeles 
que no son institucionales.” (interview # 3) 
The only interest they had was silencing the guns and it didn’t 
matter what other conditions remained after that.  There was 
no guarantee that these peace accords would be realized.  
And the reality is that the Guatemalan Peace Accords are 
“dead letters” on paper that have not been operationalized.  
 “Los acuerdos de paz le quedaron sólo al Estado o a los 
gobiernos. Pero no hubieron comisiones de la guerrilla o de 





 The Peace Accords remained in the hands of the government.  
But there were not commissions made up of members of the 
guerrillas or other sectors that verified the completion of the 
accords. 
 “Si antes había pobreza, hoy hay extrema pobreza. Ha 
incrementado el número de gente más pobre. Ha 
incrementado el número de gente que se muere de 
desnutrición crónica. Y eso es no cumplir con los acuerdos de 
paz.” (interview #8) 
 Sure there was poverty before, but now there is extreme 
poverty.  The number of people living in poverty has 
increased.  The number of people suffering from chronic 
malnutrition has increased.  This is not accomplishing what 
was set out in the peace accords. 
     Based on this disappointment, the advice focused on making sure parties are held 
accountable, making sure people are bargaining in good faith, and making sure the 
process is transparent. 
“Y entonces, como tú me decías que es como cuestión de 
consejo, eso diría yo a otros compañeros que están en lucha y 
que estarán dialogando la paz: que sí lo piensen bien y que sí 
dejen bien firmado los papeles con el gobierno de que si van 
a firmar algo, que lo cumpla el gobierno. Que no les pasa lo 
que pasó en Guatemala. Que en Guatemala todo lo que se 
firmó quedó en papel. En la práctica no hay nada. Y que estos 
dirigentes de estos compañeros combatientes, que si les van a 
prometer–Vamos a hablar por ustedes para que tengan casa y 
tengan tierra–que se los cumpla, para que no queden como 
estamos nosotros con una gran deuda.” (interview #2) 
So, then, like you said to me regarding the question of advice, 
this is what I would say to other compañeros (comrades) who 
are part of the struggle, or who will be negotiating peace 
accords:  think long and hard when you sign peace accords 
with a government, think long and hard about how the accords 
will be actualized.  Because this did not happen in Guatemala.  




paper.  In practice, there is nothing.  Also, our own guerrilla 
leaders, they are going to make promises–we will speak on 
your behalf and make sure you get your house and your land– 
think about how they will be completed, so that you don’t end 
up like us with a big debt on our land. 
 “Y como decía principalmente eso. . .la organización tenemos 
que tenerla, tenemos que estar siempre juntos para ver de 
lograr todo. Y lo que tenemos que tener en mente siempre es 
que lo que queremos es vivir en paz.” (interview #5) 
 Like I said to you at the beginning. . .we need to be organized, 
we have to be always together in order to succeed at all this.  
And that what we need to have in mind always is what we 
want, to live in peace. 
 “Entonces para que a otras personas, de excombatientes, no 
les pase eso. . .que sólo lo dejen en manos del gobierno que 
está, sino que hay que formar comisiones que sí verifiquen 
que eso se está cumpliendo. Porque aquí en Guatemala se 
firmó un montón de acuerdos y no se cumplen.” (interview 
#6) 
 Therefore, for other people, other ex-combatants, don’t let this 
happen, that it is left in the hands of the government.  Rather,  
form commissions that will verify that promises are being 
completed.  Because here in Guatemala, a mountain of 
accords were signed, but they were not completed. 
 “Mi consejo principal sería de que todas las organizaciones de 
izquierda que estén en este proceso de reincorporación, 
primero de que establezcan. . .bueno, que tenga una buena 
organización en la reincorporación… y luego de que se 
formen muy buenas comisiones que verifiquen el 
funcionamiento de las comisiones que los van atender a 
ellos.”(interview #6) 
 My main advice would be that all the organizations on the Left 
would be part of the reintegration process, so that we have a 




effective commissions will verify the function of these 
commissions. 
 “. . .y como consejo a otros pueblos que quieran también 
cambiar por la experiencia de nosotros. . .de hacer un trabajo 
más amplio en sus masas, en sus pueblos, en sus 
organizaciones, para que puedan tener mejores resultados de 
los acuerdos de paz.” (interview #7) 
 How I would advise other people who could learn from our 
experience. . .make the negotiations more open or 
transparent, in the organizing bodies, among the people, 
among their organizations, so that the peace accords can have 
better results. 
            It was not that the accords did not include all the aspects that the combatants 
were hoping to achieve, the issue was that the accords were not being 
operationalized. 
“Luego, media vez nosotros entregamos las armas, se fueron 
olvidando los acuerdos que existían. Se fueron olvidando.” 
(interview #2) 
 Later, while we were handing in our arms, they forgot that the 
peace accords even existed.  The accords were forgotten. 
     Based on the analysis thus far, I have chosen to illustrate the relationship of the 
categories as follows: 





Part 4:  Theoretical Sampling 
     Upon deciding that no further interviews were needed, I considered the following 
factors.  First of all, the themes and sentiments expressed in the eight interviews 
were very similar.  I suspect that their collective lifestyle has influenced them to 
develop a type of collective response.  It is not surprising that their thoughts on 
many issues were quite similar, as living together in a collective manner would 
naturally lead to a strong consensus on important issues.  In addition, their unified 
responses may reflect what Babbitt, Pomerance-Steiner, Asaqla, Chomsky-Porat and 
Kirschner (2009, p. 171) refer to as the collectively constructed hopes and dreams of 
groups that share a sense of oppression from a dominant culture.  Secondly, the 
theoretical framework that emerged did not have any missing pieces, or 
unanswered questions.  The analysis did not raise any significant new questions that 
could not be answered by the existing data. Thirdly, due to practical reasons, such 
as distance and time, it was necessary to limit travel to one trip to Guatemala.        
Part 5:  Developing a Theoretical Model 
     The 50 secondary codes were developed based on the above four categories:  
conditions, strategies, consequences and lessons learned.  However, there were 
themes emerging that transcended these headings.  For example, being united was 
coded as a condition of reintegration, as a strategy to reintegrate, as a consequence 
of reintegration, and, finally, under lessons learned.  Therefore, I engaged in 








     This process, which Charmaz refers to as theoretical coding (2006, p. 63) allowed 
me to move the analysis beyond a descriptive, linear representation of the core 
phenomenon.  At this point in the analytical process, I believed the utilization of the 
four categories did not push the understanding far enough.  For example, the theme 
of unity was prevalent throughout the four categories and all of the eight interviews, 
but was not reflected strongly enough in this framework that I selected prior to my 
analysis.  I believed this strong and pervasive presence of the theme of being united 
warranted a central place in any theoretical framework.  My acknowledgement of 
the importance of being united led to a third round of coding and a reconfiguring of 
the categories.   This opened up the relationships between categories to something 
bigger than a linear or chronological framework offered by the initial four 
categories.      
     Through the process of theoretical coding, I moved the understanding from a 
linear concrete process (conditions to lessons learned) to a conceptual framework, 
by removing the secondary codes from the four linear categories and by re-
grouping them into five interrelated themes.  These themes, more conceptual in 
nature than the four categories (conditions, strategies, consequences and lessons 
learned), emerged directly from the data.  As Glaser attests (as cited in Charmaz, 
2006, p. 64), they “earned their way” into the conceptual framework by authentically 
(and conceptually) representing the actions and strategies utilized by the ex-
combatants of Nuevo Horizonte during their reintegration.     
     The five themes are called themes because they represent a distinct, recurring 
and unifying quality or idea.  Unity is a theme in that it recurs throughout, as a 
condition, as a strategy, as a consequence and as part of the lessons learned. The 
five themes also could be classified as strategies.  For example, being united was a 
conscious tactic used to facilitate their reintegration.  In a sense, these five new 
categories represent a conceptualization of the process (themes) and simultaneously 
represent a concrete description of the process (strategies).   
    The framework presented here has two dimensions:  the first dimension highlights 
the five emerging themes or strategies, and the second dimension integrates the 
concept of success within these themes. 
A) Developing Themes 





 Being united  
 Being autonomous (taking charge of the reintegration process) 
 Being connected (establishing connections with their neighbours and 
international partners) 
 Being visionary (maintaining an ideology of social and economic justice 
for Guatemala) 
 Being a role model (working hard to build a community, exemplifying 
good citizenship)  
     The first theme, being united, is the foundational theme, as it enabled and 
strengthened the other four themes.  This is what Chenitz and Swanson (1986) refer 
to as a core category in grounded theory, one that solves or processes the issue or 
phenomenon (reintegration).  Glaser refers to this as a core variable (1978), as it is a 
category that recurs frequently in the data and one that is central to the theory.  
According to Glaser, a core category can be a cause, condition or consequence 
(1978) or in this case, a strategy.  Being united is the core category, core variable, 
also called a core theme and a core strategy.   
     The four points below demonstrate this hierarchical arrangement, that is, how the 
subsequent four themes, being in charge of their reintegration process (being 
autonomous), establishing connections with their neighbours (being connected), 
continuing their struggle for social justice (being visionary) and building an entire 
community from nothing (being a role model), were made possible through the core 
theme of being united: 
 Being united, as a theme, was mentioned in each of the four categories:  
conditions, strategies, consequences and lessons learned. 
 Being united was mentioned by all 8 interviewees. 
 Being united was described as having its roots in the war (interview #3) 
and even before the war (interview #2). 
 The following excepts demonstrate how their being united, or 
organized, was the foundation for the other 4 themes. 
     Being united helped them to be in charge of the reintegration process, and to be 
in control of their lives: 
“Aquí lo que está, lo hemos conquistado nosotros. De una o de 
otra forma. La Cooperativa de Nuevo Horizonte tiene muchos 
privilegios. Porque hoy por hoy, si nuestros hijos no estudien, 




pie de los árboles. Ahora tenemos una guardería infantil, 
tenemos escuela de párvulos, tenemos escuela de primaria, 
tenemos básico, tenemos academia de mecanografía, 
academia de computación, y para usos especiales tenemos el 
Internet. Esos son privilegios.” (interview #2) 
What we have here, we have done ourselves.  In one form or 
another, the Cooperative of Nuevo Horizonte has many 
privileges.  Because, day by day, if our children do not go to 
school, it is because they don’t want to.  The first children here 
studied under the trees.  Now we have a daycare, 
kindergarten, primary and junior high, a typing academy, a 
computer academy, and for special uses, we have internet.  
These are privileges. 
“Siempre hay que estar unidos. Siempre hay que estar juntos 
para hacer los planes de organización y hacer la lucha. Y 
entonces hacer la lucha sobre todo eso para que no se 
desintegre uno.” (interview #5) 
It is always necessary to be united.  It is always necessary to 
be together in order to make organizational plans and in order 
to further the struggle.  Therefore, to further the struggle 
above all is so the individual does not get lost. 
     Being united helped them to be connected and to forge relationships with 
neighbours and international partners: 
“Tenemos una comunidad a un kilómetro de aquí que tiene 
más de sesenta años de ser comunidad. Esa comunidad nunca 
ha tenido agua. Nunca. Hasta que nosotros decidimos donarle 
el agua.” interview #2) 
There is a community one kilometre away from here that has 
been around for more than 60 years.  This community has 
never had running water.  Until we decided to help them with 
a water system. 





“Entonces teníamos que organizarnos para hacerle frente al 
sistema. Creímos que solamente organizados nosotros 
podíamos darle una continuidad al proceso de lucha.” 
(interview #6) 
Therefore, we needed to organize ourselves in order to 
confront the system.  We believed that only if we were 
organized would we be able to continue with the struggle. 
“Bueno, yo, como otro consejo que diría es que también el 
vivir en colectivo ayuda a resolver muchas necesidades. Y 
desde que anduvimos en un movimiento revolucionario… 
anduvimos juntos.” (interview #1) 
Well, as another piece of advice, I would also say that to live 
collectively helps find solutions to many necessities.  Ever 
since we were together during the revolution, we moved 
together. 
     Being united helped them to build their community, which acts as a role model for 
all Guatemalans: 
“Y el hecho de vivir colectivos nos ha ayudado a resolver, 
como te decía, parte de la educación. Porque si no 
hubiéramos estado en colectivo, hubiera costado que no 
hubieran hecho la escuela, que esa sí la hizo el gobierno. 
Tenemos una guardería, que ese es un beneficio. Las otras: va 
la guardería, la escuela para primaria.” (interview #1) 
And the act of living collectively has helped us resolve, like I 
was telling you, the education piece.  Because, if we hadn’t 
have been organized collectively, it would have been hard–
we would not have built the school, that the government built.  
We have a daycare, which is a benefit.  The others:  the 
daycare, the primary school. 
“Ahora, tomemos esa lucha. O sea, unámonos para esto, y 
listo. Es la educación. Unámonos para la educación. Es la 
salud. Unámonos para la salud. Es para la vivienda. Unámonos 






Now, take the struggle.  We unite for this, and there you have 
it.  Education, we unite ourselves for education.  And health, 
we unite ourselves for health.  And for housing, we unite 
ourselves for housing.  We unite ourselves for whatever is 
necessary. 
“Entonces todo eso lo hemos logrado a través de la 
organización, a través de que siempre estamos juntos 
ahí.”(interview #5) 
Therefore, all of this we accomplished through organization, 
by always being together.     
B) The Concept of Success 
     The secondary codes from Part Three were organized under the categories of 
conditions, strategies, consequences and lessons learned.  Of the 50 secondary 
codes, 16 fell under the category of Consequences. The category of consequences 
captured those thoughts and reflections on how the reintegration process (core 
phenomenon) went overall.  I further analyzed these 16 codes in terms of whether 
they supported the idea that the reintegration process was a success or was not a 
success.  Interestingly the tone or sentiment of all 16 secondary codes was easily 
categorized into viewing the reintegration as either positive (successful) or negative 
(not successful).  Ten codes described the consequences of reintegration as positive 
and six described consequences of reintegration as negative.   
     In addition, the concept of success was also linked to the foundational theme, 
being united.  Being united was seen as the theme that had a significant impact on 
the outcome of the reintegration process.  The following quotes demonstrate this 
relationship:    
 “Cómo es. . .seguir trabajando unidamente para así mismo 
logras proyectos, logras las ayudas, porque si nos dividimos, 
no se logra nada. Sí. Eso es. Porque sí dieron la vida varios 
compañeros y compañeras. . .se quedaron en la montaña.” 
(interview #4) 
 This is how it is. . .continue working in a united fashion in 




ourselves, we will not succeed in anything.  That’s the way it 
is.   Many comrades gave their lives. . .they remain in the 
mountains. 
“Entonces aquí lo que nos ha valido mucho es la organización, 
y creo que eso nos mantiene vivos, nos mantiene en pie de 
lucha siempre como ya ve, y nos hace que estemos aquí 
todavía viviendo en esta finca porque eso se nos ha creado 
muchas dificultades.” (interview #5) 
Therefore, here, being organized has been a tremendous 
value for us, and I believe that it has kept us alive, it has 
allowed us to keep struggling, and it has brought us here 
today, living in this community, in spite of all the difficulties. 
“Claro que es un éxito para nosotros haber más de 100 
compañeros juntos. Y efectivamente la táctica de divide y 
vencerás en cualquier lugar del mundo, cualquier ejército, 
cualquier gente lo aplica. En Guatemala, particularmente en 
Nuevo Horizonte, entendía desde un principio que llegar a 
eso era prácticamente cavar nuestra propia tumba.” 
(interview #8) 
It’s clear that it is a victory for us that we are more than 100 
comrades here together.  Because really, the tactic is to divide 
and conquer us, no matter where in the world, no matter what 
insurgent forces or whomever it applies to.  In Guatemala, 
particularly in Nuevo Horizonte, we understood from the 
beginning that to be divided would have practically been like 
digging our own grave. 
     In other words, the ex-combatants believed their success was dependent upon 
being united.  In fact, not only was being united seen as a significant factor in their 
success, but being united was also seen as an indicator of success:  
“En Guatemala o los países del tercer mundo, la gente es 
pobre pero tiene paz, tiene cariño, tiene hermandad, hay 




In Guatemala, like other third world countries, the people are 
poor but they have peace, they have love, they have 
brotherhood, they have solidarity, they have everything.   
Unity was the cause of their success, and unity was also an outcome of their success.    
     Those six secondary codes (in the category of Consequences) that reflected 
negatively on the success of their reintegration, have been attributed to their lack of 
control of the process, as evidenced by the following quote: 
“Aunque en realidad pudimos haber llegado a este lugar en 
otras condiciones tal vez de una forma más organizada. . .que 
nos ha hecho falta mucha organización.” (interview #6) 
Even though in reality, we could have arrived at this point in 
perhaps in better shape, perhaps a bit better organized. . .we 
lacked a high level of organization. 
     The above quote points to the idea that being organized and being in control 
allowed for many successes for the reintegration of the ex-combatants, but not on all 
issues.  The six codes that alluded to poor success (see Appendix C), dealt with 
issues that were beyond the control of the ex-combatants, such as their debt (which 
they attribute to not being in charge of that negotiation) and their inability to socially 




Figure 4.2:  Reintegration:  The Five Themes/Strategies 
 




Towards Successful Reintegration 
 
C) A Theoretical Model 
     Developing a theory is to conceptualize the phenomenon of the study 
(reintegration) in order to understand it in abstract terms (Charmaz, 2006, p. 127), 
and offer an interpretation.  From the epistemology adopted for this study, this is the 
best understanding I can achieve, as an outsider who is trying to represent the voice 
of these people.  “Generative theory describes and explains in a way that 
challenges the taken-for-granted conventions of understanding, and simultaneously 
invites us into new worlds of meaning and action. . .one of the major routes to social 
change is through audacious theorizing”  (Gergen, 2009, p. 81).  The following 
paragraph represents a written summary of the theoretical framework. 
     At the beginning of the reintegration process, the Guatemalan ex-combatants 
were particularly vulnerable.  The strategies they used to re-integrate were tied to 
their unique vision of reintegrating collectively rather than individually.  Five themes 














autonomous, being connected with the world around them, being visionary, and 
being a role model.  Being united was their foundational theme, which facilitated 
their ability to take charge of their reintegration process (being autonomous), 
reintegrate with their neighbours (being connected), continue to struggle for social 
justice (being visionary) and build a community from nothing (being a role model).  
These themes have guided their lives for the past 13 years, and have led to 
significant, but not complete success.  These five strategies enabled them to be 
much more successful than they would have been as individuals, but were not able 
to transform those concerns (such as macro social and economic justice) which were 
beyond their sphere of collective influence.     
          Summary 
     In this chapter, I described the stages of data exploration and analysis, beginning 
from note taking and memo writing, and ending with constructing a theoretical 
framework.  Through this systematic grounded theory analysis, I explored the data 
through two stages of coding.  In an initial analysis, I arranged the data using pre-
determined categories suggested by Strauss and Corbin (conditions, strategies, 
consequences, lessons learned) to approach the core phenomenon of reintegration.  
This initial analysis evolved into a generation of a set of themes or strategies:  being 
united, being autonomous, being connected, being visionary, and being a role 
model.  This initial analysis also generated a second dimension, which provided a 
deeper understanding of the concept of success in reintegration.   Finally, this 
analysis was completed with an exploration of the concept of vulnerability and how it 
related to the above five themes or strategies.   I ended this chapter by composing a 
theoretical framework, combining all of these interrelated concepts to provide a 
coherent understanding of the reintegration experience for the ex-combatants of 




Chapter 5:  Discussion 
Introduction 
     In the previous chapter, I presented my analysis of the participant interviews, 
culminating in a theoretical framework, in order to better understand the 
phenomenon of reintegration of Guatemalan ex-combatants.  In the framework, I 
explained how the ex-combatants strove to succeed in their reintegration process 
by consciously utilizing a set of strategies.  They recognized their initial vulnerability 
and called upon familiar tactics or strategies that had served them well (some stated 
this more strongly:  these strategies kept them alive) during their armed struggle.  
The participants attributed their relative success to these five strategies.   
     In this chapter, I discuss the importance and relevance of this theoretical 
framework.  I reinforce my main points by utilizing more quotes from the participant 
interviews.  I believe that revisiting the interviews after having formulated the 
theoretical framework has assisted me in consolidating my emerging understanding.  
I also reinforce my points by referring to new literature sources, which I reviewed in 
a second but smaller post-analysis literature review.  In keeping with Charmaz’ 
(2006) tenets of grounded theory, I have combined methodology and analysis 
throughout the inquiry as a way of being open to a deeper level of understanding.     
     In this chapter, I offer a response to the questions:  So what? or, Why is this 
relevant? What does it add to the existing understanding on the issue? and How does 
it extend the literature?  I break this response down into the following sections:  
social construction of the ex-combatant, social construction of reintegration, 
relevance to the existing literature on DDR, and study limitations and suggestions for 
future research.  In the first two sections, I revisit the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions of this inquiry and further reflect on the theoretical 
framework from a social constructionist perspective.  In the third section, I apply 
these reflections to the existing literature, and demonstrate how this inquiry 
corroborates, challenges and extends the current thought on DDR.  In this section, I 
also revisit the axiological assumptions of this inquiry and suggest specific ways in 
which this understanding of reintegration can be utilized to further the goals of 
Peace Studies.      
The Social Construction of the Ex-Combatant 
     As I discussed earlier in Chapter Three (Methodology), a social constructionist 




therefore relative.  Individuals and groups develop subjective meaning to the world 
around them and these meanings are varied, multiple and complex (Patton, 2002, p. 
96).  Perception, which is widely varied, becomes one’s reality.  What is defined or 
perceived by people as real is therefore real in its consequences (Thomas & 
Thomas, 1928, quoted in Patton, 2002 p. 96) regardless of whether another group 
adheres to a significantly different perception.   
     I utilize the five strategies or themes of the theoretical framework as an outline for 
discussing the social construction of the ex-combatant.  However, I begin with a 
more foundational analysis of how identity is constructed.   
Identity Construction 
     We know that the reintegration process was profound for the ex-combatants of 
Nuevo Horizonte on many different levels.  The testimonies of the participants attest 
to the life of the guerrilla–one characterized by fear, danger, fatigue, hunger and 
hardship. In order to cope and survive, it was necessary to form relationships and 
bonds (or consolidate existing ones) that created a unity to confront these 
challenging conditions.  Therefore, an end to their combatant lifestyle would have 
inevitably led to a significant transition involving virtually all aspects of one’s life, 
from basic daily activities, to defining one’s purpose.  The following quote 
exemplifies this monumental shift:    
“Bastante duro. Bastante duro en el sentido de cuando nos 
integramos a la vida civil nuevamente era como empezar de 
nuevo, como empezar de cero, en toda escala. . .como tanto 
en mi persona, como tanto a nivel social, como en lo 
económico, en todo.” (interview #5) 
Really tough.  Really tough in the sense that when we 
integrated ourselves back into civilian life it was like 
beginning all over again, like beginning from zero, on every 
level, personally, socially, economically, everything. 
     The testimonies of the participants attest to the hope of positive change.  But even 
though there was hope for a future without violence and personal danger, the path 
that lay ahead was an unknown one, which carried its own uncertainty and fear. 
.  “La experiencia que tuvimos. . .que es un cambio, podríamos 
decirle brusco ¿no? . . .porque estábamos acostumbrados a 




que es una cuestión duda porque uno viene con ese miedo, 
con ese temor de que ¿qué nos irá a pasar, no?” (interview #1) 
 The experience we had was a change–how would you say, 
abrupt, no?  Because we were accustomed to our combatant 
life and now to pass to another new life–we had a lot of doubt 
and fear, one asks:  “what will happen to us,” no? 
     The following quote characterizes their life as combatants as being significantly 
difficult: 
“Claro entendíamos muy bien lo que es el hambre, lo que es 
la miseria, lo que es la pobreza, y entendíamos muy bien 
también en manos de quién estaban las riquezas.” (interview 
#3). 
Clearly we understood very well what hunger was, what 
misery was, what poverty was, and we also understood very 
well in whose hands lies the wealth. 
     The following quote offers a retrospective perception that there were many 
negative aspects of the combatant life that the peace accords were able to 
ameliorate: 
“Bueno, la experiencia sobre el proceso de lo que es la firma 
de la paz y todo eso ha sido una experiencia muy buena 
porque se ha vivido una vida más diferente a la problemática 
que teníamos antes… Entonces yo pienso que ha sido por un 
lado bonito porque se dejó atrás aquella tensión que uno 
tenía. . .” (interview #5) 
The peace process experience and all that was associated with 
it has been a very good experience because we have lived a 
very different life since–without the problems we had before. . 
.Therefore, I think that it has been on one hand very nice 
because the tension that we lived through has been left 
behind. 
     In contrast, the following quote provides a more nostalgic remembrance of the 
life during the Civil War, where physical hardships were overshadowed by a sense 




  “Que sí sufrimos. Sí sufrimos. Allí la gente andaba descalza en 
el tiempo. . .en el principio. Todos descalzos y sin ropa… 
porque de tanto andar para arriba y para bajo, y ya entonces 
hasta sin camisa se quedó la pobre gente. Pero allá 
andábamos. Todos contentos. Allí no había sal, allí no había 
azúcar, allí no había jabón para bañarse. Pero andábamos 
contentos. Sí, por ver si defendíamos la vida. Y por la gracia 
de Dios alcanzamos a defenderla.” (interview #4) 
  Sure, we suffered a lot.  We definitely suffered.  Back then the 
people walked barefoot, in the beginning.  Everyone barefoot 
and without proper clothing. . .we walked and marched a 
great deal, up and down, and have remained poor people 
since then, without shirts.   But that’s how we wandered.  
Everyone happy.  Back then, there was no salt, no sugar, no 
soap to wash with.   But we were happy.  Because we were 
defending our very lives.  And by the grace of God we were 
able to defend our lives. 
     These thoughts and reflections bring to mind some formal conversations I had 
with community members a year prior to the interviews.  In one conversation, an ex-
combatant insisted that nothing changed during the reintegration process.  His 
rationale for this assertion was that he, among many others, never identified 
themselves as combatants, as guerrillas or as people fighting in a war.  On the 
contrary, his firmly entrenched identity was that of a community leader, a visionary, 
and a Catholic organizer.  As such, the peace process simply allowed for the 
transition back into a role and identity from which he never truly left, that the taking 
up of arms was a necessary, but uncharacteristic detour in the journey to attain the 
same goals to which he aspired as a community leader and visionary.   
     During a different conversation, another ex-combatant presented an alternative 
perspective.  This man considered his combatant life an integral and inseparable 
component of his identity.  He attributed this partly to the fact that his father was also 
a combatant (a man who died during combat and a man whom he held in very high 
regard) and also to the fact that he joined the guerrilla movement as a young 
teenager.  For him, the disarmament procedure was particularly traumatic.  He 
recounted to me how he broke down sobbing (something he had no recollection of 
doing since his early childhood) when he handed his gun to the disarmament 
official.  His weapon had become such an integral part of his identity, since it never 




     These quotes offer a window into an experience of a significant personal 
transition, one that may have profound impact on one’s identity.  In one sense the 
two perspectives seem to contradict each other–one ex-combatant speaks of an 
identity that remained intact through reintegration, and the other of an identity that 
was traumatically terminated.  However, these two perspectives also have an 
underlying commonality.  Both ex-combatants emphasize how important their sense 
of identity was to them.  I believe these reflections raise the question about how the 
process of DDR may affect, positively or negatively, the process of re-constructing 
one’s personal and group identity, and ultimately, one’s reintegration into civilian 
life.   
     Several previous discussions have already demonstrated how DDR programs 
construct the identity of ex-combatants in a negative way by using terms such as 
belligerents, spoilers and overall as latent agents of violence who need to be 
contained to prevent a recurrence of war.  Evidence from interview excerpts, 
however, has demonstrated that the ex-combatants constructed a much different 
identity.  In the following section, I discuss how the disparity between the two 
identity constructions may inhibit the reintegration of ex-combatants.  In this 
discussion I focus on the following topics:  collective identity versus individual 
identity, identity of capacity versus identity of deficit, identity of peacemakers 
versus identity of potential violence. 
     Social identity theory (Hogg, 2006, p. 112) describes how groups define 
themselves cognitively, in terms of shared attributes.  In other words, the ex-
combatants of Nuevo Horizonte have developed a collective identity based on their 
shared goals, values and beliefs.  A number of excerpts have been shared which 
demonstrate that the ex-combatants considered themselves in fairly positive terms 
(visionary, hardworking and peaceful).  Their reflections also justify that these 
attributes were present during their time as combatants, and were intentionally 
maintained and strengthened during the phase of reintegration.  In other words, at a 
fundamental level, their collective identity of themselves did not shift dramatically 
during reintegration, in spite of this transformational process.  The concept of 
identity also takes into account the way in which people prefer to define themselves, 
that is, they are motivated to use terms that allude to achieving an ideal identity 
(Charmaz, 2006, p. 170). 
      “Yo lo sentí, en mi experiencia, totalmente grande. ¿Por qué? 
Porque en la lucha guerrillera, nosotros teníamos que 
conformar una organización integral. Es decir, en la guerrilla 




económica, la cuestión de. . .alimentación, toda la cuestión de 
conducción política. . .cómo nos dirigíamos, cómo nos 
proyectamos hacia el futuro políticamente. Y al 
desmovilizarnos se rompe todo eso. Y cómo te vas a insertar 
fue mi gran enigma. . .mi gran situación difícil.” (interview #7) 
  I felt that, in my experience, it (reintegration) was totally great.  
Why?  Because in the guerrilla struggle, we had to conform to 
organizational rules.  That is to say, in the guerrilla movement 
we would solve our problems collectively, food, political 
conduct. . .like they would direct us, how we projected 
ourselves towards the political future.  And the process of 
demobilization ripped all of this apart.  So how are you going 
to integrate was to me the great enigma. . my difficult 
situation. 
     The following quotes attest to their desire to not only maintain their positive self-
identity, but also to highlight their attributes and good character to gain the 
confidence of those who were suspicious of them. 
“Porque nosotros a través de nuestro comportamiento, a 
través de nuestra organización, les fuimos demostrando como 
tanto. . .principalmente como a nosotros como personas.” 
(interview #5) 
Because we, through our exemplary behaviour, and through 
our organized behaviour, were really demonstrating to them, 
(villages surrounding Nuevo Horizonte) basically that we were 
human beings. 
  “Entonces aquí se organizaban jugadas de fútbol de los 
muchachos. . .entre vecinos y hasta con las mismas 
autoridades. . .en ese tiempo también la policía se convirtió en 
policía nacional civil, entonces eso nos ayudó mucho a hacer 
acercamiento. Y también las muchachas, las jóvenes, también 
jugaban con equipos de otras comunidades, entonces por eso 
nos fuimos dando a conocer con la gente.”(interview #5) 
  Then soccer games were organized here among the guys, 




this time (following the terms of the peace accords) also the 
military police were converted into a civil police force, and 
they helped us a lot to get together.  And also the women, the 
youth, they also were playing on teams with other 
communities, therefore, because of this, we were getting to 
know the people. 
  “Si, nosotros avanzamos más y cuando teníamos mejores 
conocimientos lo que hicimos fue insertarnos. Que la gente 
después no lo creía que nosotros fuimos guerrilleros. Porque 
nosotros tuvimos lo que se llama las iniciativas de participar, 
en opinar, en proponer en beneficio de nuestras 
comunidades. Y como nosotros, vamos siendo. . .sin 
necesidad de meternos. . .vamos siendo aceptado por la 
misma población. Y vamos haciendo también un ejemplo en 
medio de aquella gente que no te quieren.” (interview #7) 
  Yes, we pushed ourselves more and when we were better 
known, we became integrated.   That way the people would 
later think that we were never guerrillas.  Because we had the 
initiative to participate, to offer our thoughts, to look at ways of 
improving our communities.  And we are going to be accepted 
by these people, and we are going to make an example to the 
people who didn’t like us. 
     Instead, their task was to maintain their positive identity in the face of the 
entrenched negative attitudes of the civilians among whom they were going to live. 
     These quotes suggest that in their quest to achieve recognition and value, and to 
dispel the myth of the violent guerrilla, the ex-combatants of Nuevo Horizonte 
utilized what Dumont and van Lill (2010) refer to as a strategy to attempt to diminish 
intergroup distances (p. 432).  The process to achieve value and recognition was 
done collectively, which, according to Ellemers (2002, p. 242) allows non-dominant 
groups to achieve positive identity by the dominant group.  Ellemers adds that often 
the non-dominant group (in this case, the reintegrating ex-combatants) need to 
adopt the traits or identities of the dominant group (the larger society) in order to 
gain acceptance (p. 257).  It seems in this case, however, the ex-combatants of 
Nuevo Horizonte did not need to adopt new identity traits, but rather needed to 
showcase and promote their long-held identity which they never gave up, thus 




other words, by celebrating their positive identity, and by integrating with their 
neighbours with the assumption of a commonly shared positive identity, the ex-
combatants acted against the negatively constructed identities that were 
perpetrated by a process that focussed on their potential for harm.  Gergen expands 
on the subjugation of negative identity (constructed by outsiders) by contending that 
this process often inhibits a group’s capacity to depict one’s own identity (p. 51).  It 
seems at some level, the ex-combatants intuitively addressed this, as evidenced by 
the following: 
  “Lo primero que fui. . .que me puse a participar con la gente. 
Y no que la gente llegara conmigo, sino llegar con la gente. 
Me ofrecí con la gente a trabajar en bien de la comunidad. Y 
esa es una cosa importante. No los aislamos. Al contrario, hay 
que unirte a esa comunidad. Hay que unirte a la población. No 
hay que alejarte.” (interview #7). 
 The first thing I did was engage with the people and 
participate.  I didn’t wait for the people to come and get me, 
on the contrary, I went to them.  I offered myself to work for 
the community.  And this is a very important thing.  Don’t 
isolate ourselves.  On the contrary, you need to unite yourself 
with the larger community.  You need to unite yourself with the 
people.  Don’t distance yourselves.  
     Further in this section of the chapter, I re-visit the discussion of how the ex-
combatants intentionally utilized the strategy of being autonomous.  However, it is 
worth noting at this point that one’s identity, as Gergen asserts, is a site of struggle, a 
contest between self-control versus being controlled by others (pp. 51-52). 
The Vulnerable Ex-Combatant 
     My analysis of the existing literature has documented, in my opinion, a well-
intentioned, but somewhat incomplete portrayal of ex-combatants.  Much of the 
focus of the DDR literature is from a macro-insecurity framework (Knight & Ozerdem 
2004), where the aims of DDR are to protect not only the fragile peace of a country 
(by somehow discouraging the ex-combatants to return to violence through 
rehabilitation and rewards) but also to protect the general public from people 
(mainly men) who know of little else besides violence, and know few forms of 
economic livelihood that do not translate into petty thievery (Abdullah, 1998; Boas & 




Stedman, 1997).  Through this inquiry into the reintegration experience in 
Guatemala, I  have challenged this perspective in several ways.   
     First of all, I believe that the ex-combatants of Nuevo Horizonte, not surprisingly, 
viewed themselves in the preliminary stages of reintegration, as being vulnerable.  
In Chapter 2 (Review of the Literature), I give examples of how other ex-combatant 
groups are described by their vulnerability, but it seems to be put in the context of 
either economic vulnerability (which is corroborated by the interviews from this 
inquiry) or vulnerability as fragility or instability with regards to the urge to return to 
violence if their needs are not addressed. 
     I believe the vulnerability that the participants of Nuevo Horizonte talked about is 
different.  Their vulnerability consisted of being subjected to a process over which 
they had little control and in which they had no experience, and a consequential 
sense of fear and lack of trust.  Their vulnerability reflected their limited literacy 
skills and economic capacity.  Therefore I suggest that a systematic understanding of 
how to work with people who are vulnerable can add to how DDR programs are 
being run.   This adds to the literature by offering a deeper understanding of the 
psychological and social needs of the ex-combatants in the preliminary stages of 
DDR.  It also adds to the literature by conveying an alternative portrait of the ex-
combatant–not one of a potential force to be bridled, but rather as a potential.  The 
emphasis on the ex-combatants’ self-identified positive attributes and skilful 
strategies to reintegrate offers an important expansion to our understanding.   
Being United 
     I have argued previously that DDR programming is constructed in an individualist 
paradigm, which, as contended earlier in light of Paris’ (2005) analysis, falls into the 
larger neo-liberal individualist paradigm that characterizes First World 
development work.  According to Kagitcibasi (1997), individualism has been the 
hallmark of European history and intellectual thought coming out of the 
Enlightenment, and individualism still holds great influence to this day over 
programs such as DDR.  Hofstede (1980) informs us on the challenges of working 
with groups whose background differs from our own.  DDR programs emphasize 
demobilization (relying on one’s self) and employment (personal responsibility and 
independence).  These are not negative attributes or goals, and some may argue 
that these aspirations are shared by many ex-combatants around the world.  
Nonetheless, these attributes differ from the collectivist background of those 
Guatemalan ex-combatants who live in Nuevo Horizonte.  As already demonstrated, 




they joined the armed resistance movement, and was solidified during their combat 
time, during which collectivism was seen as necessary to survive.  Therefore, their 
core strategy (being united) was not accidental.  Perhaps there are other ex-
combatants elsewhere who would benefit from the unity and the collective ability of 
their former combat groups.  This idea challenges one of the major tenets of DDR, 
which is to disband groups of combatants as a means to reduce the threat of 
resurgence of the violence.  It aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem 
that results from ex-combatants being left without livelihoods or support networks, 
other than their former comrades, during the critical transition period from conflict 
to peace and development (Knight, 2008, p. 6). 
     The constructed identity of the ex-combatants may also be viewed by DDR 
program leaders as a psychological barrier to integration.  “Whenever there are 
tendencies toward unity, cohesion, brotherhood, commitment, solidarity, or 
community, so is alienation under production” (Gergen, 2009, p. 114).  In other 
words, the unity or solidarity of the ex-combatants may inhibit their acceptance of 
the civilians among whom they will have to live, just as those civilians may feel 
alienated from a group with a strong and unified (and different from their own) 
identity.  We define who we are by how we are different.  However, the experience 
of the participants from Nuevo Horizonte does not seem to support this.  For the 
participants, it seemed that their unity gave them the power, or the collective 
wisdom instead to break down barriers, rather than reinforce them.     
Being Autonomous      
     In spite of this sense of vulnerability, (or perhaps because of it) the ex-combatants 
of Nuevo Horizonte nonetheless mobilized themselves and took matters into their 
own hands.   Their vulnerability, therefore, did not seem to invoke a plea for charity 
or takeover, but rather invoked a request for assistance so that they could build their 
own capacity for determining their future, to foster their own independence and 
autonomy.   
  “No se le tiene que imponer lo que la gente deba hacer. Y le 
decía yo, tiene la razón. No hay que imponer. Hay que facilitar 
los procesos, y no imponer. . .Porque la perspectiva de 
occidente con la perspectiva de Latinoamérica o de los países 
del tercer mundo es diferente.” (interview #8) 
 One does not have to impose on someone what they ought to 




impose.  It is necessary to facilitate the process, not impose it. . 
.because the perspective of the West is different than the 
perspective of Latin America or the Third World countries. 
     This theme or strategy of being autonomous exposes another disparity in the self 
and other-constructed identity of the ex-combatant.  To begin with, in the following 
quote, one of the participants highlights how his collective sense of seeking 
autonomy clashed with outsiders.  These opposing constructions revealed 
themselves most when the community forged economic ties with organizations 
offering development aid.    
“Yo pienso que el tema de la cooperación, llamémoslo así, es 
un tema delicado. Porque la cooperación, dependiendo cómo 
la manejes, cómo la recibas, o cómo la aceptes, te puede 
movilizar o te puede desmovilizar. No quiero criticar, sino que 
sólo quiero analizar. Para mí, la cooperación ha desempeñado 
papeles no muy gratos en Guatemala. Y no porque la 
cooperación sea mala, sino porque no se han creado 
condiciones para abordar esa cooperación. Y en este papel yo 
pienso que las ONGs locales principalmente han 
desempeñado papeles no muy positivos. Que en vez de crear 
organización, en vez de crear condiciones, han venido a crear 
dependencia y han creado mucho paternalismo.” (interview # 
3) 
I believe the topic of cooperation is a touchy subject.  Because 
cooperation, depending on who is in the driver’s seat, and 
who is on the receiving end, it can bring capacity or take away 
capacity.  I don’t want to criticize, I only want to analyze.  For 
me, cooperation has brought about unpleasing results in 
Guatemala.  And it’s not because cooperation is bad, on the 
contrary, it’s because the proper conditions haven’t been 
created.  And in this context, I think that the local NGO’s have 
brought about results that aren’t very positive.  Instead of 
creating organization, instead of creating proper conditions, 





     I believe this disparity of understanding is explained succinctly through Farmer’s 
(2005) framework for development aid.  Farmer describes three different 
constructions of cooperation:  charity, development and social justice.   
     Inherent in the charity model is that those whom we are helping (i.e., ex-
combatants), or those who are the target of charitable actions are, as Farmer states, 
intrinsically inferior (p. 153).  While it is understandable how ex-combatants may be 
viewed as needing help because of historical events and economic forces, a charity 
model would go beyond this and view them as being intrinsically inferior.  Further, 
the charity model does not question why those needing assistance are in their 
position, and it in fact often ignores the factors that have led up to the situation, in 
this case the socio-economic disparities that initiated the civil war.  Borrowing from 
Freire (1986) “in order to have the continued opportunity to express their 
‘generosity,’ their oppressors must perpetuate injustice as well” (1986, p. 29).  I 
believe that DDR programming rests in a higher evolutionary construction than 
charity, although Farmer argues that charity still commonly drives many formal 
relationships and aid programs between wealthy global organizations and the poor 
people whom they are attempting to help.  However, I believe the literature 
provides growing evidence that the trend in DDR programming is to incorporate an 
analysis of the underlying or pre-existing conditions, therefore challenging the 
shortcomings of the charity model. 
     Farmer’s (2005) second construction is the development model.  Development is 
based on a “liberal” view of poverty (p. 155).   Development still leaves the 
foreigner in charge, especially in terms of financial resources and project 
management, but views the target group’s inadequacies as something to be fixed 
through education and skill development.  It is clear to me that much of DDR falls 
under the rubric of Farmer’s development model.  According to Farmer, the 
development model, like neo-liberalism, “places the problem with the poor 
themselves:  these people are backward and reject the technological fruits of 
modernity.  With assistance from others, they too will, after a while, reach a higher 
level of development” (p. 155).  Employment and training programs fit into the 
development construction of cooperation and assistance.  As echoed by Paris’ 
economic analysis (2005), the development model tends to view the ex-combatants 
as a commodity, emphasizing outcomes and outputs, costs and cost savings, and 
economic indicators (Doane & Varcoe, 2005, p. 188), and in an attempt to improve 
economic and social indicators for the target group, may inadvertently strip them of 




    Farmer’s (2005) third construction is the social justice model in which the 
cooperative relationship between giver and receiver necessitates the blurring of 
distinguishing lines and identities.  Autonomy is a key of the social justice construct, 
and the relationships are based on “the struggle to construct a just and fraternal 
society, where persons can live with dignity and be the agents of their own destiny” 
(Gutierrez, 1973, p. xiv).  I believe the following quote supports the idea that the 
people of Nuevo Horizonte sought a social justice framework for their relationships 
with their neighbours and with the organizations that assisted them with their 
reintegration.   
 “Y a partir de ahí lo que aprendimos, no, tenemos que 
cambiar. Tenemos que deshacernos de este tipo de 
cooperación. Porque en vez de darte ventajas te da 
desventajas. Entonces para mí yo creo que Horizonte ha 
trabajado mucho y la verdad es que la cooperación sí puede 
aportar, pero si respeta las estructuras. Y claro, también el 
pueblo tiene que tener organización. Si ellos no tienen esa 
organización entonces es imposible. Aunque la cooperación 
se desborde en plata, no va a resolver el problema. Porque 
para mí el problema no es tanto la plata, sino que es crear las 
condiciones para que cuando llegue plata esa plata pueda 
florecer de manera positiva dentro de la sociedad. Y entonces 
es muy importante la creación de liderazgo.” (interview #3) 
From here what we have learned is that we have to change.  
We have to undo this type of cooperation.  Because instead of 
giving you advantages, it gives you disadvantages.  Therefore, 
for me I believe that Nuevo Horizonte has worked a lot and the 
truth is that the cooperation can contribute, but only if it 
respects the existing structure.  And, true, also the people 
need to be organized.  If they are not organized, it is not 
possible.  Even though cooperation (aid) may come with a lot 
of money, it doesn’t resolve the problem.  Because for me the 
money isn’t the issue, but rather the need to create the 
conditions so when the aid money does come, this money can 
allow the entire society to flourish.  And then it is very 
important to have good leadership. 
     The disparity is evident.  DDR programs appear to be implemented from a 




targets and recipients of foreign-run projects, are committed to a framework based 
on the principles of social justice.  Berryman (1987) summarizes this relationship 
sharply:  “Liberation entails a break with the present order in which Latin American 
countries could establish sufficient autonomy to reshape their economies to serve 
the needs of that poor majority.  The term ‘liberation’ is understood in 
contradistinction to ‘development’” (p. 91).      
     McKnight’s (1995) discourse on community capacity summarizes the disparity 
between a development and social justice model as the difference between viewing 
a group or individual through a lens of capacity or deficit.   
Community associations are built upon the recognition of the fullness of each 
member because it is the sum of his or her capacities that represents the power 
of the group.  The social policy mapmakers, on the other hand, build a world 
based upon the emptiness of each of us–a model based upon deficiency and 
need.  Communities depend upon capacities.  Systems commodify 
deficiencies. (p. 170)   
     Without having access to academic discourse on how relationships are 
constructed in the context of cooperation and assistance, the ex-combatants of 
Nuevo Horizonte appear to have a clear understanding of the pitfalls.  Their own 
thoughts accurately reflect the sentiments of Farmer (2005) and McKnight (1995). 
     At this point in this discussion I believe it is important to revisit the distinction 
between vulnerability as a deficiency, or a flaw that needs fixing, and a vulnerability 
that needs to be understood, and addressed by the existing capacities of the group.  
Note how this sense of capacity comes out of the following quote: 
“Hemos tratado de mantenernos siempre en colectivo, de 
resolver ciertos problemas de la comunidad en colectivo, y 
trabajamos individual entre mi colectivo comunal y en 
grupitos y el colectivo en general, o sea, entre formas. Y 
gracias a nuestro trabajo como lo hemos traído hasta hoy día, 
mucha gente extranjera nos ha visto de que estamos bien y 
que nos han apoyado en muchas cosas. Y el hecho de vivir 
colectivos nos ha ayudado a resolver, como te decía, parte de 
la educación. Porque si no hubiéramos estado en colectivo, 






We have tried to always remain as a collective, to resolve our 
community issues collectively, and we work among the 
collectives and in little groups. . .and thanks to our collective 
work up to now, many foreigners have come to see us and 
have assisted us with many things.  And the result of our 
working collectively has helped us to find solutions to things 
like our education.  Because if we had not worked collectively, 
we would not have got our school.  
     This sense of capacity did not preclude outside help.  On the contrary, outside 
assistance was actively sought, but the difference was that the community was still in 
control of who was invited in to assist.  Who is in control is what ultimately matters, 
as echoed by McKnight’s (1995) concern that those who offer assistance may 
inadvertently remove local capacity. 
The community, a social space where citizens turn to solve problems, may be 
displaced by the intervention of human service professionals acting as an 
alternative method of problem solving.  Human service professionals with 
special expertise, techniques and technology push out the problem-solving 
knowledge and action of friend, neighbour, citizen, and association. (pp. 105-
106) 
     Can groups ever be satisfied with what a government will do for them?  Consider 
the following quote: 
“Todos esos dinerales que donaron algunos países para lo de 
la firma de la paz quedaron en manos de saber qué 
autoridades. Y a uno, pues, no le llegó nada. Entonces, como 
repito, así a nivel general en el país, los gobiernos de turno no 
hacen nada por el pueblo.” (interview #1) 
All those fortunes that various countries donated for the peace 
process remained in the hands of the authorities.  Nothing 
made it to the people.  Therefore, I repeat, in general, the 
succeeding governments of Guatemala have not done a thing 
for the people. 
     This theme of discontentment can be found throughout the literature (Jennings, 




of the outcomes of the DDR process.  These results must be disappointing to those 
who implement and evaluate DDR programming, considering the level of human and 
financial resources dedicated to the DDR of these men and women.  I believe that 
dissatisfaction is much more likely to be present when people are not allowed to be 
part of the decision-making.  I believe that authentic partnership is a better 
predictor of satisfaction than specific economic gains, which will inevitably fall short 
of expectations.   
     In the interviews that I conducted, the ex-combatants of Nuevo Horizonte did not 
ever use the term victim.  Although they spoke of hardships and being vulnerable, 
the language of victimhood did not appear.  This is contrasted to the study referred 
to earlier by Jennings (2007, p. 211) in which Liberian ex-combatants identified 
themselves as victims of the civil war, and victims of the reintegration process.  
Jennings asserts that this victim paradigm is constructed by the DDR process itself 
and acts as a hindrance to the process of reintegration, in which being a victim 
becomes a self-fulfillment, or a “cultural performance” (Gergen, 2009, p. 53).  I 
suggest that this lack of victim identity in Nuevo Horizonte may be related to the five 
strategies of the framework. 
Being Connected   
     The authors presented in the literature review articulate many times how ex-
combatants pose a threat to newly formed democracies during the post-conflict 
phase.  And I have, in previous sections, argued that this view is not supported by 
the participants.   More likely, their views align with those of Paris (2004), who sees 
macro-economic global policies as more likely a threat to peace than they are. 
     The voice of the participants is clear:  They are not a problem to be fixed.   
     A number of the participants refer to the way that the civilians viewed them 
during the initial phase of reintegration–with fear (may be violent) and disdain 
(murderers, thieves, prostitutes).  They attributed this in part to an intentional 
campaign during the war, when government forces utilized popular media to 
construct a negative image of the guerrillas.  This process mirrors Waller’s (2007) 
description of how dominant social groups engage in the social construction of the 
“other.”  While Waller’s analysis is generally concerned with grave issues such as 
genocide and mass killings, the concept applies here as well.  The ex-combatants, at 
the beginning of reintegration, were confronted with an “us and them” schema, but 
seemed to have responded by breaking down this barrier, by re-constructing how 




“other” can escalate, especially when complicated by social and economic 
insecurity.  These patterns of widening relational distance may be a pre-curser to 
formal social exclusion (Waller, 2007, p. 201).  It appears the efforts of the ex-
combatants of Nuevo Horizonte, as represented by one of their five themes or 
strategies (being connected), were successful.   
 “Pero también uno tenía que poner de su parte… tenemos 
que poner de nuestra parte también para que la gente nos 
conozca.” (interview #5) 
But also, one has to do their part, we have to do our part as 
well so that the people get to know us. 
     We know that ex-combatants are faced with the challenge of reintegrating with 
the civilians following an armed conflict.  We also know that the ex-combatants from 
Nuevo Horizonte made a collective conscious effort to connect with the surrounding 
villages during their reintegration.  I have also argued, in the theoretical framework, 
that this theme of connection drew from their core theme of being united.  The 
question that comes to mind is whether being united would assist or hinder other ex-
combatants in integrating back into civilian life.  The literature does not offer a clear 
answer.  In Liberia, ex-combatants were widely perceived as troublemakers not 
only from outsiders, but also the ex-combatants themselves.  Interviewed ex-
combatants often labeled their former comrades using similar negative language 
(Jennings, 2007).  In fact, the ex-combatants often distanced themselves from the rest 
by constructing the other ex-combatants as troublemakers, while holding their own 
character in high esteem.  Perhaps this suggests that the ex-combatants in Nuevo 
Horizonte are unique.  It may also support the contention that being united is a 
contributing strategy for successful reintegration into civilian life.   
     I have used the phrase “being connected” thus far in a fairly tangible and 
concrete sense, but the sense of being connected can be much more profound.  
Being connected is a basic human need, a need that may well be heightened during 
a period of vulnerability.  Luckily the unity among the members of Nuevo Horizonte 
fulfilled this need in a way that no formal DDR program ever could.  “For those 
whose ‘emptiness’ cannot be filled with human services, the most obvious ‘need’ is 
the opportunity to express and share their gifts, skills, capacities, and abilities with 






     The theoretical framework provides a description for how the ex-combatants of 
Nuevo Horizonte viewed themselves in terms of being visionary.  They believed 
they had a purpose that transcended the transition from guerrilla to member of civil 
society.  Their ideological goal of social justice for all Guatemalans became a non-
violent struggle, which was made possible by the newly opened political space, and 
manifested through legal political parties and social organizations.  This 
transformation occurred on a national scale, and was frequently mentioned by the 
participants as one of the successes of the reintegration process. 
     The following quotes reiterate the participants’ sentiments that their taking up an 
armed struggle was not a matter of choice, but a necessity for a number of reasons, 
including hope for a more just future. 
 “. . .convencidos de tal manera que el único camino que nos 
quedaba para la construcción de la democracia real, funcional 
y participativa en nuestro país, era la lucha armada.” 
(interview #2) 
. . .convinced in such a way that the only path that remained 
for us to create real, functional and participatory democracy in 
Guatemala was through armed struggle. 
“. . Este uso de armas no necesariamente fue porque fuéramos 
un pueblo violento o porque fuéramos un pueblo que nos 
gusta ver correr la sangre, sino que fue como un único recurso 
después que se nos cierran todo tipo de posibilidad a través 
de la vía pacifica.” (interview #3) 
Our taking up arms was not because we were violent people 
or because it pleased us to see blood.  On the contrary, it was 
because it was the only path left, since the door had been 
closed to all peaceful means.  
“Nos fuimos a la montaña. Porque si nos quedábamos en las 
casas el ejército nos mataba. Tuvimos muchos ejemplos. Que 
todo que no salió de su casa, de su aldea, aldeas enteras 
quemaron. Los mataron.” (interview #4) 
We went to the mountains.  Because if we stayed in our houses, 
the Guatemalan army would kill us.  We had many examples, 




villages were burned.  The inhabitants were killed by the 
army. 
  “No hallamos otro camino más que tomar las armas. Y las 
tomamos, eso sí, como un medio de lucha.” (interview #7) 
 We could not find an alternative to taking up arms.  So we took 
up arms as our means to struggle. 
     The sentiment of taking up arms only as a last resort was prevalent among the 
participants.  Did their vision for social and economic equity justify their taking up an 
armed struggle?  Or conversely, did self-defence justify it?  More broadly, did the 
means justify the ends?  The longstanding debate on whether there exists a “just 
war” is perhaps relevant here, considering this discussion is occurring in the 
broader context of Peace Studies.  Just War Theory has two parts:  Jus ad bellum 
(justice of a war) and jus in bello (justice in a war) (Jeong, 2000).  It is hard to 
imagine that any group, army or nation that takes up arms does so without believing 
their cause is morally right and sometimes even sanctioned by a higher power.  
Perhaps then, the sentiments of these participants are no nobler than any other 
groups who have taken up arms.  According to Just War Theory, wars can be 
conducted in self-defence, and to restore or create a just order.  Perhaps, however, a 
social constructionist perspective aptly challenges the theory of a just war, because 
opposing sides construct differing realities and interpretations of the reasons for 
armed conflict.  Ultimately, they may construct any justification as well.  Rarely do 
two sides in an armed conflict share a common understanding of the issues prior to 
war, and this disparity becomes acutely polarized once violence commences.  
Therefore, if war separates our reality even greater, then, from a social 
constructionist perspective, can war ever attain peace without crushing the 
opposing constructed reality of social justice?  This relevant debate brings us 
beyond the scope of this study.  Nonetheless, from a social constructionist 
perspective, any shared ideological vision warrants scrutiny and dialogue.     
     The second component of the Just War Theory, Jus in bello, refers to justice within 
a war, such as keeping the number of civilian casualties to a minimum. In this sense, 
the URNG seems to have managed much better than the government forces.  As 
mentioned previously, the United Nations Truth Commission demonstrated that the 
guerrillas carried out 3% of the documented atrocities, while the government forces 




     Recent history indicates that the criteria for the moral justification of war (in and 
of) have not been applied to most wars (Jeong, 2000, p. 64).  Rather the criteria of 
ideology and retribution seem much more common.  In any case, granting political 
space to former combatants seems to work in re-directing violence.  One could also 
argue, though, that the political space opened in Guatemala is symbolic only, as 
stated elsewhere, the ones in power in Guatemala are the corporations, and the 
political space afforded to them does not touch this form of power. 
     Jennings’ (2005) premise in her article on ex-combatant reintegration in Liberia 
emphasizes the importance of client satisfaction (the client of the DDR programs is 
the ex-combatant).  However, the participants from Nuevo Horizonte emphasize the 
need to look beyond themselves: you have to satisfy the needs of all Guatemalans.  
This vision has not been expressed anywhere in the literature that I have found. 
     The literature and the official enactment of DDR programming seem to support the 
idea of allowing political space for those who have been disarmed (Knight, 2008).  
The people of Nuevo Horizonte have expressed their acknowledgement that this was 
an important step.  Knight (2008, p. 13), who writes on behalf of the United Nations, 
also recommends that the insurgent organization be part of the negotiations, and 
this, in fact, was enacted in Guatemala.  However, according to the participants in 
this inquiry, their interests were not represented well by those in charge of the 
URNG. 
“Y yo te digo, algunos de los errores de nosotros fue que nos 
creímos de nuestras mismas organizaciones de nosotros. Nos 
creímos. Y pensamos nosotros de que nuestras 
organizaciones, que nos representaban a nosotros, internas en 
Guatemala, iban a hacer estrategia para podernos a nosotros 
conducir a un desarrollo mejor, pensamos.”(interview #1) 
I say to you, some of our errors were because we believed our 
very own organizations.  We believed in them.  And we 
thought that these organizations, that represented our own 
interests, made up of Guatemalans, were going to make a 
strategy in order to enable us to forge a better development.  
That’s what we thought. 
  “Pero nosotros también por la poca experiencia en el 
desarrollo del tema de desarrollo socioeconómico para 




las necesidades que podíamos tener al futuro. Nos creímos 
más de nuestras organizaciones a que nos representaron este 
caso. . .a nosotros los representó la Fundación Guillermo 
Toriello que era integrado por todos los dirigentes de la URNG 
en general. Se hizo una fundación. Y pensamos que ahí le 
respondes por nosotros. Pensamos. Los creímos. Fuimos muy. 
. .poco visionarios. Fuimos también muy miopes políticamente 
y no nos pusimos más avorazados, no nos pusimos más con 
iniciativa para lograr un proceso de inserción mejor así a 
nosotros. Pero eso es interno de nosotros.” (interview #7) 
  But we also, due to our lack of experience in socio-economic 
development, we did not present before the state or the 
government, the list of things we needed for the future.  
Instead we had faith in our own organizations that supposedly 
represented our case, such as the Guillermo Toriello 
Foundation, which was connected to the heads of the URNG.  
And we thought that they would respond to our needs.  We 
thought.  We believed.  We didn’t see the whole picture.  We 
were short-sighted politically and did not look after our own 
interests, we did not push for a better reintegration process for 
ourselves.   But this is an internal matter. 
“Eso pienso yo que fue un error de nuestros máximos 
dirigentes de la guerrilla. Porque cuando las negociaciones. . 
.voy a regresar un poco atrás. . .cuando las negociaciones… 
supuestamente la URNG y los gobiernos estaban dialogando 
muchas cosas hacia los excombatientes. . .muchos temas ¿no? 
Pero al final, como te decía anteriormente, supuestamente que 
nosotros. . .la firma de la paz, que nos iban a dar casa, que nos 
iban a dar tierra y todo lo necesario para empezar a trabajar. 
Bueno, yo no sé si fue un descuido de nuestros máximos 
dirigentes o se dejaron meter el gol. . .no sé. Porque la tierra 
se suponía que nos la iban a regalar. . .que el gobierno lo iba a 
pagar que para eso muchos países estaban donando dinero 
para que se nos facilitara eso. Bueno, al final de cuentas, lo 
que nos quedamos fue con una gran deuda.” (interview #1) 
I think it was an error of our highest leaders of the guerrilla 




URNG and the government were discussing many things 
regarding the ex-combatants. . .many topics, no?  But in the 
end, just like I told you before, supposedly we. . .the peace 
accords were supposed to give us housing, land and all the 
necessities to begin working.  Fine, I don’t know if it was 
carelessness on the part of our URNG leaders.  Because the 
land that they were supposed to give us, that which the 
government was to pay for. . .that the government was going 
to pay for on account of many countries were donating money 
and the government was going to facilitate this.  Well, in the 
end, we are stuck with a huge debt. 
     It is unclear whether the involvement by the URNG in the negotiations was more 
symbolic than real, as the retrospective opinion of the participants is quite united in 
its criticism of their leadership. 
Being a Role Model 
     As discussed previously, the literature is full of examples of the perspectives of 
outsiders, who perceive ex-combatants as threats.  It is therefore significant that the 
ex-combatants of Nuevo Horizonte did not perceive themselves as the threat to 
lasting peace.  On the contrary, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, they saw 
themselves as catalysts for lasting peace.  This peace is one that will bring economic 
and social justice to all of Guatemala.  Unlike any literature reviewed thus far, these 
ex-combatants would say that the real threat to lasting peace is, in fact, the 
Guatemalan government and the global political and economic forces that restrain 
any meaningful attempts to create change. 
     It is also noteworthy to highlight another distinction between the DDR literature 
and the thoughts of this inquiry’s participants.  The focus of DDR programming has 
grown to include a wide range of services for ex-combatants, and is larger than 
simply keeping a cease-fire.  Nonetheless, measurements of DDR in themselves 
focus on outcomes for only the ex-combatants.  What resonated among the 
participants’ interviews was a hope for the amelioration of the social and economic 
conditions for all of Guatemala.  Their criteria for success went far beyond their own 
needs, or perhaps more accurately, reflected a realization that their own needs are 
inextricably interdependent with all of their Guatemalan compatriots.  To me, this 




“Pero siempre tratamos de mantener eso. Y muchos padres 
tratamos de meterles eso a los jóvenes porque algún día 
nosotros vamos a desaparecer, ¿no? Y entonces ojalá que la 
juventud que hay ahorita y los que vienen naciendo que 
siempre sigan con esto de estar unidos. Porque hoy en día en 
Guatemala, o tal vez en otros países, si cada quien lucha por sí 
mismo, no puede, no lo escuchan. Debe uno de estar unido. 
Entonces eso, y yo siento que ha sido un beneficio que nos ha 
ayudado a traer muchos beneficios.” (interview #1) 
But we also try to keep this (our unity).  And many parents try 
to pass this on to the youth because one day we are going to 
be gone, no?  Therefore, God willing, the youth that are 
around today, plus those who are not yet even born, will 
always follow in this path–being united.  Because one day in 
Guatemala, or perhaps in other countries, if everyone just 
struggles for justice individually, you can’t.  No one will hear 
you.  We need to be united.  Therefore, this, and I feel that it 
has been a benefit that has helped us to bring many benefits. 
     Those involved in implementing the DDR process may be curious about or 
uncomfortable with the idea that ex-combatants would consider themselves role 
models.  I believe that the ex-combatants of Nuevo Horizonte have been able to 
seize opportunities to do so as role models in reintegrating, role models in economic 
development and role models in struggling for social justice.  The following quote 
exemplifies this support for a non-violent role model identity: 
“Entonces la experiencia más importante que hay, que no sólo 
a través de las armas se puede llevar una lucha. Se puede 
llevar a través de diálogo, a través de otras formas de lucha.  
Entonces no es necesario cuándo hay voluntad de ambas 
partes. . .no llevas sólo ese proceso de armas en la mano ni 
nada de eso. Se pueden hacer diferentes luchas para que se 
siga luchando por un ideal que uno pueda tener.” (interview 
#5) 
Therefore, the most important experience is, that armed 
struggle is not the only way to fight or advance a cause.  You 
can use dialogue, and other forms of struggle. . .therefore, it is 




resort to arms and violence.  It is possible to engage in other 
forms of resistance to continue struggling for an ideal that you 
want to attain.  
          In summary, I have argued that the identity of the ex-combatant has been 
constructed differently by various stakeholders.  I believe the participants’ positive 
self-identity is directly related to their unique reintegration experience, as outlined 
in the theoretical framework in the last chapter.  Their strategies to remain united 
and autonomous (among others) enabled the development and nurturing of a robust 
and positively constructed collective identity, which they were able to promote to 
their neighbours during reintegration.  On the contrary, the tendency for others to 
construct an identity based on fear or based on deficit rather than capacity 
highlights the need for further understanding of how the DDR process may 
negatively impact the reintegration of ex-combatants more generally.   
The Social Construction of Reintegration  
     Evaluation and monitoring of DDR has become a serious and well-researched 
endeavour.  DDR evaluation modules and manuals are readily found, produced by 
highly regarded agencies such as the United Nations, the United States Government 
(United Nations, 2008; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
2000, US State Department, 2006).  There is significant interest, effort and set of 
resources dedicated to learning from past challenges, and to making the DDR 
process as effective as possible. 
     However, I would like to raise several issues regarding the underlying 
epistemology, ontology and axiology of current DDR programming, including the 
monitoring and evaluation components.  The first point I raise is what constitutes 
knowledge (epistemology) and how authoritative understanding of DDR is 
constructed.  The second point I raise is how we disseminate that knowledge and 
what our purpose is (axiology).   
     The following participant quote offers an excellent perspective on knowledge and 
reality. 
“Verdades. Tú puedes creer que lo que tu piensas es 
absolutamente lo único, lo ideal, pero tu forma de valorar las 
cosas contra las mías es diferente. Muy diferente. Entonces lo 
importante es tener esa capacidad, esa facilidad, o esa 




forma de ver las cosas y tal vez en función de eso construir 
colectivamente los procesos.” (interview #8) 
 Realities.  You may believe that what you think is absolutely 
the only way, the ideal, but your method of appraising things 
compared to mine is different.  Very different.  Therefore, what 
is important is to have the capacity, the knack or the humility 
perhaps, to allow for the other person to express their way of 
seeing things, and perhaps through this, to construct 
collectively the processes.   
     This quote exemplifies the social constructionist premise that realities are not 
necessarily shared by groups.  It also speaks to the tendency for power to dictate 
whose knowledge is accepted as legitimate.  We have said that social 
constructionists contend that there are many realities, and what may sometimes 
seem as the only reality may simply, in fact, be the reality of the majority, or in the 
case of DDR, the reality of those who write about it, measure it and control it.  Thus 
far, I have considered some of these dominant constructs to include:  ex-combatants 
are potential threats, the goal of DDR is security, the DDR process as tied to neo-
liberal ideology, and constructed on a Development Model.  By now it is clear that 
the participants’ perspective differs from these tenets of the international 
community, thus exemplifying the multiple perspectives of a reality or interpretation 
of a phenomenon such as reintegration.  To be clear, the purpose of this discourse is 
not to say that the perspective of the Guatemalan ex-combatants supersedes or is 
superior to the inadequate perspectives of the dominant viewpoints.  As Gergen 
(2009) states:  “To recognize that a favoured reality is constructed is no reason for its 
abandonment” (p. 165). 
     It would be unfair to say that United Nations (UN) arbiters of DDR do not have the 
best interest of ex-combatants in their minds when their programs are planned, 
implemented and evaluated.  However, diverse realities and understanding 
inevitably lead to divergent goals and understanding of what success would look 
like.  Kuhn describes this process by arguing that tightly organized communities of 
specialists, in this case, United Nations DDR program leaders, are the central forces 
in developing a particular dominant reality.  Rather than seeing inquiry as 
progressing steadily closer to the one truth, Kuhn (as cited in Patton, 2002, p. 99) 
suggests that inquiry and knowledge on a subject are best seen as a series of power 
struggles between adherents of differing worldviews.  Therefore, it is important to 




reintegration, and realize that the positivistic and rationalist approach of Western 
programming has its limitations.     
     I have argued thus far that the foreign-run DDR programs are constructed in a 
neo-liberal, individualist framework, which differs from the perspective of the ex-
combatants of Nuevo Horizonte. I emphasize that the central lesson from the 
theoretical framework is that DDR is best understood from the perspective of the ex-
combatants themselves.  Their constructed reality has been documented here 
(although by an outsider) and the knowledge gained from their experience is 
worthy of dissemination.  The inherent challenges of DDR programs may be due to 
the underlying and overarching ideology on which they are based, and the 
challenges of reintegration for ex-combatants are exacerbated by their participation 
in programs whose ideology they do not share.   
     The second point I wish to raise is the sharing of knowledge.   Conventional 
methods of knowledge dissemination are dominated and controlled by academics 
and technocrats who live and work in wealthy Western nations.  This study is no 
exception.  Therefore, those of us who are charged with the privilege to study and 
evaluate DDR programs are commissioned with the responsibility to showcase the 
voices of those who do not access conventional avenues of knowledge 
dissemination.  We need to share those views of the ex-combatants themselves.      
“Sabemos tantitito. Pero lo importante es que ese tantitito que 
sabemos lo socialicemos y agarremos de los demás hermanas 
y hermanos y podamos hacer algo muy grande entre todos. 
Porque es posible crear las condiciones a pesar de los 
bloqueos, a pesar del sistema capitalista se pueden crear 
alternativas que favorezcan a la sociedad”. (interview #3) 
We know so little.  But what is important is that the little we do 
know, we share and therefore we add to that which others 
know, and we can accomplish something very big among all of 
us.  Because it is possible to create change in spite of the 
obstacles, in spite of the capitalism, it is possible to create 
alternatives that benefit all of society. 
     Therefore, the participants’ call for autonomy has a lot to do with a call for an 
acknowledgement of their reality, their lived experience.  Their perceived lack of 
experience, their perceived threat to peace, may be all about their wish to simply 




construction of its goals, its outcomes or evaluative criteria speaks only to UN 
officials, then those outside this sphere cannot enter into the dialogue. 
     As Gergen (2009) states:  The challenge for DDR research, therefore, is not to 
seek the one truth, but to seek the truth within a given community.  This often means 
giving a voice to those whose reality is not part of the dominant world view. 
Relevance to the Existing Literature  
     In this section, I highlight the ways in which this study corroborates, challenges 
and extends the current literature on DDR.   I offer a discussion on the relation of the 
theoretical framework to the existing knowledge and the implications for future 
research, practice and activism. 
     To begin with, how does this study corroborate or support the existing literature?  
I would like to highlight three issues.  Firstly, the participants’ stories support some 
of the concerns uncovered by authors such as Jennings (2007).  Jennings’ critical 
analysis of DDR in Liberia raises the concern that we need to not only question 
whether ex-combatants are reintegrating, but more appropriately, what are they 
reintegrating into? Guatemala’s post-conflict journey is not unique in its challenges 
of widening poverty, growing violence and unchecked impunity.  Therefore, the 
question of successful reintegration raises significant questions about how DDR can 
successfully address longstanding and wide-reaching societal problems.  Similarly, 
the participants of this study determined that their success in reintegrating was 
hampered by powerful external forces over which they had no control, and which 
actually exacerbated conditions (such as poverty, violence and impunity) which they 
fought to eradicate.  Jennings (2007) states:  “Asking ‘reintegration into what’ seems 
a first step rarely taken, with the exception of market analyses commissioned to 
determine how many mechanics and seamstresses a post-conflict society can 
absorb.  The remedy is prescribed before diagnosis” (pp. 213-214).  
     Secondly, the participants’ stories support Stovel’s (2008) concept of sentient 
reconciliation.  The ex-combatants of Nuevo Horizonte stressed that while economic 
viability is necessary for successful reintegration, it is not sufficient.  Attaining a 
sense of belonging and acceptance was crucial, and accounted for the strategies 
they implemented during their reintegration phase.  Sentient reconciliation also 
includes less tangible qualities such as forgiveness and healing (Lambourne, 2001) 
which are more difficult to measure than economic indicators.  Because DDR 




surprising evaluators and researchers have often avoided tackling these more 
elusive outcomes. 
     Thirdly, the participants of this study confirm what has been reported in many 
other countries, that promises of job training and economic incentives have in reality 
fallen significantly short of promises and expectations.  In spite of significant 
resources utilized by DDR programs, there are no literature examples of ex-
combatants who stated they were satisfied with their economic prospects post-
reintegration.  The reasons for this are no doubt complex, and cannot be separated 
from the previously discussed challenge of widespread poverty in the affected 
countries, but I believe this dissatisfaction is exacerbated by the perceived lack of 
participation and input by the ex-combatants, which may manifest itself in various 
forms of disillusionment.  In addition, these participants blame this shortfall on 
systemic corruption, as do others (Jennings 2007; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007).   
       The next question I raise is in what ways did this study challenge the existing 
literature?  Firstly, I believe the theoretical framework clearly describes the ex-
combatants in terms of their capacity instead of their deficits.  The framework is 
based closely on the reflections of the men and women of Nuevo Horizonte who 
experienced the reintegration process and remember it vividly in terms of their own 
strengths and resources.  This orientation is not represented in the literature, which 
generally reflects a perspective that ex-combatants are in a position of needing 
help, and the solutions to their problems are found externally.  This issue warrants 
some attention.  Reframing ex-combatants in a more positive and capable frame of 
reference may seem straightforward on an intellectual level, but in practice, it is 
more difficult.  DDR brokers and managers tend to be well-educated and have an 
array of education and practical skills, while the ex-combatants often have no formal 
education or skills that are overtly applicable to re-enter civilian life.  It may seem 
unavoidable in practice for these two groups to adopt roles of expert and 
incapacitated.  Nonetheless, according to the reflections of the participants of this 
study, a big part of their success relied upon being able to use their capacities and 
skills they already had. 
     Secondly, the positive collective identity that the ex-combatants of Nuevo 
Horizonte have constructed directly challenges the negative stereotypes that are 
found in the literature.  Ex-combatants were seldom if ever portrayed as problem-
solvers, visionaries or as other positive contributors.  At best, they were portrayed in 
neutral terms, or more likely, as victims.  I believe this challenge of the identity of 
the ex-combatant is one of the most significant contributions that this study has to 




     I now wish to highlight several ways in which I believe this study extends the 
literature on the reintegration of ex-combatants.  Ultimately, the purpose of this 
inquiry has been to seek advice from experienced ex-combatants for those who are 
currently in the DDR process, either as experts or as participants.   I believe this 
aspect is important to emphasize.  The current literature is filled with many 
evaluative surveys asking ex-combatants about how the process went, but I am not 
aware of one example where these participants were asked the question, how would 
you improve it?  I believe this shortfall is reflected in McKnight’s (1995) belief that 
frequently, expertise and wisdom is held by those with power, and the expertise and 
wisdom of participants is overlooked.  “As you are the problem, the assumption is 
that I, the professional services, am the answer.  You are not the answer.  Your peers 
are not the answer” (p. 46). 
     If we look back to the secondary codes under the category of Lessons Learned 
(see Appendix B), the following seven themes can be extrapolated from the advice 
of the ex-combatants: 
1. Be united 
2. Have a transparent process 
3. Take charge of the process 
4. Install mechanisms to ensure the completion of the terms of the peace accords 
5. Build relationships with other ex-combatants 
6. Integrate with the population 
7. Do not wait for the government (or other groups) to fix things–take charge of 
your future   
     This advice does not come as a surprise at this point of this paper.  These themes 
have been discussed frequently, and are integrated into the framework presented in 
the previous chapter.  I would like to add one other piece of advice that is woven 
throughout their reflections, that is, struggling for justice is paramount, but violence 
is not the preferred means.  Use dialogue instead.      
     Another way in which this study extends the literature is its time frame.  This study 
captures the reflections of a group of ex-combatants 13 years after the peace 
accords were signed.  To my knowledge, this is unique; most evaluations tend to 





     As highlighted in the previous section, the ultimate purpose of this inquiry was to 
elicit the thoughts of experienced ex-combatants to formulate advice for others in 
the same situation.  In spite of best efforts to ensure authenticity and trustworthiness, 
and to conduct this inquiry with an anti-oppressive orientation, the fact remains that 
the participants’ voices and their stories are still being transmitted and interpreted 
by an outsider from the globally dominant society.  The challenge that DDR 
programs are organized and controlled by outsiders from the globally dominant 
society can be used as a critique to this inquiry as well. 
     As a qualitative grounded theory study, the results can be seen as understanding 
a unique story and the results are not necessarily readily transferrable to other DDR 
contexts.  Additionally, while I believe that the views and perspectives of the 
participants generally represent those of the entire community of Nuevo Horizonte, 
ultimately, they were elicited from 8 ex-combatants.  Nonetheless, there are 
important things to learn.  Additionally, in spite of the title of this dissertation, this 
inquiry is based on the people who chose to live in Nuevo Horizonte, and does not 
represent the story of all the ex-combatants of Guatemala.   
     I must add as well, that while the aim is to offer advice to others in similar 
situations, it is easy to realize that each society, culture, country, group of ex-
combatants, and conflict is unique.  As Jennings (2007, p. 204) states, DDR 
programming must be more sensitive to local contexts and capacities, therefore,  
conclusions drawn from here cannot be used as generalized recommendations for 
other countries and conflicts.   
Suggestions for Future Research 
     As a qualitative inquirer embedded in the paradigm of social constructionism, I 
believe in the value of expanding the quest for deeper understanding.  Therefore, 
my suggestions for future research do not focus so much on specific topics, 
geopolitical priorities  or specific post-conflict challenges, but rather focus on 
processes that further elicit the voice of those who do not belong in our dominant 
discourse of reintegration.  I believe one innovative focus for further inquiry is on 
how ex-combatants can be better heard and how their voices can be further 
disseminated.  Listening that is intentional and drawn from a perspective of social 
justice can reduce the disparity between the program goals of international 
development organizations and those of the people whose lives and predicaments 




     Additionally, I suggest that we expand our inquiry into longer-term retrospective 
studies in different parts of the globe.  For example, how are the ex-combatants on 
the African continent managing 10 years after their reintegration programs have 
been dismantled?  And lastly, I believe that further research (and perhaps even DDR 
implementation) needs to view ex-combatants through a lens of capacity, and needs 
to be open to the strategy and theme of unity during reintegration.  
Summary 
     In this chapter, I provided a discussion on why this study is relevant and how it 
may corroborate, challenge or extend the current literature on DDR.  I referred back 
to the ontological, epistemological and axiological assumptions to frame this 
discussion, and also discussed the limitations of this inquiry, and some suggestions 





Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
     In this study, I offered a theoretical framework to better understand how a group 
of Guatemalan ex-combatants reintegrated back into Guatemalan civilian society 
after the end of the longest civil war in the western hemisphere.  I utilized a 
qualitative methodology, grounded theory, to guide the process; I proclaimed social 
constructionism as the paradigm to guide the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions.  I aligned myself with the values and goals of Peace Studies, that is, to 
seek ways to work towards non-violence, and to strive to create communities, global 
and local, that exist not only in a state of absence of war, but also in a state of social 
justice for all.   
     In the end, after corroborating my results with the participants, I am excited that 
the story of these ex-combatants is relevant and timely, to the participants 
themselves and more importantly, to those involved in implementing DDR programs 
and to those involved as participants around the world.  The theoretical framework 
from this study rests upon the foundational theme of being united.  Challenging 
conventional views of how DDR programs are implemented, this framework helps 
me explain how the solidarity among the former guerrillas assisted them in 
significant ways.  Being united assisted the ex-combatants to be in charge of the 
reintegration process, and in control of their lives.  Being united helped them be 
connected, forging relationships with neighbours and international partners.  Being 
united helped the former combatants to maintain their vision for working towards 
social and economic justice.  Being united helped them to build their community, a 
role model for all Guatemalans.  The other themes or strategies flowed from this 
core concept:  being autonomous, being connected, being a role model, and being 
visionary. 
      I believe this study adds to the existing literature about the reintegration of ex-
combatants.  Some pervasive themes are corroborated while others are challenged.   
     I would like to reiterate two important aspects of this study that challenge the 
dominant themes of the existing DDR literature.  Firstly, the emerging theory 
challenges the pervasive orientation of DDR programs, a theme that I refer to as the 
development model, based on the work of Farmer (2007).  The theoretical 
framework presented here demonstrates that instead, a social justice model is 
necessary to draw upon the capacity of those women and men for whom the DDR 
programs are developed.  Because advocates of the social justice model explicitly 
acknowledge the existing capacity of the ex-combatants, and critically examine the 




brokers, it allows for the strategies of unity, autonomy and connectedness to drive 
the vision of the ex-combatants themselves.   
     Secondly, through the development of the emerging theory, I challenge the 
constructing of a negative identity of the ex-combatant, an identity defined by their 
potential for violence, and threat to national security and peace.  In this study, I 
highlight the ex-combatants’ notion of their own identity, one characterized by the 
highest ideals of unity, hard work, being a role model and holding a vision of social 
justice.   
     I would also like to reiterate two important aspects of this study which corroborate 
the general findings of other studies of ex-combatant reintegration.  Firstly, through 
the framework I have shown support for the idea that sentient reconciliation is 
paramount to successful reintegration.  Supporting the works of Stovel (2008), 
Hamber (2007) and Lambourne (2001, 2004), the people of Nuevo Horizonte spoke 
clearly of their need to achieve reconciliation, in the form of acceptance, with their 
Guatemalan civilian neighbours.   
     Secondly, through this emerging theory, I support the idea that reintegration is 
significantly challenged by the external social and economic pressures and 
influences over which DDR programs have little control.  Supporting the works of 
Specker (2008), Crandall (2004) and Garibay (2006), the people of Nuevo Horizonte 
spoke clearly that the overall success of their reintegration process was limited by 
the continued and unaddressed social and economic disparity in the larger 
Guatemalan society.  Reintegration cannot be conducted in isolation; their individual 
and collective vision of success was directly tied to their vision of a more just 
Guatemala.     
     Finally, I would like to reiterate several important aspects of this study that did not 
receive significant attention in the existing literature.  Firstly, through the emerging 
theory, I provide an understanding of the complex nature of the vulnerability of the 
ex-combatants as they were initiated into the reintegration process.  This 
vulnerability is not related to the common concepts of victimhood or deficiency, but 
is rather more closely aligned with the concept of being in a place with little power.  
This vulnerability is more akin to a situation of being subject to powerful brokers 
who are making life-changing decisions on one’s behalf, in spite of one’s strong 
ideals and capacities.  It is akin to the situation of having no resources to better one’s 




     Secondly, through the emerging theory, I remind us of the discourse on whether 
there is such a concept as a “just war.”  I do not enter into this dialectic directly in 
this study, but rather contend that the participants teach us that violence needs to be 
prevented at all costs.  The struggle for the ex-combatants of Nuevo Horizonte was 
not tied to violence.  On the contrary, their struggle was based on a vision of social 
justice for all Guatemalans, and for them, the DDR process provided them with the 
opportunity to continue with their vision through non-violent means.  While many 
authors of the DDR literature discuss the goal of non-violence, fewer recognize the 
importance of creating opportunities for legitimate non-violent means to further the 
ideals, which were the antecedents of the armed conflict.     
     Through their participation in this study, the people of Nuevo Horizonte offer 
another important contribution to the DDR literature.  Considering this inquiry was 
conducted 13 years after the DDR process was implemented, and 5 years after the 
final United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala report was released, the 
opinions and reflections are unique in their temporal distance from the reintegration 
experience.  A retrospective inquiry such as this would likely produce different 
opinions than one conducted immediately following the termination of a 
reintegration program (which is when evaluations tend to be piloted).  To my 
knowledge, there is no other such inquiry in the DDR literature. 
      Lastly, through this study, I offer the opportunity for those who have experienced 
the reintegration process a chance to offer advice to others.  The DDR literature is 
often about what the experts bring to the table.  Through this inquiry, I provide an 
idea of what a group of ex-combatants can bring to the table:  capacity and skills that 
they learned as guerrillas, a vision for social justice, strength in numbers and advice 
for other ex-combatants who are transitioning.  Their message is simple and 
profound:  stay united and organized, have a clear vision, ensure the process is 
transparent, and work hard to re-integrate among your neighbours.  
     These ex-combatants have a message, and it is important that we listen.  I am 
committed to follow up by pursuing opportunities to disseminate their story.  It is 
important that their voice is heard by those who seek to do as good a job as possible 
in other contexts of DDR.  It is also important that other ex-combatants benefit from 
the wisdom and understanding that has been acquired by those who have gone 
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Appendix A:  Consent Form 
(English and Spanish Versions)  
Consent to participate in Study 
Name of Participant________________________________________________ 
You are invited to take part in this research study.  This form tells you why this research 
study is being done, what will happen in the research study. If there is anything you do not 
understand, please ask questions. Then you can decide if you want to join this study or not.  
 
Name of the Study 
From War  to  Peace:    The  Transition  Experience  of Guatemalan  Ex‐Combatants:  A Grounded  Theory 
Inquiry 
 
Principle investigator:  Randy Janzen 
Institution:  Department of Social Sciences, Tilburg University 
Purpose of the Study 
Currently programs to demobilize, disarm and reintegrate ex-combatants have become an 
integral part of United Nations Peacekeeping operations around the world.  As many as one 
million ex-combatants have participated in these programs in countries in Central and South 
America, Europe, Asia and Africa.  The evaluations of these programs has been mixed, and 
have often focused on the failures or shortcomings, and the criteria for success (or failure) 
have mostly been set by United Nations personnel, academics and other Western experts, 
with limited input from the ex-combatants themselves. 
The purpose of this study, therefore, is to learn from the ex-combatants of Nuevo Horizonte 
directly, to seek advice from them to share with DDR experts, and with other ex-combatants.   
The Nature of Your Participation 




If you choose to participate, you will participate in an hour-long interview which will take 
place between December 15 and December 22, 2009.  The purpose of the interview is to 
share your thoughts on the following questions: 
-What are your personal feelings around the process of reintegration? 
-What has helped in this transition, what has been a challenge? 
-What advice do you have for others (in other countries) who are re-entering civilian life 
after a civil war? 
In general terms, the intention is to gain a better understanding of:  your transition from 
guerrilla to member of civil society; your understanding of peace and justice and the tension 
between these two concepts; your understanding of the challenges and the successes you 
have encountered personally and collectively as a member of the larger Guatemalan 
society, on your post-conflict journey from cease-fire to building a society on the principles 
of social justice; and lastly, your perspective of the formal peace process in Guatemala.       
Confidentiality 
This interview will be video recorded.  The actual recording will be used by the investigator 
(Randy Janzen).  The dialogue will be trans-scribed onto paper by a trans-scriber, but 
otherwise will not be seen by anyone without your written permission. 
You may choose to have your name on the study as a participant.  Or, if you choose, all 
information gathered from your interview will remain strictly confidential.  
A written copy of the interview will be given to you for review to ensure it accurately reflects 
your thoughts and opinions.  At this time, you may choose to delete any part of the interview 
so that it will not be used in the study. 
If you choose, you may keep a DVD copy of your interview, and with your permission a DVD 
copy can be given to the N.H. Library as an archive of your thoughts on this topic. 
Benefits and Risks of Participation 
Your participation in this study is voluntary and there is no compensation for your 
participation. However, as an appreciation for your commitment to helping other ex-
combatants with your advice, a library project has been initiated in N.H.  This project 
includes funds to help young people to work as paid library coordinators, in order for them 
to be able to return to high school or university to complete advanced studies. 
Participating in this study will require you to reflect on the process of re-integrating back 




out painful memories.    You may wish to not participate if talking about your transition 
experience will be too difficult.  If you choose to participate and later find that it was too 
difficult, you are encouraged to contact the investigator. 
What Will Be Done With the Information 
The transcribed content of the interview will be used to complete a PhD thesis with the 
above title.  The information may also be used for writing articles for publication in 
academic journals, or for presentation at conferences.   Written segments of the interview 
may be included in any of these forms.  However, the content or your interview will not be 
associated with your name in any way without your consent.   
By signing my name below, I confirm the following: 
 
 I have read (or had read to me) this entire consent document.  All of my questions have 
been answered to my satisfaction. 
 The study’s purpose, procedures, benefits and possible risks have been explained to 
me.   
 I agree to let the investigator use and share the information gathered for this study as 
outlined above. 
 I voluntarily agree to participate in this research study.  I agree to follow the study 
procedures as directed.  I have been told that I can stop at any time. 
 
IMPORTANT: You will receive a signed and dated copy of this consent form.  Please keep 

























Desde  La  Guerra  Hasta  la  Paz: La  Experiencia  de  la  Transición  de  los  Ex‐Combatientes 
Guatemaltecos.  
El Objetivo de la Investigación 
Actualmente,  programas  de  Desarme,  Desmovilización  y  Reintegración  (DDR)  están  usados 
como un componente integral de las Fuerzas de Paz de las Naciones Unidas.  Casi un millón de 
excombatientes  han  participado  en  programas  oficiales  de  DDR  en  países  de  Centro  y  Sur 
América,  Europa,  Asia  y  África.   Los  resultados  de  las  evaluaciones  de  los  proyectos  están 
mixtos, y muchas veces se enfocan en las limitaciones y fracasos.  Además, los criterios para el 
éxito  (o  fracaso)  han  sido  construidos  por  el  personal  de  las  Naciones  Unidas,  no  por  los 
excombatientes. 














¿Que  consejo  tienen  para  los  demás  (en  otro  países)  quienes  están  en  el  proceso  de 
reintegración? 
La esperanza es obtener una comprensión mas amplia sobre: su transición desde guerrillero a 
socio  de  sociedad  civil;  su  comprensión  de  la  paz  y  justicia  y  la  tensión  entre  estos  dos 
conceptos,  su  comprensión  de  los  retos  y  logros  que  usted  ha  encontrado  personal  y 
colectivamente  (como miembro de  la  sociedad Guatemalteca);  su camino personal desde  los 
Acuerdos de Paz; y finalmente, su perspectiva sobre el Proceso de Paz en Guatemala. 
Confidencialidad 
La  entrevista  será  grabada  por  video  cámara,  para  el  uso  exclusivo  del  investigador  (Randy 
Janzen)  y  su  asesora  académica  (Sally  St.  George).   La  entrevista  será  transcrita  por  una 
traductora profesional, y no será mirado por nadie más sin su permiso.    
Usted  puede  elegir  entre  escribir  su  nombre  en  el  documento  final  (como  participante),  o 
también puede elegir no escribir su nombre en el documento final. 
Una  copia  escrita  de  la  entrevista  le  será  presentada  para  revisarla,  para  asegurar  que  sus 
palabras reflejan sus pensamientos y opiniones correctamente.  









sociedad  civil  guatemalteca.  A  veces,  esta  reflexión  en  el  pasado  puede  exponer memorias 
penosas.  Podría ser que Usted decida no participar ni hablar sobre este tiempo difícil.  Si elige 













3. Yo estoy consiente que el  investigador usa y comparte  la  información de mi entrevista en  las 
maneras explicadas. 





















Appendix B:  Primary and Secondary Coding 
Below are the 438 primary or initial codes.  These codes are organized using the categories 
of Conditions, Strategies, Consequences and Lessons learned.   
Core phenomenon is:  Reintegration 
The secondary codes are represented by bold, underlines categories–50 in total.  The 438 
initial codes are grouped into the 50 secondary codes.  After each secondary code are 
numbers.  The first number represents how many initial codes were grouped under the 
secondary code.  The numbers in the parentheses (ranging from 1 to 8) indicate from which 
interview the initial codes were taken. 50 secondary codes were developed 
Conditions (76) 
Hope- 2 (1 7) 
After the peace accords, we were full of hope 
Land re-distribution was built into the peace accords 
We were organized 1 (8) 
Luckily we had some experience, specifically in organization, community organization 
No skills for civil life 16 (1 2 3 6 7 8)  
Didn’t know how to approach new situation 
We joined guerrillas at a young age 
The only knowledge we had was weapons 
We were poor, marginalized indigenous, farmers 
We were an illiterate people 
We didn’t have any advisement in legal matters regarding our rights 
For example, didn’t know how to build houses 




It was difficult to integrate economically 
You need a good profession to have a good economic situation 
We had no education  
We had no skills 
We learned to read and write at a basic level only 
How could we re-integrate without a skill or profession? 
 We grew up as guerrillas 
We did not know how to work in this situation 
Fear/uncertainty/mistrust 13 (1 2 6 7 8) 
Entered transition with fear 
They tried to destroy us with obstacles 
We came with a different vision, not having confidence with the system.  This limited our 
ability to reintegrate 
We believed they were only a political manoeuvre (the accords) 
I didn’t believe in the stories the government gave us 
Still uncertain whether the government had the power to adopt the terms 
We did not believe that the peace accords would become reality based on the recent history 
of repression 
I didn’t believe in the government 
Concerned that the peace accords were going to be a trick to eventually destroy us 
Reintegration was uncertain 
You ask the question, is this risky?  Certain?  Will the state comply?   




On a group level, there existed a sense of uncertainty as well 
Had nothing 10 (1 2 3 4 5 6) 
We had nothing to return to 
Arrived at NH:  What do we do now 
People were desperate, it was difficult to find work outside the coop 
We had to find a place to stay after demobilization was over 
 There was nothing here 
Being divided into those who have somewhere to go to and those who don’t 
We were a people with no clothes or shoes 
There was nothing here when we started 
We started from zero 
Economically we were very hard up, and had to rely on food for work projects 
Inadequate formal process 10 (2 6 7 8) 
They placed us in pig stall and chicken coops 
Not enough time to learn a trade 
Computer training was not helpful because equipment was out of date 
We received no training 
Our ID was not accepted all the time, it identified us as guerrillas, this was hard at the 
beginning 
The process of documenting us was a problem 
There were a lot of resources made available, but we did not get them 
We were to receive training during reintegration process 





There was a lot of money available, but still things did not get accomplished 
Poor leadership/representation 9 (1 2 3 5 6 7) 
Our negotiators didn’t negotiate our land situation well 
Being disadvantaged by last minute poor tactics  
The world just wanted the guns silenced, didn’t really seek justice for us. 
During the negotiation, URNG was not working on our behalf 
We didn’t know to negotiate directly–others negotiated on our behalf 
The success of reintegration depends a great deal on the leadership. We might be in a 
better position right now if we had better leadership 
In the final hour, our leadership committed a huge tactical error 
Our negotiators trusted the government 
Those who represented us did not serve us well 
Feeling vulnerable 6 (1 3 5 6) 
Feeling powerless 
We were vulnerable 
We are still vulnerable due to our lack of formal education and poverty 
These forces, who brokered our peace deal, are in charge 
We didn’t have the experience therefore, be careful when signing peace accords 
It was a brand new experience for everyone 
Feeling forgotten/abandoned 2 (1 6) 
We felt forgotten during the negotiations 




Feeling judged 2 (1 6) 
Some people accepted us, others no 
Being an ex-combatant was hard because not everyone wanted to give us food 
Difficult conditions 4 (1 6 8) 
It was difficult at the beginning 
Upon arriving, very difficult. Men and women working as equals 
We experience great hardships during reintegration–building our community 
Reintegration on a personal level was not easy 
In touch with our history 1 (6) 
We are fully informed about the knowledge of our ancestors 
Strategies (70) 
Working with people from other countries 5 (2 3 5 8) 
We have relations with other governments and bodies, in Canada, Italy etc.  This network 
has brought us to where we are 
Aid organizations can take the driver’s seat 
We have had many visitors who have helped us 
UN helped us a lot 
 International aid has been an important benefit without this international cooperation, we 
would be much worse off 
Being organized/working together 16 (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8) 
All our possessions were held collectively for the common good 
describes how they came to learn to work collectively 




What is important to us is organization and to grow 
We came to NH and continued to work together 
We have accomplished all these successes through organization 
Need organization 
Sticking together 
Solving our problems collectively 
Need to be united 
Through our behaviour, our organization, through our will, we re-integrated 
We believe we had to stay organized.  Those who had no connections decided to organize 
themselves facing a brand new situation in a collective manner.  This was necessary to move 
ahead 
Reintegration was profoundly difficult.  During the war, we were very organized, and lived 
and worked collectively 
We worked together trying to resolved these adversities 
It is a tactic to divide and conquer.  We knew that to lose our unity was to dig our own grave 
It was more strict during the war 
Building community infrastructure 5 (2) 
Looking for land 
Began constructing schools 
Completed water project in September 1998 
I helped construct the chicken barn in NH 
Deciding on NH, arriving on February 28 
Positive attitude 1 (8) 




Took charge 3 (2 5 7) 
We helped ourselves, not received help from the government 
We had to do our part 
We’re not waiting for anyone, we will take it into our own hands 
Hard work 9 (1 2 4 5 8) 
We worked hard without pay 
Peace was a result of our sacrifice and hard work 
16 construction teams, others hauling water 
Came about from our sacrifice 
Men and women working equally in hard physical labour 
In order to succeed you have to work hard.  We lived it 
Need to have a spirit of sacrifice and willingness 
We made many sacrifices 
We worked hard to improve our lives 
Nonviolence 2 (5 8) 
Leaving the violence behind 
We need to adapt our struggle 
Learning a skill 3 (2) 
Many chose computers, because they thought it was easy 
Studying construction 
Choosing one’s training 
Reached out to neighbours 16 (1 2 3 5 6 7) 




Defeating the army at soccer 
Example, neighbour community didn’t have running water 
UN showing up to organize a soccer game with army 
Everyone has the responsibility to socialize.  We have broken the silence.  Break down the 
barriers 
Collaborate with others 
We re-integrated through organized activities such as soccer games 
It was difficult but it was something we wanted to do–to reintegrate with our neighbours 
We offered support in tangible ways, such as providing water to neighbouring Santa Ana 
We made acts of friendship to others 
We worked conscientiously to have people accept us 
We won people over through our actions 
We inserted ourselves and people accepted us 
Working with the people 
Need to maintain good relations with everyone 
Need to show you’re not just guerrillas 
Used our knowledge from the war 1 (8) 
We adapted our organization from the war to our current situation 
Ideological framework 9 (1 2 3 7 8) 
Set an example for the children and others in general 
We want equality.  Want an equal relationship in the world between people 
One of the objectives of the peace accords was to be able to continue with this revolution 




We only had principles, love, desire to triumph, respect for human rights 
The peace accords were not an end to the struggle. The war continues 
We were trying to negotiate for better conditions 
Therefore we ensured the accords contained specific conditions to transform Guatemala 
We have the responsibility to develop our populations 
Consequences (153) 
Life is good 7 (1 4 5 6) 
Reintegration was a big change 
Everything has worked out well here in NH 
Life is good 
We are here on behalf of those combatants who gave their lives 
The peace process has been successful, because now we live a different life 
More than anything, we are still here, present and still in the struggle 
We are living and looking to the future 
Received a lot of outside help and recognition 2 (1 8) 
Have attracted international attention 
We received a lot of international help with the peace accords 
Re-integrated with our neighbours 7 (5 6 7 8) 
When they got to know us they thought that maybe they were wrong about us 
People now respect and appreciate us 
We are integrating 





 At the beginning, the civil society did not trust us but that has changed. We worked hard to 
change that 
Reintegration:  our neighbours have a lot of trust in us now.  This is an example of our 
success at reintegrating 
The locals are now coming to us, where before we would go to them and they would reject 
us. 
 
Employment still a problem 5 (1 2 8) 
Hard to make ends meet then and now 
Studying construction paid off when we moved to NH 
Hard to measure success by employment 
Regarding employment, the ex-combatants are not employed to signify success 
Level of employment is perhaps no worse than general population 
The repression has stopped 12 (1 3 5 7 8) 
Benefits:  the conflict stopped 
We are not at risk for being killed by the military 
Success:  we in NH have created a civil society 
We have more peaceful life now 
We left behind the tension of the conflict 
We used to be persecuted, now it has changed 
Benefit:  an end to the political repression 
Therefore, our uncertainty waned 




There are problems, but we move forward, the repression is gone 
The number one benefit on a personal level of the accords is that we are no longer in danger 
of dying 
On a societal level, the benefit is the prevention of a lot more deaths 
We’re in charge of our future 5 (2 3) 
These are privileges we have attained ourselves 
We remain in the driver’s seat 
Instead of dependence 
Creating community leadership 
Leadership is very important 
Still engaged in political struggle 15 (2 3 4 5 6 7) 
There is political space, but we haven’t taken full advantage of it 
We have adapted this way of being to our lives now, after laying down our weapons 
Signing the peace accords was not the end of our revolution 
We are now pursuing change through dialogue, which is preferred 
Capacity to debate, analyze 
The struggle continues, but without weapons 
The most important experience is being able to carry on with the struggle without arms 
Opening political space was a success on our behalf 
Political space 
We ended the armed conflict when we signed the peace accords, but we did not end the 
struggle 





Need to continue to seek solutions 
I went from guerrilla leader to community leader 
Negotiate, this is our struggle 
Continuing to work for change, continuing our social/economic struggle 
Building community infrastructure 10 (1 2 3 4 5 6 8) 
We have been able to construct daycare, schools, kindergarten 
We have schools, kindergarten, day care 
We unite ourselves for education, for health 
Economic projects 
Benefits:  health centre, schools 
We built houses and a water system 
It is a success that we have this community and its people living and working together:  
schools, health centre, etc 
In spite of our lack of experience, we have succeeded in moving ahead little by little 
We have been improving our socio economic status, we have obtained various community 
projects 
You can’t hide what we’ve accomplished in NH 
Feel betrayed, let down 26 (1 2 3 5 6 7 8) 
It’s sad, feel betrayed 
Losing faith in the process 
Promised work, housing, but did not happen 




Supposed to look for missing combatants, but never happened 
Successive governments have not completed the terms of the peace accords 
Not mobilizing support in Guatemala like they did in El Salvador 
The government did not live up to their obligations 
Peace accords did not touch the oligarchy 
The peace process has not been completed.  The peace process has not met expectations 
Peace accords don’t matter because the conditions have not changed 
Peace accords did not bring peace, they brought silencing of the guns 
Was not a success because nothing has changed.  Power structures intact 
The army still guards these powers 
 
In certain instances, the peace accords did not deliver what they promised 
There our houses are substandard 
The reintegration program was inadequate 
Plan for large changes, but in retrospect, the changes have been small 
Accords are still are risk of being taken away by the political opponents 
The accords were not institutionalized, and are subject to change by various influences 
Instead of reducing poverty post accords, poverty and inequality has increased 
Another example of not complying with the accords is the power and size of the Guatemalan 
army 
We did not receive the promised or appropriate assistance 




The state has not complied 100% with the terms of the accords–has not delivered on many 
things 
Our trust has not improved in the past 12 years 
Violence continues, just a different type 5 (1 3 8) 
Social violence continued after the armed struggle 
We don’t have peace or security now due to the violence 
The violence continues 
Still insecurity, violence 
Now we have organized gangs, the government uses the gangs to conceal their own acts 
We remain united 18 (1 2 3 4 5 6 8) 
We hope we don’t lose this unity 
We are together as a collective, organized group 
Maintained a life based on mutuality, solidarity 
We are here despite all the obstacles.  Being organized was our way to overcome the 
obstacles 
In spite of this we have remained together 
We have not tried to suppress our collectivity 
We continue with the struggle, united 
We learned to be united 
We continue to work on the project.  We work collectively–if we don’t, we won’t succeed 
We are here together 
The most important benefit is being re-integrated with family 




Benefits:  being with family, being united 
We may be poor, but we have peace, solidarity 
We depend on each other. We feel it when one of us falls/fails 
A success for us was to remain united 
We have not lost the essence.  We do not want to lose this 
It’s more flexible now, but we still maintain our sense of collectivism 
Don’t rely on the state for anything 13 (1 2 3 7 8) 
Governments haven’t done anything for the people 
We are a conservative country 
Today, the obstacle is bureaucracy 
Bureaucracy in Guatemala is putting obstacles to organizing 
Success will be when we achieve our results for all 
I don’t expect much from the government 
In comparison, the state has helped us very little 
Governments are self-serving 
In our case, the authorities did nothing to help us in NH 
Most of us do not trust the state 
Our government responds to the interests of the large economic powers 
Our governments do not have long term development plans 
Our tax system favors the wealthy 
A cynical analysis of the world 11 (2 3 7 8) 
Now is just another form of colonization 




These international pressures are keeping Guatemala in a bad situation 
Land has been passed to communities but then taken over by powerful external interests 
Land being used for African Palm–taken away by force from communities.  The land is not 
protected from these interests 
Powerful players still controlling the land 
Global inequality is growing 
Third world debt is increasing   
Currently we have the capacity to destroy our world 
The state continues to represent powerful economic and political forces 
These problems transcend Guatemala 
Recent positive government changes 3 (1 6) 
Have successfully negotiated to decrease the interest on the land, due to President Colom 
But this current government is still way better than the others 
This is the first government in which we have a bit of trust or confidence 
There was some success 4 (2 4 5 6) 
We were successful in negotiating a number of accords that benefitted all of Guatemala 
The process was a success 
We succeeded in all aspects 
It was a success and a failure 
Debt 10 (1 2 4 6 7 8) 
Expressing fear of losing everything 
Challenges:  debt 




The end result:  a huge mortgage for us 
Result of our decreased ability to negotiate is our high interest rate on our land 
I’m still afraid because the land is not paid for.  Are they going to kick us out? 
The land was not negotiated well.  We were charged way too much and now we have a big 
debt.  We didn’t have the know-how to negotiate 
For example, our housing and our land debt 
We didn’t receive a good deal, as evidenced by our houses and our land debt 
An example is our land purchase and our debt 
Lessons Learned (76) 
We didn’t negotiate well 8 (3 5 7) 
Need to work for justice for all our people in Guatemala 
Cooperation is tricky.  It depends who is in the driver’s seat  
Need to work for all society, not just for those negotiating 
As a result, we didn’t get what we had thought we negotiated.  Be careful of this 
Don’t blame the UN for these shortcomings 
I don’t blame the UN 
We need to lay some blame on our own leaders, who negotiated poorly 
We didn’t represent ourselves and our demands well enough 
Stay united 14 (1 2 3 4 6 7 8) 
Have to have clear ideals and be clear on where you are going.  Being organized kept us 
alive 
You will accomplish more if you work together 
Live collectively to solve you problems.  We struggled together in the armed conflict, we 




Stay together to solve your problems 
The enemy is powerful 
Can’t create conditions where we depend on only one or two people 
The most important advice:  stay united 
Work together for the common good 
We need to change this type of cooperation.  Being organized will help 
We need to teach our youth how to move forward 
We would be more prepared and organized 
Need to organize yourselves 
We need the group power to solve the problems 
It is difficult to challenge or compete with the powerful 
Need to be in charge of the process 9 (2 7 8) 
We have to help ourselves, no one else can do it for us 
Need to solve our own problems 
We need to solve our own problems 
What I learned–don’t wait for others to do things for you, or for others to get to know  
you 
Need to understand that someone else may see things differently 
No one has a monopoly on truth 
There are different ways to view things 
Outsiders have different perspectives than us 
It’s better when outsiders facilitate our future, rather than imposing it. 




Seek alliances with others in the same boat 
We could have collaborated with the Zapatistas and the FMLN in El Salvador 
Can use other points of view from others in the same situation 
Need to know what you’re getting into 12 (5 6 7) 
Hoping that others have say in how peace will be operationalized 
Didn’t have enough time to analyze the deal 
You need a lot of tact.  You need to be careful, as important things can fall through the cracks 
This lack of knowledge may happen to other ex-combatants 
Need to be very cautious 
If only we knew then what we know now 
Make sure your process is open and with a socio-economic vision, not just bandaid solutions 
Make sure the peace process is open 
Know where you want to go 
Have a clear process and strategy 
Before demobilizing, develop your strategy 
Be clear on what you want to accomplish 
Integrate with the locals 4 (7) 
Need to get involved in local politics 
Seek relations, seek friendship 
Make the first move 
Don’t isolate yourself 




Need to negotiate well, perhaps get a few things accomplished before signing and handing 
in your weapons 
Think very carefully before signing any peace accords.  Need to make sure the government 
will come through with their promises 
You don’t win the war by signing the peace accords.  You more likely lose, and giving up 
your arms makes you give up your power   
The minute we handed in our arms, they forgot the accords 
Their only aim was to silence the guerrillas 
Need to form mechanisms to verify the completion of any accords 
No mechanism to verify whether the accords were actualized 
Need to build in mechanism to verify completion of accords. They signed a whole bunch of 
things but did not deliver.  This happened because we did not have experience. 
Struggle through nonviolence 6 (2 3 5) 
People who fight back are not terrorists 
Dialogue is preferred method 
Revolution does not mean violence. To work towards developing society–giving power to 
the people 
It’s better to use dialogue and now we are able to do this 
Seek dialogue over violence 
There will always be conflict, it’s part of being human, but hopefully we can avoid war 
Hard Work is necessary 2 (2) 
In order to move ahead you need to want to move ahead 
Need to be prepared for the obstacles 
Apathy, cynicism  3 (2 8) 




There is no will from those in power to address the social violence 
Our greed and hate will lead us to destruction 
Need to have a good analysis of the causes of war and conflict 7 (2 3 8) 
We don’t want agreements that will disadvantage us.  The US is very powerful.  Problems 
arise when people’s rights are not respected.  People will fight back 
The Guatemalan struggle begins with the stomach.  The struggle begins with acquiring land 
When you understand the causes, you can find the cure 
When seeking peace, need to look at the structural causes of the conflict 
Inequality is a common cause of conflict throughout the world 
Without injustice and inequality, there would be no war 
Miscellaneous (63) 
Coding that does not relate to the research question 










Appendix C:  Developing a Two-Dimensional 
Framework 
 
a) Developing themes 
The 50 secondary codes have been categorized into the following 5 themes. 
b)  Consequences of Reintegration:  Reflecting on the concept of success 
Those secondary codes that came under the category of “Consequences” in Part Two 
(16 in total), are highlighted either red or green.  These 16 codes reflect the 
interviewees’ thoughts on how the process of reintegration turned out.  The bolded 
codes (10) reflect the idea that the reintegration process was positive or 
“successful”, while the italicized codes (6) reflect the idea that the reintegration 
process was negative or “not successful”. 
 
Being United 
 Being organized/working together 
 We were organized 
 We remain united 
 Stay united 
 Had nothing 
 Difficult conditions 
Being Autonomous 
 Need strong mechanisms to implement peace accords 
 In touch with our history 
 Took charge 




 Don’t rely on the state for anything 
 We didn’t negotiate well 
 Need to be in charge of the process 
 Need to know what you’re getting into 
 Need to have a good analysis of the causes of war and conflict 
 Poor leadership/representation 
 Employment still a problem 
Inadequate formal process 
 Feeling vulnerable 
 Feeling forgotten/abandoned 
 Feeling betrayed/let down 
 No skills for civil life 
Debt 
Being Connected 
 Work with other ex-combatants 
 Integrate with the locals 
 Received a lot of outside help and recognition 
 Reached out to neighbours 
 Working with people from other countries 
 Re-integrated with our neighbours 
 Feeling judged 





 Still engaged in political struggle 
 Used our knowledge from the war 
 Non-violence 
 Ideological framework 
 Hope 
Struggle through nonviolence 
Violence continues, just a different type 
Recent positive government changes 
The repression has stopped 
 
Being a role model 
 Building community infrastructure (2) 
 Hard work 
 Hard work is necessary 
 Learning a skill 
 Positive attitude 
 Apathy, cynicism  
 A cynical analysis of the world 
 Life is good 
 There was some success 
  





Appendix D:  Summary for Member Checking 
(English and Spanish versions) 
Desde la Guerra Hasta la Paz:  La Experiencia de la Transición de los ex-
combatientes Guatemaltecos: 
Summary of Interviews 
Dear Participant: 
Since the interviews in December, 2009, I have analyzed the thoughts and reflections 
and have made a collective summary of what was said.  At this point, I request that 
you read this summary and provide me with feedback regarding whether you 
believe it accurately reflects your thought about the reintegration of the ex-
combatants who live in NH. 
Part 1:  Themes 
In analyzing the responses to what reintegration was like, five themes emerged. 
Being united  
 Being autonomous (taking charge of the reintegration process) 
Being connected (establishing connections with their neighbours and 
international partners) 
Being visionary (maintaining an ideology of social and economic justice for 
Guatemala) 
Being a role model (working hard to build a community, exemplifying good 
citizenship)  
The first theme, being united, was the foundation which facilitated the other themes 





According to my analysis, the reintegration process was partially successful and 
partially unsuccessful.  Being united and working collectively made the process 
more successful than if combatants had have re-integrated individually.  Success 
was characterized by open political space, the building of Nuevo Horizonte, 
(including the schools, health centre, projects, etc.), building relationships with 
neighbors, and the end of the war.  Lack of success was characterized by no change 
in the social and economic reality of Guatemala, and the debt on the land.   
Part 3:  summary of the reintegration process 
During the reintegration process, the Guatemalan ex-combatants were particularly 
vulnerable.  The strategies they used to re-integrate were tied to their unique vision 
of reintegrating collectively rather than individually.  Five themes emerged from 
their reflection on the process of reintegration:  being united, being autonomous, 
being connected with the world around them, being visionary, and being a role 
model.   Being united was their foundational theme which facilitated their ability to 
take charge of their reintegration process (being autonomous), reintegrate with 
their neighbours (being connected), continuing to struggle for social justice (being 
visionary) and building a community from nothing (being a role model).  These 
themes have guided their lives for the past 13 years, and have led to significant, but 
not complete success.  These five strategies enabled them to be much more 
successful than they would have been as individuals, but were not able to transform 
those concerns (such as macro social and economic justice) which were beyond 
their sphere of collective influence.     
Part 4:  advice for others in the DDR process: 
The following is a summary of the advice that should be given to other ex-
combatants entering the DDR process: 
  Make sure the process is transparent 
  Negotiate well 
Make sure there is a mechanism to ensure the peace accords are 
completed 





Desde la Guerra Hasta la Paz:  La Experiencia de la Transición de los ex-
combatientes Guatemaltecos: 
Resumen de las Entrevistas 
Estimado Participante: 
Después de llevar a cabo las entrevistas en Diciembre, las he analizado y he hecho 
un resumen de los ideas y las reflexiones  sobre el proceso colectivo de le 
reintegración de la gente de Nuevo Horizonte. Ahora, quisiera que pudieran leer 
este resumen y decirme si mi comprensión es justa.   
Parte 1:  Los Temas 
Durante mi análisis de las entrevistas, emergieron algunos temas del proceso de la 
reintegración.  Los temas representan los estrategias que eran los mas importantes 
para los excombatientes: 
1.  Ser Unidos 
2. Ser autónomos (estando a cargo del proceso de la reintegración) 
3. Estar conectados (con los vecinos, organizaciones internacionales) 
4. Tener una visión solidaria (siguiendo con la lucha) 
5. Ser un modelo ejemplar (trabajando para construir una comunidad 
ejemplar social y económica) 
 
El primer tema (Ser Unidos) fue fundamental, puesto que contribuyó al surgimiento 














Parte 2:  Fue exitoso o no? 
Según mi análisis, el proceso de reintegración fue en parte un éxito, y el ser unidos 
y trabajar de una manera colectiva contribuyó al éxito de la reintegración.  Ejemplos 
del éxito fueron obtener espacios políticos, la creación de la Cooperativa Nuevo 
Horizonte (con escuelas, centro de salud, guardería etcétera), establecer relaciones 
con los vecinos, y la terminación de la guerra y la violencia política.  Por el 
contrario,  la realidad social y económica Guatemalteca, la violencia social, y la 
deuda de la cooperativa fueron ejemplos que el proceso no fue completamente 
exitoso.    
Parte 3:  Resumen del Proceso de la Reintegración  
Durante el proceso de la reintegración, los ex-combatientes guatemaltecos estaban 
en una posición de vulnerabilidad.  Las estrategias para re-integrarse estaban 
relacionadas con su gran visión de reintegrarse de una manera colectiva, en vez de 
hacerlo individualmente.  Cinco temas (o estrategias) surgieron de su reflexión:  ser 
unidos, ser autónomos, estar conectados, tener una visión solidaria, y ser un modelo 
ejemplar.  Ser unidos fue fundamental puesto que facilitó su capaz de estar a cargo 
del proceso de reintegración (ser autónomos) establecer relaciones con sus vecinos 
(estar conectados), seguir con la lucha socio-económica (tener una visión solidaria) 














Estos temas han guiado sus vidas por los últimos 13 anos, y han contribuido a 
muchos éxitos (pero no a todos).  Sin embargo, estos temas (o estas estrategias) han 
contribuido mucho al proceso de la reintegración, y mucho mas por ser unidos. Sin 
embargo, estas estrategias  no fueran suficientes para transformar los problemas 
(por ejemplo, la justicia económica nacional) que estuvo fuera de su alcance de su 
influencia. 
Parte 4:  Consejos para los otros ex-combatientes en el proceso de DDR 
Los siguientes consejos son los mas importantes de los ex-combatientes de Nuevo 
Horizonte: 
  Ser unidos 
  Tener un proceso claro 
  Estar a cargo del proceso  
Asegurar que haya mecanismos en los acuerdos para asegurarse que 
estos se cumplan 
  Relacionarse con otra excombatientes que viven la misma situación 
  Integrarse en la población  
No esperanzarse en el gobierno o en cualquier otra organización–
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